Profile of Matt_StableLab in Rari Foundation

Posts by Matt_StableLab

• [RRC-XX] Empower active delegates by Matt_StableLab - GWG Mods
  Posted on: July 2, 2024, 2:44 p.m.
  Content: StableLab supports empowering active delegates through increased delegation after the conclusion of this cohort of delegates. However, we have some concerns regarding the proposal in its current form. Our Concerns What is the total amount of veRARI the foundation can delegate? Are the proposed calculations feasible or will we run out of veRARI? What happens if we run out? We believe 5 , 000 veRARI delegated per proposal passed is far too much. We believe offering 5 k per proposal could lead to delegates gaming the system by publishing meaningless proposals to build up their voting power. In the example, the delegate publishes 10 proposals and gets 50 , 000 + veRARI delegated. This is a negative for the DAO as it would create a whale that could single-handedly decide most votes. Additionally, a 5 k bonus may lead to people voting not on the proposal’s merits but on whether they want the proposer to gain 5000 voting power. Finally, giving so much voting power to delegates for creating proposals might limit the number of delegates we can delegate to. For example, if there is only 50 K veRARI available to delegate and someone passed 10 proposals, would they receive all of the delegation? We believe it makes sense to have a more significant number of delegates with a smaller amount of veRARI. Ideally, we need to eventually move away from the foundation being the largest delegator and attract outside delegators. Allowing delegates to accumulate very large voting powers without going out and finding delegators may prevent delegates from taking the initiative to find additional delegators. We need to encourage delegates to go out and find delegation so we are not so reliant on the foundation. It is unclear what timeline is used to calculate rewards or how often delegation will be recalculated. If someone passes multiple proposals after the initial delegation, when will they receive their bonus? Our Recommendations Implement a cap on total delegation from the foundation to 5 , 000 veRARI. This allows the DAO to delegate to more delegates and prevents delegates from becoming too powerful but still allows the most active delegates to receive enough veRARI to post proposals to Tally. Introduce a clear timeline for when delegation is calculated, starts, stops, is recalculated, and any decay schedule. Lowering the “Passed a proposal onchain” bonus to 2000 and make is yes/no. This will reduce the chances for gamification and will prevent delegates from gaining too much power. Include some mechanism to encourage delegates to find delegation outside of the foundation. We believe a 5000 veRARI delegation helps accomplish this as it forces delegates to find alternatives if they want to gain more power in the DAO. Another Idea is some matching aspect where the foundation would match a delegates outside delegation. However, this will be tricky as it can also be gamed
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  Likers: bitblondy
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  • bitblondy: jengajojo: The only reason the DAO quorum is what it is now, is that there isn’t sufficient active voting supply at the moment. The point of a cohort based governance onboarding and this proposal is that it allows: I think we all agree that the voting supply / voting activity is low, but as @Matt_StableLab is already pointing out, it would not be healthy if the amount of veRARI / the current quorum is “artificially” increased by the foundation. I guess a delegate with 50k voting power (like in your calculation example) could actually discourage regular RARI holders from participating. Matt_StableLab: We believe 5,000 veRARI delegated per proposal passed is far too much. We believe offering 5k per proposal could lead to delegates gaming the system by publishing meaningless proposals to build up their voting power. I support this concern and recommendations. As I suggested before, a cap o 5-10k is already a 2,5 - 5x increase of the current delegations (2k) for active delegates. That seems like a good ratio / incentive to participate to me. As for the 5k per passed proposal, I would rather suggest the authors split the amount, since they also shared the work. @forexus regarding rewards in “real” RARI tokens, I still think it would be a good additional incentive to grant a (small) share of their delegation to active delegates. The metrics you suggest are difficult to monitor, however. Looking at the proposal, the evaluation for active delegates could be used for this as well.
• RRC-XX Implementing a RARI Protocol Fee by Matt_StableLab - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
  Posted on: June 3, 2024, 3:55 p.m.
  Content: Requesting Community Feedback This post is meant to start a community discussion regarding directing Rarible Protocol fees to the treasury. Below is a basic outline of what a protocol fee proposal would look like. This proposal will be updated to reflect community feedback once the specifics of the fee structure have been thoroughly discussed by the community. Important questions to consider. What should the fee be? Currently a flat fee is proposed to test out the fee switch mechanism. SHould we eventually move to a tiered fee structure? How else can the DAO improve the fee system to create long-term sustainability of the DAO and improve user alignment of the RARI Protocol? Abstract This proposal suggests altering the Rarible protocol’s fee structure to create a protocol fee of 0 . 5 %. The revenue generated from this fee would all go to the RARI DAO treasury. This will enhance the DAO’s financial resources and create more alignment between users and the DAO. Motivation Implementing a fee structure that directs fee revenue will help bolster the sustainibility of the RARI DAO. It will also create more autonomy for the RARI DAO as the DAO will not have to rely on external capital and will instead have more resources available to fund DAO initiatives. This will help with the progressive decentrilization of the DAO and make the DAO stronger for the future. Rationale The proposal aligns with RARI DAO’s mission of broadening the NFT use case horizon by creating a creator-centric and fully decentralized robust ecosystem. By channeling revenue to the DAO treasury, it enhances the financial stability and resilience of the protocol, enabling further development, community initiatives, and long-term sustainability. This helps to address the Long term sustainability of the DAO, which is one of the three core values of the RARI DAO. Specifications Since the protocol’s contracts are fully controlled by the DAO, the on-chain Tally proposal can automatically update the fee structure using Tally’s executable code feature. The proposed fee would be 0 . 5 %. 100 % of the Protocol Fees will be sent to the RARI DAO treasury to help bolster the autonomy and long-term sustainability of the RARI DAO. Steps to Implement DAO discusses appropriate fee structures. Tally proposal is created with executable code to update fee structure and direct revenue to the DAO automatically Implement new order version with enabled protocol fees Timeline 1 week for the DAO to decide on fee structure and provide opinions on the proposal 1 week for Tally vote Time for the protocol team to implement new order version with enabled protocol fees Upon the passing of the Tally vote, the contracts will automatically be upgraded to reflect the new fees and direct said fees to the DAO treasury Overall Cost There is no cost associated with this proposal.
  Likes: 5 Replies: 0
  Likers: sixty, jaf, bitblondy, forexus, lionmsee
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• RRC-23: Framework for setting up a working group by Matt_StableLab - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
  Posted on: May 8, 2024, 2:15 p.m.
  Content: StableLab supports this initiative to outline the process of starting a working group in the RARI DAO. As a part of the working group that formed the Delegation Incentive Program StableLab saw how working groups can make a large impact in the DAO. Organizing large initiatives can often be difficult to do as a DAO. There are many conflicting voices and it is unclear who is responsible for what. Having a working group with a specific task helps streamline getting things done in a DAO. Additionally, a common problem in DAOs is people don’t know how to start on ideas they have to improve the ecosystem. This Proposal clearly outlines how a RARI DAO contributor can start a working group and secure funding to get something done in the DAO. StableLab believes that this will encourage more contributors to take on different initiatives in the dao and help create a more robust and modular governance system that helps grow the entire RARI ecosystem.
  Likes: 3 Replies: 0
  Likers: jaf, coffee-crusher, sixty
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• StableLab Delegate Thread by Matt_StableLab - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
  Posted on: Feb. 21, 2024, 5:26 p.m.
  Content: Proposal: RRC- 18 Raise Proposal Quorum Vote: For Rationale: As the author of the proposal StableLab supports RRC- 18 and believes it will help protect the RARI DAO Proposal: RRC- 17 : Distribute remainder of Incentives Reward Program budget 1 Vote: For Rationale: StableLab supports distributing the remainder of the incentives rewards to those who delegated Proposal: RRC- 19 Rari Chain Sequencer Revenue Split 1 Vote: For Rationale: StableLab supports this split as it ensures a fair distribution of resources between the RARI DAO and the Foundation, fostering sustainability and growth for both entities.
  Likes: 2 Replies: 0
  Likers: jaf, janabe
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• RRC-19 Rari Chain Sequencer Revenue Split by Matt_StableLab - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
  Posted on: Feb. 7, 2024, 5:44 p.m.
  Content: Abstract The proposal aims to create a plan for what to do with the RARI Chain sequencer revenue that is now being generated. The proposed revenue share is a 50 / 50 split between the Rari DAO and the Rari Foundation. The DAO’s share would go towards the DAO treasury ( 35 %) and a new sub-treasury called the “Creator Fund” ( 15 %). The foundation’s Share would go towards operational and maintenance costs ( 30 %) and towards repaying the Arbitrum Grant ( 20 %). Motivation With the new Rari Chain now generating sequencer fees the Rari Community needs to decide where these funds should go. Implementing this revenue-sharing model ensures a fair distribution of resources between the RARI DAO and the Foundation, fostering sustainability and growth for both entities. By allocating funds to a creator fund, we support creator innovation within the community, while bolstering the main treasury ensures financial stability for future DAO endeavors. Allocating a portion of the Foundation’s share to pay off the Arbitrum grant will help fulfill the Foundation’s agreement agreement with Arbitrum and allocating funds towards maintenance and operations ensures the continued smooth functioning of the chain. Rationale This proposal aligns with the RARI DAO community’s mission to foster a decentralized and sustainable ecosystem for digital art and collectibles. By sharing revenue between the DAO and the Foundation, we ensure that both entities have the necessary resources to support the growth and development of the RARI ecosystem. The allocation of funds to a creative fund reflects our commitment to nurturing creativity and innovation within the community while directing resources to the main treasury strengthens the financial foundation of the DAO. Key Terms (optional) RARI Foundation: A Cayman Islands legal entity that represents the DAO IRL. It allows the RARI DAO to have a formal representation, enter into contractual relationships, and utilize the other benefits and protections of a legal entity. Creator Fund: A new treasury that would be created and used to fund creators and their initiatives within the RARI community. Main Treasury: The primary repository of funds controlled by the RARI DAO for supporting various initiatives and projects. Sequencer Fee Revenue: Rewards collected in ETH generated from transactions on the RARI Chain Specifications The RARI DAO and RARI Foundation would split the Sequencer Revenue 50 / 50 with the funds more specifically being broken down into the following categories. DAO’s Share - 50 % 15 % to a Creator Fund RRC- 19 proposes creating a new sub-treasury called the Creator Fund. This treasury would be funded using 15 % of all sequencer revenue generated. This treasury will be reserved to fund creative projects and initiatives. Having a new treasury explicitly for creative initiatives will encourage creatives in the NFT space to join the DAO and create proposals to fund interesting creative projects. This will help attract new members to the DAO and help foster innovative ideas in the Rari Ecosystem. 35 % to the Treasury: 35 % of the Sequencer Fees would go towards the RARI DAO Treasury. This will help sustain the DAO by funding DAO initiatives as well as ensuring the DAO has the funding to continue with operation costs for the foreseeable future. Foundation’s Share - 50 % 30 % for maintenance and operations costs: This portion of sequencer revenue would be used by the RARI foundation to operate, maintain, and improve the RARI Chain. This helps to ensure the Chain remains operational and can continue to return sequencer fees for the RARI Ecosystem. 20 % for paying off the Arbitrum Grant: RARI received a grant from the Arbitrum Foundation to build the RARI Chain using Artribrum Orbit. This grant needs to be paid back by the RARI Foundation. Using 20 % of sequencer fees to repay this grant will allow us to fulfill the agreement with Arbitrum without requiring the use of treasury funds. Steps to Implement Create a new Creator Fund Treasury Address and give the DAO the power to control these funds. The foundation will inform the third party that operates the sequencer to send the rewards to the appropriate addresses. Timeline Once the proposal is passed, the revenue split can be enacted for the next monthly sequencer payment. Overall Cost There is no cost associated with this proposal
  Likes: 4 Replies: 0
  Likers: addie, lionmsee, jaf, firefly808
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• StableLab Delegate Thread by Matt_StableLab - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
  Posted on: Jan. 11, 2024, 12:08 p.m.
  Content: Proposal: RRC- 16 : RARI Foundation 2024 Operational Budget Vote onchain 1 Vote: For Rationale: See StableLab’s full reasoning here RRC- 16 : RARI Foundation 2024 Operational Budget - # 4 by Matt_StableLab
  Likes: 1 Replies: 0
  Likers: winverse
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• RRC-18 Raise Proposal Quorum by Matt_StableLab - GWG Mods
  Posted on: Jan. 10, 2024, 12:52 p.m.
  Content: Authors: @Matt_StableLab Abstract This proposal aims to Increase the quorum from 10 % of the total supply of veRARI to 15 % of the total supply of veRARI. Motivation Recently the amount of veRARI has dramatically increased thanks to the delegate launchpad programs and the delegation incentives program. This has increased the number of votes cast on RARI proposals. While this is a good sign as it shows Rari governance is growing and becoming more active, it also can put the DAO in danger if the quorum is too low. A low quorum can allow malicious proposals to pass through governance using very few votes. After the recent delegation campaigns, 4 delegates can now single-handedly reach quorum with their votes. It is important to raise the quorum to require many voices in the DAO to be heard before a proposal is valid. This will help protect the DAO and the protocol. Rationale As the Rarible Protocol continues to be transferred to the control of the DAO the DAO must have safety measures in place to protect the protocol. Currently, the quorum of about 10 , 000 veRARI is not sufficient to protect the protocol. A higher quorum ensures more votes need to be cast before a proposal is legitimate. Requiring more voters to vote will help limit the possibility of a malicious vote passing. 15 % of the total supply of veRARI is a more appropriate quorum for the new state of the DAO. This increase will serve to protect the DAO as we gain more responsibility over the protocol. Additionally, raising the quorum will serve to accommodate the recent increase in participation we have seen and will continue to see as the DAO grows. Key Terms Quorum: the minimum number of votes that must be cast on any proposal to make the results of that proposal valid. Steps to Implement To implement this proposal the DAO will change the quorum from 10 % of the total supply of veRARI to 15 % of the total supply of veRARI. Timeline This proposal would follow the normal governance timeline with the quorum being changed after a successful Tally vote. Overall Cost There is no cost associated with this proposal
  Likes: 4 Replies: 0
  Likers: lionmsee, janabe, jaf, winverse
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• RRC-16: RARI Foundation 2024 Operational Budget by Matt_StableLab - GWG Mods
  Posted on: Jan. 10, 2024, 12:03 p.m.
  Content: StableLab Supports RRC- 16 for the following reasons: Fair Budget Working in many other DAOs and seeing operating budgets across the industry we believe 1 , 650 , 000 USD for an entire year of salaries, legal fees, vendor costs, marketing costs, travel, and other infrastructure costs is a very fair number. Will help the DAO Succeed After working with the Foundation for the past several months in the DAO we have strong faith in the Foundation Team and believe that these funds will allow the Foundation to continue doing a fantastic job supporting the DAO. StableLab believes the goals the proposal has laid out for the next year are highly aligned with the DAO’s mission. Achieving these goals will greatly benefit the DAO and will be well worth the cost of the proposal’s budget. Transparency and Accountability This proposal does a great job of being transparent. We appreciate the budget area breakdown and specifics to help the DAO understand exactly how these funds will be used. JanaBe: Periodic budget spending reports shall be shared with the community quarterly, no later than 30 days after the end of the quarter. The community may request budget updates at any point. In such event, the Foundation shall present the budget status no later than in 15 working days. Additionally, StableLab strongly supports the inclusion of the spending reports as they will help provide transparency and accountability. Finally, the inclusion of the goals for the next year can serve as KPIs for the DAO to measure how successful the year went when we evaluate next year’s budget. This will add accountability to the foundation and incentivize them to continue doing a great job.
  Likes: 2 Replies: 0
  Likers: jaf, janabe
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• StableLab Delegate Thread by Matt_StableLab - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
  Posted on: Dec. 30, 2023, 8:54 p.m.
  Content: Proposal: RRC- 13 : Delegation Incentives Program 1 Vote: Yes Rationale: We believe this will help strengthen RARI by attracting more RARI delegations and helping to align delegates Proposal: RRC - 15 : Glambase Integration with RARI Chain Vote: No Rationale: Our full rationale can be seen here: RRC - 15 : Pre-Vote Discussion on Glambase Integration with RARI Chain - # 8 by Matt_StableLab Proposal: Creator Economy Working Group Proposal Vote: Yes Rationale: StableLab supports this proposal as we believe it will help spread awareness about Rari. We support the team involved in this working group as they have been very involved in RARI governance and will do a great job creating content about RARI features. Proposal: RRC- 14 : Continuation of Rarible Protocol Transfer to Community Vote: Yes Rationale: StableLab supports Rari’s dedication to decentralizing the protocol by transferring it to the community. We are excited to continue sitting on the security council with the 2 new members.
  Likes: 3 Replies: 0
  Likers: lionmsee, addie, winverse
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• RRC - 15: Pre-Vote Discussion on Glambase Integration with RARI Chain by Matt_StableLab - GWG Mods
  Posted on: Dec. 15, 2023, 9:10 a.m.
  Content: StableLab is AGAINST RRC- 15 . Not Using the Growth Fund The proposal “seeks funding from the RARI Ecosystem Growth Fund.” However, this is not the case as in their Tally proposal they are attempting to take funds directly from the DAO. The growth fund established in RRC- 12 has funds set aside for strategic partnerships and grants. These funds are managed by the foundation and the grants council which StableLab believes can make a much more educated decision regarding this topic. We believe if Glambase wants this grant they should work with the foundation or the grants council and actually go through the RARI Ecosystem Growth Fund. Too Much Money for No Product StableLab feels it is insane for the DAO to spend 100 K or 1 . 3 % 2 of the DAO’s treasury on a project that doesn’t even have a product yet. “We’re definitely still in the development phase”. We have no idea if this product will bring users/activity to Rari Chain because they currently have no users, activity, or even product. No Clear Budget Glambase does not provide any clear budget of what they will use the funds for. Simply stating percentiles for development and marketing means nothing. For us to even consider this proposal we would want to see a detailed breakdown of the budget that would include salaries, the number of people working on this, marketing strategies, estimated marketing spending, and a more detailed breakdown of what operational expenses are. Conclusion StableLab thinks this ask is far too high and provides far too little information to be considered. We think this proposal would be detrimental to the DAO. We urge the rest of the community to vote AGAINST this proposal.
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  Likers: jaf
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