Profile of dzonson.eth in Rari Foundation
Posts by dzonson.eth
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[RRC-XX] Rari Staking Incentives
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 10, 2024, 2:13 p.m.
Content: I appreciate the thought put into this proposal and agree that incentivizing staking could help increase governance participation. However, I have a few points to consider before we move forward with such a high budget allocation.
1 . Current Participation Landscape:
Let’s be realistic about where we stand. The number of delegates and active participants staking their RARI is currently low. Given the relatively small size of our DAO, most of the active community members will likely migrate to Arbitrum and participate in staking without additional incentives. The core group of contributors and delegates are already engaged and committed to the governance process. This makes the argument for allocating nearly $ 400 k in rewards seem disproportionate to the scale of the problem.
2 . Cost vs. Impact:
Given our DAO’s limited treasury and low on-chain activity, I believe we need to be cautious about how we allocate funds. A $ 400 k initiative is not a small undertaking. If the primary goal is to encourage participation and prevent attrition of governance power, there may be simpler and more cost-effective ways to achieve this. We could, for example, design more targeted campaigns to re-engage inactive token holders or focus on community-building initiatives that strengthen long-term participation.
3 . Gamification and Engagement Strategies:
I agree that we need an initial incentive to attract dormant token holders who have been inactive in governance. But rather than following a rigid APY model, which may not appeal to crypto-native participants, I suggest introducing an element of gamification and mystery. Instead of setting a fixed yield that might be seen as unattractive (e.g., 5 - 10 % APY), we can allocate a specific pool of 40 k RARI (as suggested by Jose) and create a dynamic reward mechanism. Here’s how it could work:
Mystery Pool: Announce a prize pool where rewards are distributed proportionally among stakers within a defined time frame. This creates the perception that early stakers could earn significantly higher returns based on the participation rate—effectively making the rewards unpredictable and potentially higher than a standard APY.
Dynamic Milestones: Implement a tiered reward structure that increases if certain governance milestones are hit (e.g., reaching a quorum on votes, increasing the number of active delegates, etc.). This would transform staking from a passive activity to one that incentivizes active governance participation.
4 . Focus on Organic Growth First:
It’s important that we prioritize organic community growth and engagement rather than relying solely on monetary incentives. At this stage, a heavy focus on financial rewards could lead to short-term participation that fades once incentives run dry. By introducing gamification and mystery elements, we shift the focus from just earning to participating, creating a stronger alignment with long-term engagement.
Conclusion:
For now, I suggest we reframe the proposal around a more flexible and gamified rewards structure, allocate a smaller budget for an initial pilot phase, and assess engagement metrics over a shorter timeframe. This would allow us to gauge the actual need for staking incentives without overcommitting our resources. Let’s see how the community responds to a smaller-scale initiative before committing large amounts from the treasury.
Likes: 1
Replies: 0
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Enable RARI Staking
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 10, 2024, 1:52 p.m.
Content: I appreciate the effort put into drafting this proposal and understand the intent behind introducing RARI staking to enhance governance participation and security. However, at this moment, I have reservations about proceeding with such a significant initiative, primarily due to our DAO’s current state.
Key Concerns:
Resource Allocation in a Low-Revenue Environment: RARI DAO is currently facing a period of low activity and minimal revenue streams. Investing $ 100 , 000 USD worth of RARI into staking infrastructure and additional integrations seems excessive given our current financial position. Committing such a substantial portion of our treasury when there’s limited income generation does not appear sustainable. This is a sophisticated mechanism that assumes a level of protocol activity and treasury inflow that we simply do not have at the moment.
Timing and Scope Mismatch: While I see the potential value of staking in the long term, the proposal feels too advanced for our current ecosystem. As a small DAO, with relatively low governance participation and few active proposals, introducing a complex staking mechanism could lead to more overhead and complications rather than solving pressing issues. We need to focus on simpler, foundational improvements before scaling up to such a level of governance sophistication.
Lack of Immediate Need: The core motivation centers around increasing governance participation and security, yet we haven’t identified these as immediate pain points. Participation has been relatively manageable, and our small size allows us to directly engage and coordinate through existing mechanisms. Introducing staking and its complexities might not only be premature but could also distract us from more pressing issues—such as enhancing revenue generation or stimulating protocol growth.
Considerations for the Future:
That being said, I’m not against the concept in principle. If we reach a point where RARI DAO demonstrates more consistent revenue streams, greater community engagement, and a clear need for more sophisticated governance mechanics, I would be open to revisiting the idea. At that stage, a staking mechanism might add value by formalizing governance participation and improving security as outlined.
Conclusion:
For now, I am opposed to this proposal, as I believe it is too advanced and resource-intensive given our current ecosystem status. However, I am open to reconsidering my stance in the future should the DAO’s priorities and capacity evolve to support such an initiative.
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Adding Temperature Check to Governance Process
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: Oct. 10, 2024, 1:44 p.m.
Content: I agree with the general sentiment expressed by @Jaf regarding the value of introducing a Temp Check mechanism to gauge preliminary support. However, I share concerns about potential misuse of such a system if not properly structured. Allowing any user—regardless of their integrity or token holdings—to participate could lead to the creation of artificial sentiment, which might not accurately reflect the broader community’s stance.
Moreover, I question the necessity of implementing this change given our current circumstances. With a proposal passing rate on Tally exceeding 90 %, it’s evident that only well-supported proposals make it to the on-chain voting stage. As a smaller DAO, we have the advantage of a tightly-knit community where feedback is already exchanged transparently through regular calls and active forum discussions. These channels provide a solid understanding of community sentiment without the need for an additional formalized process.
Implementing a Temp Check may add a layer of complexity without yielding significant benefits at this stage. Instead, I suggest focusing on enhancing our existing communication channels and ensuring that delegates remain actively engaged in discussions, rather than introducing a process that could potentially slow down governance and add administrative overhead.
That said, if the community feels strongly about integrating this process, I would recommend exploring mechanisms to mitigate potential abuse. For example, incorporating a minimum threshold of token holdings or account age for eligibility to participate in these polls could be one way to preserve the integrity of this Temp Check.
In conclusion, while I see the merits of formalizing community sentiment tracking, I believe that in our current structure, we are not experiencing governance inefficiencies that would necessitate such a change. However, if we choose to move forward, we must do so thoughtfully, with safeguards in place to prevent skewed results and to ensure that Temp Checks add value to our governance process rather than disrupt it.
Likes: 4
Replies: 0
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RRC-Dropable
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: Sept. 17, 2024, 8:05 a.m.
Content: It would change in a good way. Meaning that now $RARI won’t be locked and people could participate in both governance and the program itself.
Likes: 2
Replies: 0
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Proposal Overflow Call
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: Sept. 11, 2024, 9:47 a.m.
Content: Thanks for bringing it up Jenga. All these topics are really important and it’s of huge priority that we as a community discuss them and break them down.
Likes: 4
Replies: 0
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RRC-Dropable
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: Sept. 7, 2024, 3:40 a.m.
Content:
Firefly 808 :
Lack of Incentives for Artists: The proposal doesn’t offer clear rewards for artists, which are essential for genuine engagement.
Hey there! Thanks for the feedback, but I’m not sure how you came to this conclusion. As I mentioned in my earlier reply, the focus of this program is on artists. We’re creating an organic competition for creators/artists where they’ll earn points when people mint their collections, and also for spreading the word on socials. Their community can earn points through a referral system as well. Our goal is to motivate creators to put effort into their collections, as higher quality naturally leads to higher value. We need creators to be active on socials and build communities—something we desperately lack on Rari Chain.
Firefly 808 :
Focus on Farming: This feels like another farming rewards program, which may attract reward farmers more than genuine artists or collectors.
Years ago, I was a $RARI farmer myself, and that’s how I discovered this ecosystem. Now, I’m here as a delegate and active user. Unfortunately, not many have followed a similar path. It’s crucial to have a quality product to retain users. For instance, a lot of traffic was driven to Rari Chain through the Galxe campaign, but none of the new users were interested in the product, and out of thousands of new wallets, none stayed for more than a week.
Firefly 808 :
Competes with Rarible.com: DROPable seems to overlap with Rarible.com, potentially creating internal competition. We should aim to complement, not compete, with our existing platform.
I’m not sure how this conclusion was reached, and since it’s not the first comment of its kind, I feel it’s important to address it. Rarible is planning to shift META to multichain, aiming to acquire and assert dominance on other chains. Rari Chain is not their priority, and it’s uncertain whether they’ll even focus on Rari Chain at all. It’s not of interest to them since the chain is currently dead. Here, we want to come together as a DAO to revive and reignite traffic and content. The most logical approach is to incentivize creators, followed by encouraging usage and reach of the drops.
Firefly 808 :
Revamping the Rarible Image: Instead of investing in farming programs, the funds could better serve a refresh of the Rarible brand, appealing to a wider audience, including high-profile influencers like Heidi Klum.
Incentives for usage are still, in 2024 , the most effective way to drive traffic and build a user base. What better “brand refresh” is there than becoming relevant on the charts and having more than 0 users daily? :smile: Influencers can certainly coexist, but relying solely on their reach won’t suffice in my opinion.
Honestly, I don’t understand the logic of voting yes months ago on a half-million-dollar grant for apps on Rari Chain that solve none of the issues and won’t change the fact that Rari Chain is dead, yet now, allocating funds to actually bring users to Rari Chain is seen as an issue. Not to mention that these funds are already in a custodial wallet after the passing of RRC- 7 , where you voted yes to allocate them for incentive programs.
To make it clear for anyone reading this: If we, as a DAO, don’t come together with a way to bring activity to Rari Chain, it will remain irrelevant and dead. This proposal might not be the best version of what we can achieve together, so let’s discuss it and adapt it. I hope this clarifies things.
Likes: 1
Replies: 3
Replies:
- bitblondy: Thanks @forexus for the proposal, there was obviously much work put in the design, and you’re already in coordination with the foundation folks. That’s a great initiative.
At first glance, I would support @andreitr’s idea to start with a short term MVP, just in terms of the size of the project.
And are you planning on a presentation in the community call? A breakdown of the mechanism might help to clarify some of the details.
And generally, are you calculating in RARI or USD? There’s some of both in the proposal. For such a long-term project, it might be good to keep in mind price changes of the token.
- Firefly808: dzonson.eth:
Hey there! Thanks for the feedback, but I’m not sure how you came to this conclusion. As I mentioned in my earlier reply, the focus of this program is on artists. We’re creating an organic competition for creators/artists where they’ll earn points when people mint their collections, and also for spreading the word on socials. Their community can earn points through a referral system as well. Our goal is to motivate creators to put effort into their collections, as higher quality naturally leads to higher value. We need creators to be active on socials and build communities—something we desperately lack on Rari Chain.
Call me blind but I only see the artists mentioned once here
forexus:
We’ll find artists to launch with through art contests on The Hug and through wildcards by Rarible and the Rari Foundation itself, this will all happen in the month “November”. Artists will be supported by creating their first drop in the permissionless minting app if needed. Rarible / Rari Foundation will boost these (partnership) drops.
Could you please point out where the line items are show that artist get any of the things you talk about, I don’t see it.
dzonson.eth:
Years ago, I was a $RARI farmer myself, and that’s how I discovered this ecosystem. Now, I’m here as a delegate and active user. Unfortunately, not many have followed a similar path. It’s crucial to have a quality product to retain users. For instance, a lot of traffic was driven to Rari Chain through the Galxe campaign, but none of the new users were interested in the product, and out of thousands of new wallets, none stayed for more than a week.
I think this program will attract people while it’s live, but the second it ends they go away too. What’s the reason to stick around after the rewards are gone? Where is the fun reason that keeps people coming back for more?
dzonson.eth:
I’m not sure how this conclusion was reached, and since it’s not the first comment of its kind, I feel it’s important to address it. Rarible is planning to shift META to multichain, aiming to acquire and assert dominance on other chains. Rari Chain is not their priority, and it’s uncertain whether they’ll even focus on Rari Chain at all. It’s not of interest to them since the chain is currently dead. Here, we want to come together as a DAO to revive and reignite traffic and content. The most logical approach is to incentivize creators, followed by encouraging usage and reach of the drops.
This conclusion is reached by dropable being a 3rd party service that wants to develop a competing front end. Rarible is already permissionless and easy to mint on. The only cool thing dropable is doing is letting you lock up Rari on your favorie artsits. However I think locking up RARI and not have it count toward governance is a horrible idea.
Yes, Rari Chain is fairly dead at the moment. Sure we can throw money at people, they will show up as long as we pay them, but they will leave the moment they find greener pastures. That is what all the past rewards programs have taught me, handing out $$ as a way to attract long term users is dumb it never works. This program looks like all the other ones, just a bit more refined, What we are doing is handing out money as a way to attract attention. There has to be a better way to attract users than to throw money at them.
- forexus: dzonson.eth:
I’m not sure how this conclusion was reached, and since it’s not the first comment of its kind, I feel it’s important to address it. Rarible is planning to shift META to multichain, aiming to acquire and assert dominance on other chains. Rari Chain is not their priority, and it’s uncertain whether they’ll even focus on Rari Chain at all. It’s not of interest to them since the chain is currently dead. Here, we want to come together as a DAO to revive and reignite traffic and content. The most logical approach is to incentivize creators, followed by encouraging usage and reach of the drops.
This is exactly why we focus on the RARI Chain only.
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RRC-Dropable
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: Sept. 6, 2024, 4:48 a.m.
Content: I notice there’s a lot of confusion surrounding the origins of this idea, so I want to take a moment to clarify. Over a year and a half ago, there was a proposal, RRC- 7 , in which 400 K $RARI was transferred to the wallet 0 xcD 9 f 82 Fe 3 B 60 a 5 C 8482 A 69279 AB 5 C 8 d 0 Be 19 cA 24 . The purpose was to fund reward programs and incentivize user engagement with Rari. However, those funds remained unused in the wallet, waiting for a reward incentives program organized by the RARI Foundation team. Unfortunately, all the programs that were launched were poorly conceived and ultimately failed, leaving the DAO with lost funds and almost no new users. Hundreds of thousands of USD were wasted. The last reward program which was initiated in April was shut down much earlier than planned because it was unsustainable as a business model. The DAO was losing money while gaining no value.
The plan we discussed back then during community calls was to reassess and modify the program.
Through months of study, we identified key problems:
Regarding NFTs, the Rari Chain is essentially dead. We have no collections, no users, and no volume. The Galxe program did generate a lot of traffic—many wallets were created, and ETH was bridged to Rari Chain—but we led all those people to an empty Rari Chain with no quality collections, no communities, no memes. Now, we want to shift our focus from targeting traders to targeting builders, collection creators, artists, community engagement, memes, and quality artwork.
Previous programs were easily manipulated, and people ended up walking away with free money. We’re now upgrading the system to reward metrics beyond just providing liquidity.
We as DAO have already granted nearly 100 K $RARI, with $RARI valued at $ 5 at the time (a half-million-dollar approval), to five projects. However, I’m almost certain these projects won’t come close to breaking even for the DAO, as they do not address the core issues related to community building, attracting builders, etc.
I believe that if we work together as a community and come up with a well-thought-out plan to attract people to the Rari Chain using the incentives that have already been approved and voted YES for, we can bring it back to life. Thank you, everyone, for your comments. Looking forward to continuing discussion and finding the best way possible.
Likes: 1
Replies: 0
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RRC-27: Trial run a Governance Working Group
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: July 30, 2024, 11:56 a.m.
Content: Standing behind this.
Likes: 1
Replies: 0
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[RRC-XX] Delegate Incentive Program
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: July 1, 2024, 4:53 a.m.
Content: Thanks for bringing it up Jenga!
In regards to empowering active delegates my thought process is that we have really quality individuals who participated in Cohort II program and since the program is ending soon and the participants will lose their voting power, I believe that discussing this topic is really important right now since it is time sensitive.
I fully agree with the idea behind this draft which suggest that the most active members should be rewarded with $RARI (way for delegates to be permanently part of DAO instead of depending on programs and temporary veRari allocation).
Now that is the part I assume many would agree with. Next and crucial question is how to we determine eligibility? Should the team decide? Should we track on chain data like participation in governance, activity on forum etc?
Would really like to hear what do you guys think. In my opinion I don’t think it will be major issue since it’s pretty clear who’s been active past months in the DAO but yeah, we gotta articulate eligibility requirement somehow.
Likes: 1
Replies: 0
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[RRC-XX] Empower active delegates
by dzonson.eth - No Role
Posted on: June 20, 2024, 6:40 a.m.
Content:
bitblondy:
Another idea would be to reward active delegates with a share of their delegation, so they can build up their own RARI holdings if they stay active, instead of hoping for a delegation every season.
I want to highlight this part from @bitblondy. By rewarding volunteer work and contributions from these delegates, we can further strengthen the bonds within the Rari DAO. Given that the Cohort program provides a ‘fictional’ asset that is not owned by the delegates and disappears after a few months, I think rewarding active delegates with real $RARI will lay a strong foundation for the future. This approach will enable these individuals to participate in governance regardless of their financial situation, as it is currently quite expensive to participate.
Additionally, there is a draft created by @jengajojo a few months ago that clearly defines the criteria for ‘active’ delegates and how to reward them.
I believe that rewarding delegates with a share of their delegation is completely doable too in financial sense, having in mind that not all of the selected delegates from Cohort 2 are being active.
Likes: 2
Replies: 3
Replies:
- jengajojo: Thanks for the feedback @Jaf @WinVerse @forexus @dzonson.eth
Jaf:
Could you please provide an example?
Criteria Measurement/Multiplier veRARI Fictitious Delegate veRARI allocated
Passed a proposal onchain per proposal 5000 Has passed 10 proposal on Tally 50000
Engaged in governance yes/no 2000 Has non zero values for gov engagement 2000
Voted on proposals Proportional to % proposals voted on 1000 Voted on 40% of proposal since receiving delegation 400
General Participation yes/no 500 Has non zero values for gov engagement 500
Total veRARI this delegate will receive is 52900
Jaf:
The incentive for token holders is already in place; we just need to lower the barrier for participation. It’s a win-win situation.
I don’t know if this is true tbh. There is really no incentive for the average token holder to delegate or bother with governance in general since the reason why someone holds governance tokens today is because they act like pseudo-equity and/or represent some sort of claim on the treasury, but in reality gov tokens behave more similar to meme coins. The tally team actually puts this in much better words than me. You can check out the whole post here: Liquid staking for $ENS - #2 by dennison - ?️ Meta-Governance - ENS DAO Governance Forum
WinVerse:
(delegates incentives) adopted towards the end of cohort one. Jana did mention a cap allocated for these initiatives so I would be in favor of a 60-40/50-50 split to keep things in check.
Delegation incentives should be a separate topic as you pointed out already. However, we need to see the data from the previous program first imo. Did 100K RARI actually generate 100K RARI worth of voting weight?
To the other point on token split, this proposal does not request any tokens from the DAO treasury, so we do not need to make a split here unless the DAO wants to use tokens from the treasury for this purpose.
dzonson.eth:
I think rewarding active delegates with real $RARI will lay a strong foundation for the future.
I am completely in sync with this idea and even made a proposal about it [RRC-XX] Delegate Incentive Program
However I’d like to stress on the fact once again that governance is work, and expecting delegates to lock their compensation for increased voting weight will only attract delegates who are well capitalised and do not need an income to pay their living costs.
I’ll refer back to the thread I shared earlier on tally’s solution to align incentives between token holders, DAO and delegates. It is the best one I have seen so far however it will be costly to implement this unless the tally team wants to help us build this with their own funds. In the short term, the best solution is to take tokens from the DAO or the foundation and delegate them to performing delegates.
- bitblondy: Thanks for your opinion on this.
Rewarding active delegates with a share of their delegation is essentially a form of retroactively “paying” delegates.
While I think this can ca part of an engagement strategy (especially to give delegates a long-term perspective), that’s probably something the foundation has to decide upon, whether it’s an option at all.
Maybe it’s possible to lock the rewards for some time, since the point would be, that the rewards stay in the governance system.
- forexus: I agree on this, it would be more motivating if there are rewards to be earned for delegates in the DAO.
Think of a weekly reward system where Delegates have to complete simple tasks like:
Be active in the telegram channel
Gain some levels in the Discord Channel
Activity in the telegram group
Authentic engagement on forum posts
Create a discussion regarding a proposal
Creating proposals on Tally
Voting on proposals on Tally
Weekly reoccuring rewards depending on a delegates activity would reward and motivate someones effort in the DAO.