Profile of jengajojo in Rari Foundation
Posts by jengajojo
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Proposal Overflow Call #2
by jengajojo - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
Posted on: Oct. 23, 2024, 8:13 a.m.
Content:
Announcement:
As part of it’s mandate to host governance calls when necessary, the Governance Working Group will host the second proposal review call on Tuesday October 29 th at 16 UTC in the discord server voice channel.
This call will be primarily focused on gathering consensus on [RRC-XX] Rari Staking Incentives 3 by @Jaf and GWG
Likes: 8
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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[RRC - XX] DAO Code of Conduct
by jengajojo - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
Posted on: Oct. 9, 2024, 7:40 a.m.
Content:
This is the latest version of the proposal
Abstract:
This proposal introduces a Code of Conduct for RARI DAO delegates and community members to ensure a respectful and productive governance environment. It outlines expectations for delegate behavior and engagement policies, enforced by market forces and moderators respectively, and details consequences for violations.
Motivation:
Implementing this Code of Conduct will help establish a respectful and professional environment within the RARI DAO. It ensures that both delegates and community members engage in meaningful and constructive discussions, aligning with the broader mission of decentralization and community-driven governance.
Rationale:
The proposed Code of Conduct aligns with the mission of RARI DAO by promoting transparent, respectful, and informed decision-making. The expectations for delegates encourage professionalism, accountability, and empathy, which reflect the values of a decentralized autonomous organization focused on the collective good. The engagement policies aim to maintain a healthy community discourse, contributing to the long-term sustainability of the DAO.
Key Terms:
Delegation market: A system where token holders delegate their voting power to trusted individuals, who act as their representatives within the DAO.
Conflicts of interest: Situations where personal interests may compromise the impartiality of a delegate’s decisions.
Specifications:
The Code of Conduct consists of two facets and will be enforced by their own mechanisms:
Delegate Expectations (Enforced by the delegation market)
These are ‘should’ statements which are enforceable by the delegation free market but not directly by any elected or unelected committee. All delegates should abide by these expectations. If a delegate does not abide by these expectations, their delegators should consider re-delegating to a delegate who does abide by them.
Be informed about the broader crypto ecosystem.
Act and vote based on what they believe best serves the interests of the DAO.
Review proposals professionally without bias and abstain if unable to do so.
Provide constructive, well-researched feedback, avoid personal attacks, unsubstantiated claims, and use designated channels for discussions.
Avoid conflicts of interest wherever possible and reduce the impact of these when it’s not possible to avoid them.
Disclose potential conflicts of interest whenever possible.
Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In cases such as multiple-choice voting, delegates may vote for themselves as long as they also vote for at least one other candidate.
Be respectful of diverse options and demonstrate empathy towards other delegates or community members.
Policies for Engagement (Enforced by moderators)
Using the Forum (Discourse), Discord, and Telegram.
Treat everyone with respect, avoiding discrimination, harassment, and inappropriate language or behavior, especially in tough conversations.
Contribute meaningfully to discussions by adding value, providing constructive critiques, and offering evidence for claims.
Encourage respectful discourse and avoid personal attacks in all interactions.
Uphold civility, common sense, and a positive attitude in all interactions.
Stay vigilant against scams and phishing attempts. Reporting suspicious activity is encouraged.
To report a Policies of Engagement violation by any user one may flag the violation using tools provided by the platform on which it has occurred. These should be handled by moderators of various platforms in cooperation with the Foundation. If a delegate does not abide by the rules above, they will:
Receive a warning, in minor cases.
Receive a suspension for one month in severe cases.
After that, a delegate may receive a six-month suspension for repeated violations.
If a delegate continues to violate the above rules they may face permanent suspension from the DAO. Suspensions will apply to participation in community platforms such as the forum (Discourse), Telegram or Discord, not the DAO as a whole.
Steps to Implement:
Gather feedback from the community
Modify proposal if needed (based on feedback)
Post onchain for voting
Overall Cost:
There are no direct costs associated with the implementation of this proposal
Likes: 3
Replies: 1
Replies:
- cr1st0f: Thanks for taking into account the feedback. I still can’t get my head around why there are exceptions to self voting rules and don’t think there’s a difference between single and multiple choice voting here. If there are issues with not enough voting power being active to reach quorum, perhaps this could be something the GWG should look at and provide recommendations for in their report? Allowing self voting to solve this seems suboptimal.
I’d support this as a first version of the code of conduct and if issues emerge with self voting in future I’ll make some noise then - we’re only a small DAO but it’s so easy to slip into bad, high spend, easily manipulated, inefficient practices like we see in arbitrum at the moment for example. Being a small DAO means avoiding this is even more important imo, preventing self voting is a really basic rule that helps build good culture especially where vote power isn’t evenly distributed.
Looking forward to seeing what else the GWG puts out and glad to see progress on building these foundations.
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[RRC - XX] DAO Code of Conduct
by jengajojo - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
Posted on: Oct. 8, 2024, 9:40 a.m.
Content: Thank you for your thorough review and feedback on the proposal @cr 1 st 0 f @bitblondy I’d like to address a few of the points raised, as there are some nuances that need further clarification:
1 . Voting for One’s Own Candidacy:
While I understand the need for clarity, I believe there’s value in allowing delegates to vote for themselves in multiple-choice elections as long as they also vote for others. The rationale here is that in multiple-choice voting, a delegate may genuinely be a strong candidate but could also fairly support others, thereby ensuring fairness in the process. In single-choice elections, the potential for self-serving bias is much stronger, hence the stricter rule.
Regarding proposals where a delegate stands to benefit financially (such as working group participation), this is an important point, however the way voting power is distributed today disallows proposals from meeting quorum without the top delegates voting in favor. If these delegates are also part of the WG then we face gridlock like we did in the first iteration of the GWG proposal. We can amend this point once the voting power distribution imbalance has been resolved.
2 . Conflicts of Interest:
I agree that the statement on disclosing conflicts of interest can be simplified for clarity. The original phrasing was intended to acknowledge the complexities of disclosure in certain cases, but I agree that transparency should be non-negotiable. As for enforcement, I think your idea of introducing penalties for those who fail to disclose conflicts, such as blacklisting individuals from treasury spending, is worth exploring. This would add a layer of accountability and deter exploitative behavior however this would also involve assigning these responsibility to someone, which is something we want to avoid in this exercise. If there is any way we can enforce penalties without additional overhead please let us know.
3 . Social Media and Subjective Language:
I appreciate your concerns regarding discussions in public spaces like social media. The intent behind recommending designated channels was to ensure that sensitive or contentious issues are discussed in controlled environments where moderation can take place. However, I see how restricting these discussions may be interpreted as limiting open discourse, which is a critical aspect of decentralized governance. I’m open to revising this language to allow for public discussions, while still maintaining respectful and constructive engagement.
Regarding the points about civility, common sense, and positive attitude, I understand how subjective these can be. However, the aim here is not to suppress valid criticism or heated debate, but to maintain a baseline of respectful discourse. We could refine this language to ensure that it does not become a tool for silencing dissent but still discourages personal attacks or harmful behavior.
As for the point on compromised private keys, the intention was to encourage community vigilance against phishing and scams, not to punish individuals for security failures. We can rephrase this to avoid unintended consequences.
Amendment:
“Encourage respectful discourse and avoid personal attacks in all interactions.”
“Stay vigilant against scams and phishing attempts. Reporting suspicious activity is encouraged.”
4 . Extending Code of Conduct to Working Group Participants:
I think your suggestion to extend the Code of Conduct to working group participants, treasury-delegated token holders, and grant recipients is a strong one. The current framework for setting up WGs is limited to delegates and this CoC document already applies to this group.
bitblondy:
Also the part “Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election”, does it mean that delegates can vote for themselves if it’s a group of people, or only if there is multiple-choice voting?
The intention behind that part of the proposal is that delegates should not vote for themselves in single-candidate elections to avoid conflicts of interest and self-serving behavior. However, in multiple-choice voting (where delegates vote for more than one candidate or option), the proposal allows a delegate to vote for themselves as long as they also vote for at least one other candidate.
bitblondy:
“suspension from the DAO”
We can modify the language to reflect that:
Amendment:
“Suspensions will apply to participation in community platforms such as the forum (Discourse) or Discord, not the DAO as a whole.”
Likes: 4
Replies: 1
Replies:
- bitblondy: Thanks for the clarification and adaptions to the proposal. The part about suspension sounds good.
When thinking about the term “multiple-choice”, it’s usually referring to multiple options (e.g. giving yes/no for every single candidate, there are different voting schemes in Tally), therefore the wording might not be optimal.
I agree with @cr1st0f that in case of the voting of a whole group (as with the GWG), the candidates should abstain. Same with the thoughts about the quorum.
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[RRC - XX] DAO Code of Conduct
by jengajojo - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
Posted on: Sept. 28, 2024, 8:38 a.m.
Content:
bitblondy:
is this a deliverable of the governance working group or your initiative?
Yes. The GWG maintains public communication and public weekly calls on discord which everyone is welcome to attend and give feedback when these topics are being discussed. Here is the working document https://www.notion.so/rari-foundation/Code-of-Conduct-a 08304 ffd 8 b 94 d 33 b 66 a 6 f 998130 d 090 1
Likes: 1
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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[RRC - XX] DAO Code of Conduct
by jengajojo - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
Posted on: Sept. 25, 2024, 8:03 a.m.
Content: Thanks for the question @Firefly 808
The engagement policies do not cover voting participation since there is currently no sybil resistant way to censor an individual or org from participating in onchain voting. The best we can do is prevent someone from spreading inappropriate content while engaging in public discourse.
Likes: 5
Replies: 2
Replies:
- Firefly808: I will support this proposal. I can put it on tally once Delegate Launchpad 3 launches and I have a few more votes again, if it hasn’t been put up on tally already by then.
- bitblondy: Thanks for clarifying, appreciate the effort of the working group. I requested access to the notion.
I agree with @Firefly808 that the part about “suspension from the DAO” might not be accurate, rather from the forum or discord. Maybe you could adapt that.
Also the part “Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election”, does it mean that delegates can vote for themselves if it’s a group of people, or only if there is multiple-choice voting?
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[RRC - XX] DAO Code of Conduct
by jengajojo - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
Posted on: Sept. 23, 2024, 1:12 p.m.
Content: Latest version of this proposal can be found here
Abstract:
This proposal introduces a Code of Conduct for RARI DAO delegates and community members to ensure a respectful and productive governance environment. It outlines expectations for delegate behavior and engagement policies, enforced by market forces and moderators respectively, and details consequences for violations.
Motivation:
Implementing this Code of Conduct will help establish a respectful and professional environment within the RARI DAO. It ensures that both delegates and community members engage in meaningful and constructive discussions, aligning with the broader mission of decentralization and community-driven governance.
Rationale:
The proposed Code of Conduct aligns with the mission of RARI DAO by promoting transparent, respectful, and informed decision-making. The expectations for delegates encourage professionalism, accountability, and empathy, which reflect the values of a decentralized autonomous organization focused on the collective good. The engagement policies aim to maintain a healthy community discourse, contributing to the long-term sustainability of the DAO.
Key Terms:
Delegation market: A system where token holders delegate their voting power to trusted individuals, who act as their representatives within the DAO.
Conflicts of interest: Situations where personal interests may compromise the impartiality of a delegate’s decisions.
Specifications:
The Code of Conduct consists of two facets and will be enforced by their own mechanisms:
Delegate Expectations (Enforced by the delegation market)
These are ‘should’ statements which are enforceable by the delegation free market but not directly by any elected or unelected committee. All delegates should abide by these expectations. If a delegate does not abide by these expectations, their delegators should consider re-delegating to a delegate who does abide by them.
Be informed about the broader crypto ecosystem.
Act and vote based on what they believe best serves the interests of the DAO.
Review proposals professionally without bias and abstain if unable to do so.
Provide constructive, well-researched feedback, avoid personal attacks, unsubstantiated claims, and use designated channels for discussions.
Avoid conflicts of interest wherever possible and reduce the impact of these when it’s not possible to avoid them.
Disclose potential conflicts of interest whenever possible.
Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In cases such as multiple-choice voting, delegates may vote for themselves as long as they also vote for at least one other candidate.
Be respectful of diverse options and demonstrate empathy towards other delegates or community members.
Policies for Engagement (Enforced by moderators)
Using the Forum (Discourse), Discord, and Telegram.
Treat everyone with respect, avoiding discrimination, harassment, and inappropriate language or behavior, especially in tough conversations.
Contribute meaningfully to discussions by adding value, providing constructive critiques, and offering evidence for claims.
Use designated channels for discussions, avoiding social media or public spaces for contentious topics.
Uphold civility, common sense, and a positive attitude in all interactions.
Stay safe from scams and phishing attempts, protect your private keys, and report suspicious activities to safeguard the community.
To report a Policies of Engagement violation by any user one may flag the violation using tools provided by the platform on which it has occurred. These should be handled by moderators of various platforms in cooperation with the Foundation. If a delegate does not abide by the rules above, they will:
Receive a warning, in minor cases.
Receive a suspension for one month in severe cases.
After that, a delegate may receive a six-month suspension for repeated violations.
If a delegate continues to violate the above rules they may face permanent suspension from the DAO.
Steps to Implement:
Gather feedback from the community
Modify proposal if needed (based on feedback)
Post onchain for voting
Overall Cost:
There are no direct costs associated with the implementation of this proposal
Likes: 8
Replies: 1
Replies:
- cr1st0f: I have further feedback having reviewed this more throughly:
I believe this should be simplified to asking people to not vote for themselves under any circumstances, I’m not sure why delegates should be allowed to vote for themselves if multiple choice but not if single choice. How about voting for proposals which benefit them financially in other ways? For example creating a working group where the delegate is a paid member, should delegates be allowed to vote in favour of this?
jengajojo:
Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In cases such as multiple-choice voting, delegates may vote for themselves as long as they also vote for at least one other candidate.
This needs to be simpler: disclose all conflicts of interest. In what circumstances would this “not be possible”? We need to have clear conflict of interest policies imo otherwise the DAO could become very extractive. Is there any way to impose penalties on this sort of behaviour for example blacklisting individuals who do this from treasury spend or something like that? Would that be better for the DAO?
jengajojo:
Disclose potential conflicts of interest whenever possible.
jengajojo:
Avoid conflicts of interest wherever possible and reduce the impact of these when it’s not possible to avoid them.
These seem unnecessary and potentially open to exploitation, I’d recommend removal. We should be free to discuss things on social media, forum is also a public space so I’m not sure what this really means. Civility, common sense and a positive attitude is very subjective, I can see this being abused in the case of contentious topics. The third one could see a delegate being kicked from the forums and discord for having their private keys compromised, this doesn’t seem a particularly good outcome for delegates or the DAO.
jengajojo:
Use designated channels for discussions, avoiding social media or public spaces for contentious topics.
Uphold civility, common sense, and a positive attitude in all interactions.
Stay safe from scams and phishing attempts, protect your private keys, and report suspicious activities to safeguard the community.
Finally, I’d recommend that all working group participants, those who have tokens delegated from the treasury, and anyone receiving funds from the treasury through grants or any other programs are required to abide by all of the code of conduct at risk of having their pay/grants/delegation revoked. This would provide a third level of sanctions aside from “delegation market” and “banning from forums etc”.
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RRC-xx: Continuation of RARI DAO Security Council
by jengajojo - GWG Mods
Posted on: Sept. 13, 2024, 7:23 a.m.
Content: Glad to see that the first term of the security council went smoothly. Can you please help us understand:
What is the rationale behind continuing with the same members as opposed to running a fresh election?
How many members of the council besides the tech lead are able to read and understand code? and have experience with deploying code in production?
Likes: 5
Replies: 2
Replies:
- Jaf: As for me
When it comes to my technical background:
I’ve been in the software game for over 20 years now, playing different roles. And I’ve been in the web3 space for the past 7 years.
During my time with Push Protocol I led for some time the engineering team at the beginning before transitioning into getting the DAO started.
I can read/write/debug/deploy code, and have done it in Prod environments.
Also, I’m currently building my own project where I play a hands-on technical role and I’m very involved with the infrastructure side of things - among other things.
When it comes to RariDAO:
I’ve been a delegate since cohort 1. Always staying on top of most discussions, actively engaging in governance, and supporting RariDAO initiatives.
I take my role on the council seriously, always acting promptly and with the responsibility it requires.
- JanaBe: hey @jengajojo thanks for the questions.
We’re proposing the same security council members for a couple of reasons:
To ensure qualified delegates with links to our community, established reputation, and the right profile (technical and/or governance expertise)
To comply with a requirement of one member being the Director of the Foundation and for geographically dispersed members (Americas, Europe, Asia)
Technical members: Eugene, Andrei, Jaf. Governance&technical: StableLab.
Let us know if there’s anything else!
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Proposal Overflow Call
by jengajojo - This user is a moderator, GWG Mods
Posted on: Sept. 11, 2024, 7:49 a.m.
Content:
Announcement:
As part of it’s mandate to host governance calls when necessary, the Governance Working Group will host the first proposal review call on Tuesday September 17 th at 16 UTC in the discord server voice channel. These are some community led proposals that will be discussed:
RRC-Dropable 1 by @forexus and @dzonson.eth
DePIN Support for RARI Chain. Onboarding RARI to the POKT Network 2 by @benedictvs
[RRC-XX] Empower active delegates by @jengajojo
If anyone else wishes to discuss other topics please reply below by 17 th Sept 15 UTC
Likes: 6
Replies: 0
No replies yet.
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Enable RARI Staking
by jengajojo - GWG Mods
Posted on: Sept. 10, 2024, 12:36 p.m.
Content: Thanks for the proposal @coolhorsegirl
Will there be a default Karma score threshold for being eligible for rewards?
Does the DAO have the option to toggle this threshold?
Will tally go out to money markets and enable lending and borrowing of the stRARiI token or does the DAO have to do it?
Jaf:
Is there a limit on how much voting power one delegate can accumulate? In the past, we’ve seen situations where a single delegate had enough power to significantly influence the outcome of a proposal.
This is a legit concern. I strongly recommend ways around this in the default implementation
Likes: 1
Replies: 1
Replies:
- coolhorsegirl: Hi @jengajojo !
There will not be a default Karma threshold for being eligible for rewards - this is up to Rari DAO and can be adjusted by the DAO at its discretion.
We define an active delegate using Karma Score. The DAO will define the Karma Score requirement for being considered an active delegate. Karma Score is a combination of delegate’s Snapshot voting stats, onchain voting stats and their forum activity. To accurately calculate forum activity score, delegates are required to prove ownership of their forum handle by signing a message with their delegate address and posting on the forum.
By this proposal, Tally will be responsible for standing up the LST version of RARI (stRARI) - not including enabling borrowing/lending of the token in money markets.
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RRC-Dropable
by jengajojo - GWG Mods
Posted on: Aug. 30, 2024, 4:42 a.m.
Content: Thanks for this well researched proposal. Can you please help me understand the following:
As I understand the current state of chain usage is a reflection of the overall drop in interest in collictables as a usecase for NFTs. Is there any report or third party links that you can point to which shows
a. sustained growth in this segment i.e. collectibles
b. sustained chain usage AFTER incentives dry up
forexus:
All fees earned through the Dropable Permissionless Minting App, according to the proposed fees, will need to be set through the DAO. After the completion of the reward program the fees for the use of the minting app will change according the results from our evaluation.
Some percentage will go to Rarible.com, some percentages will go to the Rari Foundation, and some percentages will be used according to the proposed referral commissions.
As I understand the DAO wallet is used to simply receive and forward the funds? Is there any possibility for the DAO to retain a cut?
forexus:
Developers Rarible / Rari Foundation: 4000 $RARI
This seems pretty low for any dev job. Is the foundation subsidising the rest of the cost?
Finally I see many foundation contributors listed on the WG. Have these contributors already agreed to participate in this project or is this a suggestion?
Likes: 1
Replies: 1
Replies:
- forexus: Thank you Jenga Jojo for your questions! Let me elaborate.
jengajojo:
Thanks for this well researched proposal. Can you please help me understand the following:
As I understand the current state of chain usage is a reflection of the overall drop in interest in collictables as a usecase for NFTs. Is there any report or third party links that you can point to which shows
a. sustained growth in this segment i.e. collectibles
b. sustained chain usage AFTER incentives dry up
The best example to this would be Coinbase’s Onchain Summer campaign, which ended September 1st. Since the start of the program there was a rise in statisctics, hitting a critical mass at the end off the campaign (I can tell with 2 mints I did there, first did 10k mints and the last one 61k mints).
However, 2 days after the campaign, activity and statisctics are shrinking again.
Coinbase Wallet
Onchain Summer
Onchain Summer is a celebration of onchain art, music, culture, gaming, and more. Earn points from minting your favorite drops, redeem prizes, and buy merch onchain. Join me in creating a better and more creative internet.
As an artist I will stay on $BASE, I will keep creating, however, I will probably not use Coinbase’s launchpad without marketing support or exposure. So with $RARI upvoting we bring exposure, I will most likely use this to get on top in the Dropable app after the incentives dry up.
And if those incentives dry up, that means the $RARI price has risen significantly. We basicaly create a stream of revenue towards the treasury, which could replenish all the $RARI untill a certain price point. After 3 months we’ll evaluate, see if we can continue giving out incentives. Most ideal scenario would be to keep doing this forever.
jengajojo:
As I understand the DAO wallet is used to simply receive and forward the funds? Is there any possibility for the DAO to retain a cut?
This is the best feedback I can give about these 2 questions based on our research.
jengajojo:
As I understand the DAO wallet is used to simply receive and forward the funds? Is there any possibility for the DAO to retain a cut?
The Rari Foundation will pay everyone according to the proposal and work that has been completed. So when the devs start to work, they’ll receive some funds, and upon completion, they’ll receive the remaining amount of funds.
@jengajojo should we specify this more in the proposal?
jengajojo:
Finally I see many foundation contributors listed on the WG. Have these contributors already agreed to participate in this project or is this a suggestion?
The Rari Foundation/Rarible devs will focus on the mechanics for the $RARI rewards. Since they already get paid for their work by these entities, consider it as a bonus. Correct me if I am wrong here.
