Profile of GFXlabs in Optimism

Posts by GFXlabs

• GFX Labs - Delegate Communication Thread by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Oct. 30, 2024, 1:02 p.m.
  Content: 2 Polls Closing October 30 , 2024 Governor Update Proposal # 3 : Enable Onchain Treasury Execution Summary: This poll asks OP holders if they support moving the treasury to onchain execution rather than management by a multisig. This new capability extends only towards OP portion of the treasury. This includes 3 -day timelock; audit report can be found here. Recommendation: Vote For. This is a tiny step, and certainly not sufficient to satisfy ourselves or the other delegates who, combined, signed a petition to accelerate decentralization. 17 , 000 , 000 OP currently stands in support of that petition. This proposal still requires Foundation permission to post a proposal, allowing them to keep a de facto veto. It also does not address the much more valuable ETH owed to governance. Overall, we find it disappointing that this appears to be the single item granted (if it even counts, given the permissioned nature of how it will work) on the extensive list that delegates requested. It’s beyond frustrating that Foundation feels the need to oversee governance spending, but governance is not allowed to oversee Foundation spending. It’s also ironic, given that governance is by far the smaller spender of OP tokens. Season 6 : Standard Rollup Charter Ratification Summary: This poll asks OP holders if they support ratifying changes to the Standard Rollup Charter (full text found here 1 ). Recommendation: Vote For. We don’t think this charter is as clear on some points as it should be, such as revenue sharing details, but we also acknowledge that it is an aspirational document, and has no legal, social, or other binding obligations on governance. Just like the Law of Chains more broadly, these are more guidelines to begin and maintain conversations with potential partners, and to our reading, in no way constrains the degrees of freedom of Optimism governance.
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• Superchain Product Vision by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Oct. 10, 2024, 12:46 p.m.
  Content: system: Governance creates a flywheel of sustainable growth and development Governance incentivizes the development and maintenance of public goods that benefit all OP Chains, application developers, or users Governance supports the growth of the Superchain economy, and makes sustainable economy policy decisions such as inflation and resource allocation The big outstanding question is around business model. Superchain – once increasing levels of interoperability are implemented – is a good product design. But we would like to see more thought into the business design since this has to be financially sustainable. Assuming technical interoperability comes sooner rather than later, the big longterm question is what benefit do OP tokenholders see from dilution-financing hundreds of millions of dollars in grants and investments on chains outside of Optimism mainnet? In our opinion, sequencer revenue sharing is a melting ice cube – it will trend towards zero over time. We do believe Optimism needs to avoid being locked into a strategy where this is the only way to monetize a relationship with Superchain members. It would shock us if Superchain members themselves are not already debating how to ultimately monetize their chains in ways that are unrelated to the sequencer fees. Unfortunately, this is a topic that needs to be settled now – so that Superchain members are understanding of what the longterm relationship with Optimism will be, and so that OP tokenholders are still entitled to a share of the financial success of other chains even if sequencer fees become inconsequential. If we were to launch an L 2 , we would certainly sign up for Superchain membership for access to grants, future interoperability, etc, and would absolutely have a plan other than sequencer fees to realize a return. As very large blocks of grants flow out to Superchain members from both the Foundation and the Grants Council, this needs to be a settled question: What is in this for OP holders if the member chains have – by design or necessity – close to no sequencer fees? We understand this post was a product vision rather than a business strategy, but it needs to be set in the context of financial reality. Tokenholders need to see a plan to navigate through that reality without endless dilution of the OP token to finance what could be competitor chains if either the technical (via interop) and economic (via revenue sharing agreements) are not executed upon perfectly.
  Likes: 8 Replies: 1
  Likers: Capt_Mal, alexsotodigital, upperdeck, 0x666, cap, pfedprog, Tane, Bashir
  Replies:

  • alexsotodigital: Hi! Excited to see this kind of vision-centered communication, something so important for creating alignment and often overlooked. As a product vision, I find the perspective presented super interesting and appealing. Although I confess that at times I don’t fully grasp the specifics of what is being described. Am I alone on that? And BTW, to address this comment… GFXlabs: Superchain – once increasing levels of interoperability are implemented – is a good product design. But we would like to see more thought into the business design since this has to be financially sustainable. I want to thank @GFXlabs for not letting go of the thread and for asking the necessary questions. But I agree that this post was a product vision rather than a business strategy… so I’d like to point out that I’ve started a new thread to collectively address the big outstanding question around the business model. I also want to acknowledge the OP foundation @system for keeping communication open and clarifying the source vision. I celebrate that governance is being highlighted. As a wannabe-govNERD, it seems to me () that ‘governance’ is becoming our biggest value proposition to such an extent that the ‘business model’ thing could precisely be solved by offering our built capacities to other organizations as a form of consultancy, providing ‘governance-as-a-service’. It could range from ensuring the safety of user funds (and all the technical implications in protocol updates) to facilitating feedback sessions and agreement building (understanding that governance is also present throughout that entire process). While it may not be the solution we dream of, since it isn’t automatable or a ‘passive income’, It’s a model with potential, especially if we think about the DAO-ification that organizations of the future will undergo. Moreover, it is based on person-to-person work (which can be a positive in a world full of AIs). As the pillar of pragmatism says, “sometimes, the best solution isn’t the prettiest one.”
• [GF: Phase 0 Proposal] Synapse Protocol by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Oct. 9, 2024, 5:02 p.m.
  Content: @maxbronstein is there an update on this grant? It looks like the 1 m OP was distributed to an alternative address on March 24 , 2023 : 0 x 2431 CBdc 0792 F 5485 c 4 cb 0 a 9 bEf 06 C 4 f 21541 D 52 On March 26 , 2023 , 850 , 000 OP was then sent to this address, which appears to be a deposit address with Cumberland: 0 x 450 F 82319 f 940936 F 1 f 4 F 253 B 468 c 3 e 6 E 566 Cdd 5 That 850 k OP was transferred to 0 xad 6 eaa 735 D 9 dF 3 D 7696 fd 03984379 dAE 02 eD 8862 on March 27 , 2023 . That address is tagged as Cumberland on both Arkham and Etherscan. It looks as though you immediately sold 850 k OP tokens rather than use them for the stated purpose. Would you please return the remaining 150 k OP tokens from your 1 m OP grant?
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• GFX Labs - Delegate Communication Thread by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Oct. 8, 2024, 8:15 a.m.
  Content: 1 Poll Closing October 9 , 2024 Rolling Mission Requests: Voting Cycle 28 Summary: This poll asks OP holders if they support creation of new Mission Requests. There is only one proposed Mission Request this cycle: Mission Request Request 1 : Increase Prevalence of Non-USD/EURO Stablecoins Recommendation: Vote Mission Request Request 1 : Increase Prevalence of Non-USD/EURO Stablecoins. This mission targets a vertical that has not yet become established, much less dominated by a competing chain. The total budget is 15 , 000 OP, which also makes this a low-risk RFP to craft.
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• [Mission Request] Optimism Dominance in Yield-Bearing Assets (3 of 4) by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Sept. 30, 2024, 3:13 p.m.
  Content: It should be following the standard process where the applicant clears compliance with Foundation and then gets the first tranche of the grant. So speed of deployment probably is a function of compliance backlog + applicant’s speed at implanting. @Gonna.eth may know if there’s a public dash to see if/when individual grant tranches have been distributed to applicants.
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• Accelerated Decentralization Proposal For Optimism by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Sept. 25, 2024, 6:50 a.m.
  Content: OPUser: However, at present, anyone can submit a proposal in this open forum. We want to point out that this is not correct. Proposals are permissioned by the Foundation and also are subject to fitting within certain categories of approved proposal type. Also, these two statements are contradictory: OPUser: The Foundation takes a backseat, while we lead the way. OPUser: We haven’t yet onboarded other members of the superchain, which I believe will happen in the next season Superchain members often receive substantial grants of OP tokens from the Foundation, and neither membership nor those initial grants is not subject to governance approval. Leuts: I would be curious for GFX to provide comparisons on how more trust-minimized DAOs such as Arbitrum are performing in key categories against Optimism, including as mentioned above. This would be a very long conversation in and of itself, but we would characterize Arbitrum as more nimble and energetic since it can capture bottom-up ideas quickly and act on them, but this does come at the cost of substantial waste in spending. Optimism would have the benefit of already having a structured governance system in place, while Arbitrum started largely from the primordial ooze and has had to evolve in real time. Leuts: Others like Lido, Aave, Maker seem to be the darlings of DAOs but are of course not chains. GFX’s time at Maker is one of the main drivers of the desire to decentralize while we can. Maker is as tightly controlled as any centralized company, and is a perfect example of why decentralization is needed. Thank you to everyone who has commented so far. And if you’ve not yet done so, please signal your desire for accelerated decentralization on this Snapshot petition. 17
  Likes: 6 Replies: 0
  Likers: 0xR, web3magnetic, Alec.eth, 0xDonPepe, Juanbug_PGov, chaselb
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• Accelerated Decentralization Proposal For Optimism by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Sept. 23, 2024, 1:21 p.m.
  Content: cp 0 x-AlexQ: Did @GFXlabs specifically set the end date until 2026 ? So that this voting would always be in progress? It’s a petition, not a proposal. All proposals must be approved by the Foundation, which should illustrate the need for this slate of reforms. cp 0 x-AlexQ: Voting is a basic right and giving delegates the opportunity to speak out, including by initiating a vote - should be an inalienable right (with an adjustment for the presence of a certain number of OP tokens) We agree, and the ability to push a proposal to a vote is one of the main points of contention where discussions broke down before presenting this plan publicly. Thank you for the support!
  Likes: 2 Replies: 0
  Likers: Alec.eth, ml_sudo
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• [Mission Request] Optimism Dominance in Yield-Bearing Assets (3 of 4) by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Sept. 19, 2024, 11:06 a.m.
  Content: pete: Please whitelist superOETHo as we intend to replicate the Super OETH success on Optimism and anticipate incredible growth. The Grants Council will discuss internally, and if an update to the whitelist is made, we will notify you.
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• Accelerated Decentralization Proposal For Optimism by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Sept. 18, 2024, 5:30 p.m.
  Content: It’s wonderful the Foundation has taken the time to address the priorities laid out above in detail. Some of them do require some additional context for readers, or prompt a request for more clarification. system: In regards to the ability for delegates to submit proposals for a vote, we don’t believe it is safe to put the entire Governance Fund onchain with permissionless proposal rights while the cost of governance attack is currently lower than the value of the Governance Fund. This is a dynamic many DAOs currently face but that we can avoid while we work to increase votable supply (and we’ve hired someone to focus exclusively on doing this.) However, Agora has shipped a new feature that allows any delegate to draft a proposal in the voting UI. Drafts will still need to follow a valid proposal type and receive the required delegate approvals to move to a vote. We don’t feel this is the case. Optimism’s governance structure, with the Citizens’ House and Security Council, has fairly robust checks and balances compared to most DAOs. Additionally, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to discuss the Foundation retaining some form of veto rights that it could actively exercise over certain sorts of proposals. system: We don’t currently believe there is a strategic need for the DAO to manage ETH while the DAO has access to the + 150 M OP Governance Fund and the + 800 M OP Retro Fund. This is also a responsibility that should come online alongside a comprehensive framework for managing the treasury, governing the macroeconomic policies of the Collective, and measuring the efficacy of capital allocation. These are all important governance responsibilities that are under or poorly defined in most other systems. We agree with the sentiment that the near term priority should be on the more technical aspects listed above rather than transition of these responsibilities. There is a very strong strategic need for governance to have these funds. Firstly, under the Foundation’s custody, this ETH is like a fallow farm field. None of the substantial ETH is staked, either through a service or directly staked. It is clear that there is some hesitancy on the part of the Foundation that makes them skittish about picking such low-hanging fruit. Let governance assume this risk, and offload it from the Foundation. Secondly, and more importantly, Optimism suffers under a competitive disadvantage versus other grants programs, in that any grantee being directly compensated has their funds locked for 12 months. This is because they are paid in OP tokens, which are also volatile in price. Having access to this ETH would allow these grants – currently forcing grantees to be illiquid and long OP tokens for a year – to be made with ETH or stables, neither of which presumably require a 12 -month vesting. Currently, grants that must be locked regularly have to overpay for services or attract lower quality counterparties, and governance control over this ETH would remedy this. system: We agree that all Protocol Upgrades—of which L 1 Escrow contracts are among the highest stakes—are decisions for governance to make. However, since this post alludes to “utilizing” the bridge funds, we feel an obligation to express our strongly held viewpoint that such appropriation of user assets would represent an existential threat to Optimism’s social contract, business reputation, and long-term viability. Tactically speaking, it is a clear violation of the key User Protection to State Transition and Message Validity outlined in the Law of Chains . Strategically speaking, the Collective is in the business of providing neutral, scalable blockspace. No matter how alluring it may be to move user assets, deposited with the clear expectation of being fully custodied in a known escrow contract, into a different smart contract—even a relatively low-risk one—the long-term erosion of trust which would accompany such violation of expectations outweighs any short-term sustainability improvements which might come with it. We think this option should remain open. We and others have lost faith in the current business model of relying upon sequencer revenue, both from Optimism and Superchain members. We fully expect sequencer revenues to trend down over time as L 2 s must remain competitive with both each other and mainnet. This means the revenue may not allow Optimism to be sustainable, and also that other Superchain members will have an incentive to pioneer new ways to see returns on their investments, since Optimism gets 15 % of sequencer revenues. Already we see ultra-low-fee Superchain members where sequencer revenue may never materialize in any meaningful way. Users have shown little aversion to conservative bridge asset management. Gnosis, Blast, and others serve as examples. Polygon may be the first of the “major” chains to experiment with this, as they are fielding proposals currently. That should serve as a good test of whether users react negatively and can inform any future plans. But there are no plans at present. We believe it’s the responsible thing to do to keep options open, though. system: We would also like to reinforce that the Law of Chains is a critical governing document, which was ratified by the Token House. The Law of Chains also plays a pivotal role in onboarding OP Chains to join the Superchain, which is the sustainable way to drive revenue for the Collective. The Law of Chains does not irrevocably bind Token House or governance as a whole. It even says so: But Participant Protections are not, and do not create, legal rights, or corresponding legal obligations. They are not absolutely guaranteed to any ecosystem participant. The Law of Chains is a set of guidelines. It is not a contract. 3 Governance approved it, and governance can change it. It is also specifically intended to be a living document, and will require regular updating and re-ratification to remain relevant. As stated upthread, we do not have faith that sequencer revenue sharing will long-term provide the return that OP tokenholders require to justify holding the asset. system: We think sharing more plans on the timeline suggested is a reasonable goal. It feels worth flagging now that this will be a long burn — decentralized sequencing protocols are still rapidly evolving, but even beyond the tech itself, have deep economic and strategic implications for the Superchain and its partners. As such, we think holding the sequencer accountable to governance is the correct short-term focus. This is an entirely reasonable response, and we’re happy to see it. system: Although the budget with which the Foundation makes these grants was part of the initial token distribution, and is therefore not subject to detailed disclosure, we are supportive of greater disclosure around the Foundation’s expenditures. However: This is another area where Optimism lags behind peers. Consider beginning with a level of disclosure similar to The Arbitrum Foundation, and working out from there to meet this goal. See this example: Screenshot 2024 - 09 - 18 at 5 . 21 . 13 PM 1564 × 1162 121 KB (The footnote leads to a table 7 of projects that have received grants, though not with amounts.) Compare to the Optimism Foundation 3 , which does not readily make available lists of grants made at the discretion of the Foundation. system: As stated above, this is a very important topic and this post has started a very important conversation. We look forward to continuing to engage in many more constructive and collaborative conversations on this topic as we work to progress on this path as a Collective. 100 % agree, and we are excited to move forward on this together. We view the Foundation and Labs as parents to governance. Just as there is sometimes tension when a child has grown up, and the parents need time to adjust to the new dynamic, we understand it can be difficult to let go of the reins. The Foundation has done a wonderful job raising governance, but governance has matured, and it’s time to begin the transition from Foundation overseeing governance to governance being a full partner in developing and growing Optimism. If you hold OP, please signal your approval of this accelerated decentralization on this Snapshot petition. 15
  Likes: 6 Replies: 1
  Likers: Griff, brichis, jacq, alexsotodigital, kohei, Thequimera
  Replies:

  • alexsotodigital: Hi! After reading this thread, I realize that concrete actions are already being taken to follow up on the various proposals that have been presented. Wanting to avoid repeating what more capable people have already expressed, I’ll set the topic of ‘decentralization’ aside; understanding that we are all aligned with the intention, and it’s just the details of the implementation that differ. ACC: The ACC members discussed with Foundation that there are concrete proposals for decentralization coming up in the next few Voting Cycles and gradually but surely, more control is being ceded to governance in a progressive manner. To this effect, the Petition for Accelerated Decentralization felt like a timing issue while we are all on the same path towards decentralization. And yet, I believe this conversation has highlighted a different topic: revenue opportunities for the Collective, beyond sequencing revenues. SEEDGov: The discussion on revenue opportunities for the Collective, beyond sequencing revenues (which remain unresolved), warrants deeper analysis considering the design of Superchain. Especially if we consider that the trend is for that revenue source to decrease over time. AnthiasLabs: The value proposition of the Superchain may be correct, but we, along with other delegates, continue to maintain the thesis that sequencer fees are going to 0. And I believe that coming up with possible solutions is a responsibility of the collective rather than the foundation. GFXlabs: We view the Foundation and Labs as parents to governance. Just as there is sometimes tension when a child has grown up, and the parents need time to adjust to the new dynamic, we understand it can be difficult to let go of the reins. In other words, if we continue with the analogy of parenthood, I’d say we need to demonstrate our maturity and capability by taking proactive steps in this matter, rather than waiting for someone else to solve it in the future. What do we do about it? For the sake of order, I suggest opening a new thread to focus on ‘revenue opportunities’ without diverting this one from its initial focus (which is the pace at which we should decentralize operations). I’m not aware if there are other conversations about this, but at least it wasn’t evident to me when searching the forum. I leave this post here, inviting anyone who wants to participate in a 'Collective Proposal Creation’ to brainstorm and synthesize some paths to address this concern. I hope my suggestion is appropriate. Thank you in advance for your comments in the thread.
• Accelerated Decentralization Proposal For Optimism by GFXlabs - No Role
  Posted on: Sept. 18, 2024, 5:30 p.m.
  Content: It’s wonderful the Foundation has taken the time to address the priorities laid out above in detail. Some of them do require some additional context for readers, or prompt a request for more clarification. system: In regards to the ability for delegates to submit proposals for a vote, we don’t believe it is safe to put the entire Governance Fund onchain with permissionless proposal rights while the cost of governance attack is currently lower than the value of the Governance Fund. This is a dynamic many DAOs currently face but that we can avoid while we work to increase votable supply (and we’ve hired someone to focus exclusively on doing this.) However, Agora has shipped a new feature that allows any delegate to draft a proposal in the voting UI. Drafts will still need to follow a valid proposal type and receive the required delegate approvals to move to a vote. We don’t feel this is the case. Optimism’s governance structure, with the Citizens’ House and Security Council, has fairly robust checks and balances compared to most DAOs. Additionally, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to discuss the Foundation retaining some form of veto rights that it could actively exercise over certain sorts of proposals. system: We don’t currently believe there is a strategic need for the DAO to manage ETH while the DAO has access to the + 150 M OP Governance Fund and the + 800 M OP Retro Fund. This is also a responsibility that should come online alongside a comprehensive framework for managing the treasury, governing the macroeconomic policies of the Collective, and measuring the efficacy of capital allocation. These are all important governance responsibilities that are under or poorly defined in most other systems. We agree with the sentiment that the near term priority should be on the more technical aspects listed above rather than transition of these responsibilities. There is a very strong strategic need for governance to have these funds. Firstly, under the Foundation’s custody, this ETH is like a fallow farm field. None of the substantial ETH is staked, either through a service or directly staked. It is clear that there is some hesitancy on the part of the Foundation that makes them skittish about picking such low-hanging fruit. Let governance assume this risk, and offload it from the Foundation. Secondly, and more importantly, Optimism suffers under a competitive disadvantage versus other grants programs, in that any grantee being directly compensated has their funds locked for 12 months. This is because they are paid in OP tokens, which are also volatile in price. Having access to this ETH would allow these grants – currently forcing grantees to be illiquid and long OP tokens for a year – to be made with ETH or stables, neither of which presumably require a 12 -month vesting. Currently, grants that must be locked regularly have to overpay for services or attract lower quality counterparties, and governance control over this ETH would remedy this. system: We agree that all Protocol Upgrades—of which L 1 Escrow contracts are among the highest stakes—are decisions for governance to make. However, since this post alludes to “utilizing” the bridge funds, we feel an obligation to express our strongly held viewpoint that such appropriation of user assets would represent an existential threat to Optimism’s social contract, business reputation, and long-term viability. Tactically speaking, it is a clear violation of the key User Protection to State Transition and Message Validity outlined in the Law of Chains . Strategically speaking, the Collective is in the business of providing neutral, scalable blockspace. No matter how alluring it may be to move user assets, deposited with the clear expectation of being fully custodied in a known escrow contract, into a different smart contract—even a relatively low-risk one—the long-term erosion of trust which would accompany such violation of expectations outweighs any short-term sustainability improvements which might come with it. We think this option should remain open. We and others have lost faith in the current business model of relying upon sequencer revenue, both from Optimism and Superchain members. We fully expect sequencer revenues to trend down over time as L 2 s must remain competitive with both each other and mainnet. This means the revenue may not allow Optimism to be sustainable, and also that other Superchain members will have an incentive to pioneer new ways to see returns on their investments, since Optimism gets 15 % of sequencer revenues. Already we see ultra-low-fee Superchain members where sequencer revenue may never materialize in any meaningful way. Users have shown little aversion to conservative bridge asset management. Gnosis, Blast, and others serve as examples. Polygon may be the first of the “major” chains to experiment with this, as they are fielding proposals currently. That should serve as a good test of whether users react negatively and can inform any future plans. But there are no plans at present. We believe it’s the responsible thing to do to keep options open, though. system: We would also like to reinforce that the Law of Chains is a critical governing document, which was ratified by the Token House. The Law of Chains also plays a pivotal role in onboarding OP Chains to join the Superchain, which is the sustainable way to drive revenue for the Collective. The Law of Chains does not irrevocably bind Token House or governance as a whole. It even says so: But Participant Protections are not, and do not create, legal rights, or corresponding legal obligations. They are not absolutely guaranteed to any ecosystem participant. The Law of Chains is a set of guidelines. It is not a contract. Governance approved it, and governance can change it. It is also specifically intended to be a living document, and will require regular updating and re-ratification to remain relevant. As stated upthread, we do not have faith that sequencer revenue sharing will long-term provide the return that OP tokenholders require to justify holding the asset. system: We think sharing more plans on the timeline suggested is a reasonable goal. It feels worth flagging now that this will be a long burn — decentralized sequencing protocols are still rapidly evolving, but even beyond the tech itself, have deep economic and strategic implications for the Superchain and its partners. As such, we think holding the sequencer accountable to governance is the correct short-term focus. This is an entirely reasonable response, and we’re happy to see it. system: Although the budget with which the Foundation makes these grants was part of the initial token distribution, and is therefore not subject to detailed disclosure, we are supportive of greater disclosure around the Foundation’s expenditures. However: This is another area where Optimism lags behind peers. Consider beginning with a level of disclosure similar to The Arbitrum Foundation, and working out from there to meet this goal. See this example: Screenshot 2024 - 09 - 18 at 5 . 21 . 13 PM 1564 × 1162 121 KB (The footnote leads to a table of projects that have received grants, though not with amounts.) Compare to the Optimism Foundation, which does not readily make available lists of grants made at the discretion of the Foundation. system: As stated above, this is a very important topic and this post has started a very important conversation. We look forward to continuing to engage in many more constructive and collaborative conversations on this topic as we work to progress on this path as a Collective. 100 % agree, and we are excited to move forward on this together. We view the Foundation and Labs as parents to governance. Just as there is sometimes tension when a child has grown up, and the parents need time to adjust to the new dynamic, we understand it can be difficult to let go of the reins. The Foundation has done a wonderful job raising governance, but governance has matured, and it’s time to begin the transition from Foundation overseeing governance to governance being a full partner in developing and growing Optimism. If you hold OP, please signal your approval of this accelerated decentralization on this Snapshot petition.
  Likes: 6 Replies: 1
  Likers: Griff, brichis, jacq, alexsotodigital, kohei, Thequimera
  Replies:

  • alexsotodigital: Hi! After reading this thread, I realize that concrete actions are already being taken to follow up on the various proposals that have been presented. Wanting to avoid repeating what more capable people have already expressed, I’ll set the topic of ‘decentralization’ aside; understanding that we are all aligned with the intention, and it’s just the details of the implementation that differ. ACC: The ACC members discussed with Foundation that there are concrete proposals for decentralization coming up in the next few Voting Cycles and gradually but surely, more control is being ceded to governance in a progressive manner. To this effect, the Petition for Accelerated Decentralization felt like a timing issue while we are all on the same path towards decentralization. And yet, I believe this conversation has highlighted a different topic: revenue opportunities for the Collective, beyond sequencing revenues. SEEDGov: The discussion on revenue opportunities for the Collective, beyond sequencing revenues (which remain unresolved), warrants deeper analysis considering the design of Superchain. Especially if we consider that the trend is for that revenue source to decrease over time. AnthiasLabs: The value proposition of the Superchain may be correct, but we, along with other delegates, continue to maintain the thesis that sequencer fees are going to 0. And I believe that coming up with possible solutions is a responsibility of the collective rather than the foundation. GFXlabs: We view the Foundation and Labs as parents to governance. Just as there is sometimes tension when a child has grown up, and the parents need time to adjust to the new dynamic, we understand it can be difficult to let go of the reins. In other words, if we continue with the analogy of parenthood, I’d say we need to demonstrate our maturity and capability by taking proactive steps in this matter, rather than waiting for someone else to solve it in the future. What do we do about it? For the sake of order, I suggest opening a new thread to focus on ‘revenue opportunities’ without diverting this one from its initial focus (which is the pace at which we should decentralize operations). I’m not aware if there are other conversations about this, but at least it wasn’t evident to me when searching the forum. I leave this post here, inviting anyone who wants to participate in a 'Collective Proposal Creation’ to brainstorm and synthesize some paths to address this concern. I hope my suggestion is appropriate. Thank you in advance for your comments in the thread.