Profile of bitblondy in Rari Foundation
Posts by bitblondy
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Proposal Overflow Call #2
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 27, 2024, 4:13 a.m.
Content: Thanks! I can’t join unfortunately, would be great if there were some recap of the discussion. (-:
Likes: 3
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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Adding Temperature Check to Governance Process
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 27, 2024, 4:11 a.m.
Content: Thanks for the proposal, it’s an interesting idea and. It would be good if proposers had a better idea of what to expect from an on-chain vote. However, we are a small DAO, and it’s very rare that the outcome of an on-chain vote is unexpected, right?
Regarding the complexity and duration of a proposal, I also would not be in favor of an additional Snapshot space. That’s rather something to think about, when having a large voter base, and it’s more difficult to navigate the forum.
My main concern with Discourse would be the sybil resistance, as @Jaf and @dzonson.eth already pointed out, that everybody can create a forum profile and vote. Are there any roles or a similar structure that could prevent non-token-holders or delegates from participating in the polls.
Likes: 2
Replies: 0
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[RRC - XX] DAO Code of Conduct
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 13, 2024, 5:15 a.m.
Content: Thanks for the clarification and adaptions to the proposal. The part about suspension sounds good.
When thinking about the term “multiple-choice”, it’s usually referring to multiple options (e.g. giving yes/no for every single candidate, there are different voting schemes in Tally), therefore the wording might not be optimal.
I agree with @cr 1 st 0 f that in case of the voting of a whole group (as with the GWG), the candidates should abstain. Same with the thoughts about the quorum.
Likes: 2
Replies: 0
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[RRC-XX] Rari Staking Incentives
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 13, 2024, 4:33 a.m.
Content: Thanks for the proposal. So the working group has not concluded yet, whether you would suggest funding the staking from the treasury or inflation?
We would at least add a function to fund incentives from protocol rewards, in case more fees get collected in the future. I like @dzonson.eth idea to add a gamification mechanism and support @Jose_StableLab suggestion to keep the discussion in Arbitrum DAO in mind.
Generally, you’re absolutely right that we should implement staking rewards if the Tally proposal gets accepted.
Likes: 0
Replies: 1
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Replies:
- Jaf: Thank you all for your feedback.
Will review your comments and refine this proposal to ensure it maximizes benefits and participation for everyone within the Rari ecosystem.
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RARI DAO Weekly Highlights - September 30, 2024-October 6, 2024
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 13, 2024, 4:13 a.m.
Content: Thanks for the suggestion in the community call! Sounds worth a discussion :+ 1 :
Likes: 1
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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Enable RARI Staking
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 5, 2024, 9:37 a.m.
Content: Thanks for answering all the questions!
Would appreciate an update on how Arbitrum is going to handle the redistribution of voting power.
Regarding possible staking rewards, is this something the foundation has dedicated funds for, or would you be in favor of inflating the token (if this is possible at all with the current setup) @addie?
I also have to agree with @forexus that the implementation cost is substantial, regarding that customizing the Arbitrum contracts will likely not be as much work as the initial setup (forgive me if this assumption is not correct).
However, I generally support the proposal and believe that a governance update is a key initiative for the DAO.
Likes: 2
Replies: 1
Replies:
- Jaf: bitblondy:
Regarding possible staking rewards, is this something the foundation has dedicated funds for, or would you be in favor of inflating the token (if this is possible at all with the current setup) @addie?
I’m working together with the GWG to initiate a separate discussion on this topic.
We’ll likely share it here in the forum early next week.
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[RRC - XX] DAO Code of Conduct
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 5, 2024, 9:11 a.m.
Content: Thanks for clarifying, appreciate the effort of the working group. I requested access to the notion.
I agree with @Firefly 808 that the part about “suspension from the DAO” might not be accurate, rather from the forum or discord. Maybe you could adapt that.
Also the part “Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election”, does it mean that delegates can vote for themselves if it’s a group of people, or only if there is multiple-choice voting?
Likes: 2
Replies: 1
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- jengajojo: Thank you for your thorough review and feedback on the proposal @cr1st0f @bitblondy I’d like to address a few of the points raised, as there are some nuances that need further clarification:
1. Voting for One’s Own Candidacy:
While I understand the need for clarity, I believe there’s value in allowing delegates to vote for themselves in multiple-choice elections as long as they also vote for others. The rationale here is that in multiple-choice voting, a delegate may genuinely be a strong candidate but could also fairly support others, thereby ensuring fairness in the process. In single-choice elections, the potential for self-serving bias is much stronger, hence the stricter rule.
Regarding proposals where a delegate stands to benefit financially (such as working group participation), this is an important point, however the way voting power is distributed today disallows proposals from meeting quorum without the top delegates voting in favor. If these delegates are also part of the WG then we face gridlock like we did in the first iteration of the GWG proposal. We can amend this point once the voting power distribution imbalance has been resolved.
2. Conflicts of Interest:
I agree that the statement on disclosing conflicts of interest can be simplified for clarity. The original phrasing was intended to acknowledge the complexities of disclosure in certain cases, but I agree that transparency should be non-negotiable. As for enforcement, I think your idea of introducing penalties for those who fail to disclose conflicts, such as blacklisting individuals from treasury spending, is worth exploring. This would add a layer of accountability and deter exploitative behavior however this would also involve assigning these responsibility to someone, which is something we want to avoid in this exercise. If there is any way we can enforce penalties without additional overhead please let us know.
3. Social Media and Subjective Language:
I appreciate your concerns regarding discussions in public spaces like social media. The intent behind recommending designated channels was to ensure that sensitive or contentious issues are discussed in controlled environments where moderation can take place. However, I see how restricting these discussions may be interpreted as limiting open discourse, which is a critical aspect of decentralized governance. I’m open to revising this language to allow for public discussions, while still maintaining respectful and constructive engagement.
Regarding the points about civility, common sense, and positive attitude, I understand how subjective these can be. However, the aim here is not to suppress valid criticism or heated debate, but to maintain a baseline of respectful discourse. We could refine this language to ensure that it does not become a tool for silencing dissent but still discourages personal attacks or harmful behavior.
As for the point on compromised private keys, the intention was to encourage community vigilance against phishing and scams, not to punish individuals for security failures. We can rephrase this to avoid unintended consequences.
Amendment:
“Encourage respectful discourse and avoid personal attacks in all interactions.”
“Stay vigilant against scams and phishing attempts. Reporting suspicious activity is encouraged.”
4. Extending Code of Conduct to Working Group Participants:
I think your suggestion to extend the Code of Conduct to working group participants, treasury-delegated token holders, and grant recipients is a strong one. The current framework for setting up WGs is limited to delegates and this CoC document already applies to this group.
bitblondy:
Also the part “Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election”, does it mean that delegates can vote for themselves if it’s a group of people, or only if there is multiple-choice voting?
The intention behind that part of the proposal is that delegates should not vote for themselves in single-candidate elections to avoid conflicts of interest and self-serving behavior. However, in multiple-choice voting (where delegates vote for more than one candidate or option), the proposal allows a delegate to vote for themselves as long as they also vote for at least one other candidate.
bitblondy:
“suspension from the DAO”
We can modify the language to reflect that:
Amendment:
“Suspensions will apply to participation in community platforms such as the forum (Discourse) or Discord, not the DAO as a whole.”
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[Update Report] Empowering LATAM Artists
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 5, 2024, 8:53 a.m.
Content: Thanks for the update and detailed milestones, the landing page looks really cool!
Likes: 2
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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DePIN Support for RARI Chain. Onboarding RARI to the POKT Network
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 5, 2024, 8:51 a.m.
Content: Thanks, @benedictvs, for the additional info. I was referring to the second part (the NFT API), not sure if I understand that correctly.
Also thanks for further explaining the discontinuation scenario, a decentralized structure makes sense.
Likes: 0
Replies: 0
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DePIN Support for RARI Chain. Onboarding RARI to the POKT Network
by bitblondy - No Role
Posted on: Sept. 28, 2024, 6:54 a.m.
Content: Thanks for updating the proposal and the suggestion to include the first year of threshold usage.
I’m not fully sure, if I understand the benefit of the second part of the proposal (Development and Deployment of NFT API & Integrations). Is this supposed to provide easier access to developers?
I would also be curious to hear some other opinions on this, especially with development experience.
And what would be the plan, if there is no sufficient activity on the chain, and it doesn’t seem to improve, is there an “offboarding” scenario? Just thinking about the worst case :see_no_evil:
Generally, I’m in support of the proposal.
Likes: 2
Replies: 1
Replies:
- benedictvs: Thank you @bitblondy for your kind response and question!
Your assumption is spot on. We know that some initiatives on RARI Chain, such as @jarisjames can benefit from an improved developer experience for NFT minting on the chain. Everything related to minting, also requires RPC support. Therefore, the second part of the proposal ties RARI’s success closer together with ours, as we can provide useful tooling to get more people started more easily and also ensure that RARI starts to be used more over RPC.
There are no costs associated with the POKT backend that are carried by RARI Foundation or DAO, as long as the RPC relay threshold is reached. If the RARI community wants to discontinue being serviced by PORTERS, it can cease sending relays at which point the chain may cease to be serviced by node operators.
Yet, the general idea of POKT is to further decentralisation. Thus, there should not be a single entity being able to remove RARI from POKT. A classical offboarding would look like rendering the integration unserviced by PORTERS, but does not prevent others from developing new offerings for RARI based on the whitelisted chain for the POKT network. In effect, the integration with POKT is censorship-resistant.
Thank you for your support! I am also interested in hearing other voices.
