Profile of TokenBrice in Optimism
Posts by TokenBrice
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: Nov. 30, 2022, 1:23 p.m.
Content: First posted in July, this proposal has received extensive community feedback, and the situation for LUSD on Optimism evolved, leading to a sizeable update of the copy: A new safe has been deployed to manage the OP grant, now included as the “L 2 Recipient Address”. Liquidity incentives recentered around the LUSD/ETH pool. Updated LUSD market metrics Added mention of Stargate/LUSD released since: thus, the usage of OP as an incentive for bridge, the most controversial component of the proposal, has been removed. Added all missing entries required to match the template Other copy improvements The goal was to prepare it for the Committee Review, hoping it would be included in one of the next voting rounds.
Likes: 3
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 29, 2022, 8:47 a.m.
Content: Urgh sorry, I hadn’t enabled notifications on this post. Yes there is definitely interest! It seems like the template for proposals evolved, so I’ll adjust the format of this one ASAP.
Likes: 1
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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[READY][GF: Phase 1 Proposal] Velodrome Finance
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 29, 2022, 8:29 a.m.
Content: Hello here; glad to see a healthy discussion happening! I wanted to give some perspective on what those OP lock bonuses achieve from the point of view of a project involved in the Velodrome races. I am TokenBrice 2 , DeFi Strategist at Liquity, leading the charge on topics related to LUSD/LQTY liquidity strategies and integrations of LUSD within DeFi. We are currently leading various campaigns to sustain liquidity, whether on Curve, through Warden Bribes, or on Velodrome. In terms of the amount of liquidity sustained / $-invested, Velodrome is one to two orders of magnitude above the competition. Thanks to an initial 3 . 4 M veVELO position (protocol airdrop), compounded weekly to now ~ 4 . 5 M veVELO, Liquity can sustain about ~$ 6 . 3 M on four different pools (LUSD/sUSD, LUSD/USDC, LUSD/MAI, LUSD/USD+). Adding the OP lock bonus drove us to adjust our strategy, increasing the weekly locks to enhance our gauge supporting power while maximizing the reward. To put some numbers in perspective: 4 . 5 M veVELO (~$ 120 K) locked enable to support ~$ 6 M of stablecoin liquidity on Velodrome. (+some bribes from projects we work with that are re-injected as bribes again the following round) To direct 1 % of CRV emissions, you’d need to bribe either ~ 25 K a week or a ~ 5 M veCRV position costing ~$ 4 . 8 M. 1 % of CRV-gauge votes is enough to draw a ~ 3 % base APY to a $ 25 M TVL pool. Translating back above into similar terms, it means that to sustain a > 3 % base APY on a 6 M TVL stable Curve Pool you’d need roughly either 6 . 2 K weekly bribes ( 0 . 25 % total gauge voting) or 1 . 25 M veCRV ($ 1 . 2 M) I think those napkin maths illustrate what I meant by “one or two orders of magnitude above” when it comes to Velodrome’s efficiency for a project. Of course, there are other things to consider, and the comparison should be based on various dimensions. However, one of Velodrome’s core value propositions is enabling projects to attract and sustain liquidity efficiently. In that regard, it is delivering beyond what was expected: the OP veVELO locking bonus is a key part of the equation - increasing the efficiency of the flywheel even further. Besides, it drives projects to lock VELO, which means they enter a long-term commitment with Velodrome and Optimism. Hope this helps fuel the discussion, I am available if there are more questions about the impact of the OP-bonuses on the strategies projects involved in the races harness.
Likes: 7
Replies: 1
Replies:
- alexcutlerdoteth: Good Morning
Voting is coming up so we wanted to create a summary/guide of the discussion so far for those unable to parts through the record breaking 133 comments on the proposal.
Overview
Velodrome spent several weeks creating what is likely the detailed and evidenced proposal to be submitted to governance yet. If you have the time, please consider reading its in it’s entirety.
Since it’s posting 12 days ago it has received 133 comments from 31 commentators:
Positive Commentators: 17 (58%)
Mixed Commentators: 5 (17%)
Negative Commentators: 7 (24%)
As you can see, there are more positive commentators than negative and mixed commentators combined. Though it may be hard to tell from differentials in the volume of post:
2.4x more commentators were positive than negative
100% of comments from builders were positive
43% of negative commentators were from new accounts
Only 13% of positive comments were from new accounts
Notable Positive Comments
Since there are have been far more positive comments than negative ones on the proposal, we’ll start by highlighting a few positive ones that we think emphasize our impact well. You can also check out the testimonials we’ve collected from 10+ partners (and counting) on our Twitter.
Aes:
this is Aes from MakerDAO’s Strategic Finance Core Unit. Wanted to post in support of this proposal and the Velo team - they’ve been extremely patient, a pleasure to work with, and have been critical in analyzing how MakerDAO could best leverage the velo veNFT airdrop to maximize DAI’s liquidity on Optimism.
bebis:
There’s a lot of technical analysis going on here which I think distracts a bit from the value being added by the Velodrome team.
They’re on-boarding a ton of people the hard way - with actual customer/client services.
They’re getting teams and users invested long-term in the ecosystem’s success.
They’re the main Optimism point of contact if you’re a builder/developer.
Their bribing system makes operations much lighter for small teams and startups.
They’re doing the hard, high-effort stuff that most aren’t willing to. I’d consider any proposal they put forth extremely seriously.
SethVdL:
alexcutlerdoteth:
It would behoove us not to think of it in terms of this will cost $3.8m. But rather, it will return at least $7.6m to $11.4m in value based on the demonstrated performance of the original grant.
I am not one for long winded governance debates and even knowingly sat out on the Overtime discussion even though I sit on the Thales Council … That being said, I feel compelled to point out this statement from Alex because I feel the Velodrome ROI is in a class of it’s own and I want voters to understand what’s at stake … the system is working and it’s currently providing multiple protocols the opportunity to have deep liquidity for a fraction of the cost elsewhere. An approved grant to velodrome is like granting the entire ecosystem imo… which is what we are set out to do.
TokenBrice:
We are currently leading various campaigns to sustain liquidity, whether on Curve, through Warden Bribes, or on Velodrome. In terms of the amount of liquidity sustained / $-invested, Velodrome is one to two orders of magnitude above the competition.
…it is delivering beyond what was expected : the OP veVELO locking bonus is a key part of the equation - increasing the efficiency of the flywheel even further. Besides, it drives projects to lock VELO, which means they enter a long-term commitment with Velodrome and Optimism.
states_of_nature1651:
It seems like the main source of the criticisms is that the benefit for Optimism looks like this:
Optimism should be looking to cultivate the presence of legacy mainnet protocols rather than supporting OP native upstarts with flashy marketing and distortive incentives. Supporting deep liquidity on known legacy protocols will be better for OP in the long run. Putting our thumb on the scale for Velodrome will prevent this needed development.
I think this is a flawed argument based on the data provided and I don’t see how any other current ecosystem player will step in to fill the niche Velodrome is filling in the near term.
This isn’t a knock on the legacy protocols. Onboarding a bunch of new protocols to Optimism makes no sense for them as a growth strategy. This shows up If you look at their grant proposals. They are looking to extend their current competitive advantage on mainnet to Optimism - not get into the business Velodrome is in.
jornx:
I’ve been a long time user of Optimism and I use it frequently since I do a lot of arbitrage and other trading strategies on here…Optimism was never that interesting because liquidity was very limited on the main DEX at that time (uniswap). When Velodrome was added and especially when the OP grant was liquidity boomed and there were a lot more projects with deep liquidity on Optimism.When I look at all the grants that have been given by OP in my opinion Velodrome must have been one of the most succesful, onboarding new users and creating more possibilities for the user on the network.
Key Discussion Points
While negative and mixed commenters have represented a minority of the total engagement on the proposal, questions and concerns they’ve raised have allowed us to discuss and clarify key points on our proposal. We provide a quick overview of some of the key questions raised and provide short summaries of our responses:
Is Velodrome Asking for Too Large a Grant?
TLDR: No. It is 90%+ smaller than the average grant by every KPI, offers a proven 2x-3x ROI, and comes with Velodrome offering $6.5mm in co-incentives (31x those of other DEXs combined). Likewise, Velodrome represents 10% of TVL, 12% of transaction volume, 16% of transactions, and 13% of users, while requesting 1.72% of grant funds. No alternative frameworks for grant size evaluation have been suggested or offered.
Is The Lock Bonus An Appropriate Use of Funds?
TLDR: Yes. The incentive flows to veTOKEN lockers consistent with other proposals such as Curve/Balancer and while drive similar second order effects that grow the ecosystem by multiples and reduce costs for the ecosystem. No data has been provided suggesting it has any meaningful impact on price.
Would Builder Grants be Better?
TLDR: No. Velodrome grants have brought 30+ new builders to the ecosystem by reducing their incentive costs by 20% - 70% while less accountable direct builder grants offered by other protocols have yet to demonstrate their efficacy.
Is Velodrome Really Competitive with Curve and Uniswap?
TLDR: Yes. Velodrome is more efficient in TVL/Volume / $ spent in incentives (lowering costs ecosystem wide). It also attracts similar levels of volume per dollar in TVL while simultaneously hosting 3.2x more ecosystem projects tokens than Uniswap and Curve combined.
Should Velodrome Be Forced to Operate Without OP Incentives?
TLDR: Velodrome has demonstrated the highest ROI in terms of ecosystem growth of any governance or partner fund grant to date. The primary impact of pulling back on incentives would be to slow or reverse that ecosystem growth while simultaneously continuing the flow of incentives to less effective programs on other DEXs making comparative evaluations of different programs more challenging. Incentives already represent a declining proportion of our total activity and we expect that to continue to shrink over the course of this grant.
Does Granting Velodrome Harm Other DEXs?
TLDR: Ecosystem native DEXs and multi-chain DEXs have different goals and incentives when it comes to growing Optimism and cannot be easily compared. Overall though, all should be evaluated / granted equally in terms of the growth multiple they can return and growing ecosystem activity will benefit all.
Summary
We hope you’ve found this summary helpful and will continue to add it if/when new topics are raised to make the overall thread a bit easier to navigate as we move into the voting page.
Thank you for reading!
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: Aug. 15, 2022, 4:19 p.m.
Content: Hello @millie and @mm 3729 _PrimeRating, great questions! I’ll answer them in order. millie: If a significant portion of the LUSD supply is on L 2 and there is a period of sharp price volatility for ETH, liquidators may not be able to fully liquidate troves on L 1 and the whole protocol would be at risk. This is a valid concern the team is not overlooking and partly why this proposal focuses a sizeable share of the OP budget on providing incentives for users providing LUSD liquidity to the mainnet bridge. We’re discussing with Hop protocol to examine how their solution might prove more efficient at ensuring balanced liquidity on both sides of the bridge at all times, although it comes with additional requirements. Finally, we’ve also slightly revised the budget to allocate more for the bridging incentives to ensure we have sufficient firepower if needed. mm 3729 _PrimeRating: Thanks for the proposal @TokenBrice. Last time we reviewed Liquity , there was a huge 63 . 7 % of the LQTY token reserved for team + insiders (reference from Liquity Medium article here) which raises concerns of centralization. Also increases risk of insiders making a nice buck when the lock-ups end. How do you see this? Since LQTY doesn’t have any governance capability, this is a non-issue, and there cannot be any centralization concerns stemming from this observation. I might also remind you that many of the protocols pleading for OP grants have a token with governance capability and similar ownership distribution, with a few actors able to be decisive in governance proposals. And to be sure we’re clear: this is not the case with Liquity since there is no governance. The LQTY allocated to investors already unlocked last April, without any significant impact on LQTY’s price nor massive sell-off, demonstrating strong confidence of the investors that are not looking for a quick buck. Meanwhile, the LQTY allocated to the team is under a 4 year vesting period, with no funds unlocked during the first year - meaning that team-owned LQTY barely started to unlock and won’t be fully liquid until 3 more years. Thus, a large share of the LQTY circulating today is made of the Community Allocation (mostly distributed to Stability Pool depositors), which was quite generous initially and progressively decreases. I hope this post addresses your concerns, let me know if that is not the case.
Likes: 5
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: Aug. 15, 2022, 12:19 p.m.
Content: Hello @millie and @mm 3729 _PrimeRating, great questions! I’ll answer them in order.
millie:
If a significant portion of the LUSD supply is on L 2 and there is a period of sharp price volatility for ETH, liquidators may not be able to fully liquidate troves on L 1 and the whole protocol would be at risk.
This is a valid concern the team is not overlooking and partly why this proposal focuses a sizeable share of the OP budget on providing incentives for users providing LUSD liquidity to the mainnet bridge. We’re discussing with Hop protocol to examine how their solution might prove more efficient at ensuring balanced liquidity on both sides of the bridge at all times, although it comes with additional requirements. Finally, we’ve also slightly revised the budget to allocate more for the bridging incentives to ensure we have sufficient firepower if needed.
mm 3729 _PrimeRating:
Thanks for the proposal @TokenBrice. Last time we reviewed Liquity , there was a huge 63 . 7 % of the LQTY token reserved for team + insiders (reference from Liquity Medium article here) which raises concerns of centralization. Also increases risk of insiders making a nice buck when the lock-ups end. How do you see this?
Since LQTY doesn’t have any governance capability, this is a non-issue, and there cannot be any centralization concerns stemming from this observation. I might also remind you that many of the protocols pleading for OP grants have a token with governance capability and similar ownership distribution, with a few actors able to be decisive in governance proposals. And to be sure we’re clear: this is not the case with Liquity since there is no governance.
The LQTY allocated to investors already unlocked last April, without any significant impact on LQTY’s price nor massive sell-off, demonstrating strong confidence of the investors that are not looking for a quick buck.
Meanwhile, the LQTY allocated to the team is under a 4 year vesting period, with no funds unlocked during the first year - meaning that team-owned LQTY barely started to unlock and won’t be fully liquid until 3 more years. Thus, a large share of the LQTY circulating today is made of the Community Allocation (mostly distributed to Stability Pool depositors), which was quite generous initially and progressively decreases.
I hope this post addresses your concerns, let me know if that is not the case.
Likes: 4
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: Aug. 12, 2022, 8:41 a.m.
Content: lefterisjp: A suggestion here to make it more readable would be to add the % of the allocation you would like to devote to each category. Adding it to the top post, thanks for the suggestion. lefterisjp: Also why incentives to bridge back to mainnet? How is that supposed to help optimism growth? We discussed this topic a bit above in the post: essentially, right now, the only liquid bridge is the official one with the 7 days withdrawal delay. Considering LUSD can only be minted on mainnet by taking on some debt, we’re confident users would be more comfortable bridging their LUSD to Optimism if they know they can withdraw them quickly to repay some debt if needed. lefterisjp: Would you forward the OP directly for the development grants or would you first liquidate them for stables? They will be paid out as OP token, but that is a good point to clarify, I’ll update the opening post. lefterisjp: Most other protocol teams had some form of co-incentives so this would help your proposal if you guys manage to match it with something. I understand, sadly the Liquity treasury is more limited than Optimism’s. I’ll still ask around and see if we can allocate some LQTY. Yet, even though Liquity is not contributing assets directly, Liquity has been decisive to Optimism’s success, as LUSD was the top stablecoin on Optimism for a while (before the OP token) and contributed to help stabilize sUSD on the network.
Likes: 2
Replies: 1
Replies:
- millie: Also why incentives to bridge back to mainnet? How is that supposed to help optimism growth?
We discussed this topic a bit above in the post: essentially, right now, the only liquid bridge is the official one with the 7 days withdrawal delay. Considering LUSD can only be minted on mainnet by taking on some debt, we’re confident users would be more comfortable bridging their LUSD to Optimism if they know they can withdraw them quickly to repay some debt if needed.
It’s worth mentioning that given LUSD’s liquidity on Mainnet it’s basically essential for there to be a fast bridge if this program were to go live. If a significant portion of the LUSD supply is on L2 and there is a period of sharp price volatility for ETH, liquidators may not be able to fully liquidate troves on L1 and the whole protocol would be at risk.
For context Synthetix had integrated an LUSD wrapper on Optimism for many months but had to eventually shut it down due to risk of cornering too much of the supply on L2 without fast bridging relief and risking the the possibility of Troves becoming under collateralized in a black swan event (or even just a market wide nuke like we saw in May and June).
cc @lefterisjp
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: Aug. 12, 2022, 4:41 a.m.
Content:
lefterisjp:
A suggestion here to make it more readable would be to add the % of the allocation you would like to devote to each category.
Adding it to the top post, thanks for the suggestion.
lefterisjp:
Also why incentives to bridge back to mainnet? How is that supposed to help optimism growth?
We discussed this topic a bit above in the post: essentially, right now, the only liquid bridge is the official one with the 7 days withdrawal delay. Considering LUSD can only be minted on mainnet by taking on some debt, we’re confident users would be more comfortable bridging their LUSD to Optimism if they know they can withdraw them quickly to repay some debt if needed.
lefterisjp:
Would you forward the OP directly for the development grants or would you first liquidate them for stables?
They will be paid out as OP token, but that is a good point to clarify, I’ll update the opening post.
lefterisjp:
Most other protocol teams had some form of co-incentives so this would help your proposal if you guys manage to match it with something.
I understand, sadly the Liquity treasury is more limited than Optimism’s. I’ll still ask around and see if we can allocate some LQTY. Yet, even though Liquity is not contributing assets directly, Liquity has been decisive to Optimism’s success, as LUSD was the top stablecoin on Optimism for a while (before the OP token) and contributed to help stabilize sUSD on the network.
Likes: 2
Replies: 1
Replies:
- millie: Also why incentives to bridge back to mainnet? How is that supposed to help optimism growth?
We discussed this topic a bit above in the post: essentially, right now, the only liquid bridge is the official one with the 7 days withdrawal delay. Considering LUSD can only be minted on mainnet by taking on some debt, we’re confident users would be more comfortable bridging their LUSD to Optimism if they know they can withdraw them quickly to repay some debt if needed.
It’s worth mentioning that given LUSD’s liquidity on Mainnet it’s basically essential for there to be a fast bridge if this program were to go live. If a significant portion of the LUSD supply is on L2 and there is a period of sharp price volatility for ETH, liquidators may not be able to fully liquidate troves on L1 and the whole protocol would be at risk.
For context Synthetix had integrated an LUSD wrapper on Optimism for many months but had to eventually shut it down due to risk of cornering too much of the supply on L2 without fast bridging relief and risking the the possibility of Troves becoming under collateralized in a black swan event (or even just a market wide nuke like we saw in May and June).
cc @lefterisjp
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: July 8, 2022, 9:33 a.m.
Content: I’ll need to double-check with the cBridge what they can do but ideally, it would be a liquidity mining campaign only for one side: people providing LUSD on mainnet (and therefore enabling fast withdrawal of others from Optimism) The Optimism side doesn’t really need support since it’s getting filled naturally as people are fast-withdrawing. Edit ~ 2 h later: so yes indeed the cBridge can handle LM campaigns for LP on one side only. So LM only for users providing LUSD on the Ethereum side seems preferable, as it would help to solve the current unbalance issue.
Likes: 3
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: July 8, 2022, 5:33 a.m.
Content: I’ll need to double-check with the cBridge what they can do but ideally, it would be a liquidity mining campaign only for one side: people providing LUSD on mainnet (and therefore enabling fast withdrawal of others from Optimism)
The Optimism side doesn’t really need support since it’s getting filled naturally as people are fast-withdrawing.
Edit ~ 2 h later: so yes indeed the cBridge can handle LM campaigns for LP on one side only. So LM only for users providing LUSD on the Ethereum side seems preferable, as it would help to solve the current unbalance issue.
Likes: 3
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1] Liquity
by TokenBrice - No Role
Posted on: July 6, 2022, 4:57 p.m.
Content: Mhn, at first glance I’m having trouble understanding the thought process leading to this conclusion, but I’ll dive into the link you shared, thank you for that. With the additional context provided above. I truly think that in that case incentivizing liquidity bridges would result in more confidence in LUSD on Optimism overall, and therefore more tokens bridged and activity there. So I’ll see how the other delegate reacts to the bridging incentives component of the proposal and adjust if needed. Thanks for your support!
Likes: 2
Replies: 0
No replies yet.