In the course of this season, some investigation surfaced a few links across several Mission proposals, ultimately resulting in a few revelations. There’s been discussion on one of these revelations throughout several threads, so I’d like to centralize that here.
Here is the background:
General Magic, led by @Griff , has been connected to several mission proposals, some of which Griff himself voted to advance. Examples of these connections are as follows (all direct quotes)
General Magic provides grantwriting services 24 to many of these proposals, charging 7 - 50 % of the total grant ask to e.g., DAOstar, Unitap, BrightID, Metagame, Fair Data Society, and Dappnode 9 – often conditional on the grant’s passage
Although the claim has been that part of this is to help add capacity for an onerous grant process, the pitch also states that part of the value added is “our vast network of connections from the Giveth Galaxy, and Public Goods space.”
General Magic provides contract work to grant proposers:
Season 4 Feedback Thread
The hard part is, that General Magic is a for-hire consultant, and has contracts with over 20 different teams in the space to do work for them (everything from accounting to solidity development). GM is usually hired when teams have short term projects that need extra support, and many of these Optimism proposals really fit that use case.
Griff, a delegate with approval power, is providing upfront funding to several of these proposers in anticipation of grants being approved.
Season 4 Feedback Thread
This is probably the most important thing to mention, and what enabled the projects I founded to apply for a larger percentage of the grants than other teams. I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral so that they can have the short term liquidity they need to pay their employees. Honestly, this is a huge risk on my part, but it’s ok, I’m an Optimist. I want all of my teams to work with Optimism.
Griff is directly a team member of several proposing projects, almost all of which put in proposals this round.
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I started/cofounded:
Giveth in 2016
Dappnode in 2017
Commons Stack in 2019
Token Engineering Commons in 2019
Praise in 2020
Trusted Seed in 2020
General Magic in 2021
Pairwise in 2022
Griff used his status as a delegate to put forward to a vote the following selected proposals, several of which (not all here) are affiliated:
Giveth 7
Unitap 5
REGEN Score
Pairwise 6
ITU Blockchain 7
Rumbo Optimista 8
Bankless Dao 7
Bankless Academy 6
ThriveCoin 6
Optimistic Womxn 5
Espacio Crypto 6
DAOStar 5
Bankless Academy 2 7
So there are a few questions to ask:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Are affiliated proposals whose approval for a vote depend on him actually eligible for voting?
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
The post highlights connections between General Magic, led by Griff, and various mission proposals, pointing out potential conflicts of interest. General Magic provides grantwriting services to multiple proposals, and Griff, as a delegate with approval power, is providing upfront funding to proposers. Questions are raised about financial interests, disclosure, lending terms, voting eligibility, and the impact of such practices on governance distributions.
Netrim: Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video.
jackanorak:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
As stated in your video, you are working with a lot of projects and you disclosed it after the fact.
GaaS looks like conflict of interest between Griff (delegate) for Optimism and General Magic services.
The ENS example doesn’t apply unless you are a delegate on the ENS DAO and you voted in favor of the swag shop.
jackanorak:
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
It has now
jackanorak:
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
jackanorak:
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
There is a conflict of interest if you are able to temp check, move something to vote or even altogether approve
jackanorak:
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
More projects would apply for grants, more % that GM takes?
As a personal note, the issue with videos is that they do not get indexed in the forum so there is no way to reference your answers.
In the course of this season, some investigation surfaced a few links across several Mission propos…
In the course of this season, some investigation surfaced a few links across several Mission proposals, ultimately resulting in a few revelations. There’s been discussion on one of these revelations throughout several threads, so I’d like to centralize that here.
Here is the background:
General Magic, led by @Griff , has been connected to several mission proposals, some of which Griff himself voted to advance. Examples of these connections are as follows (all direct quotes)
General Magic provides grantwriting services to many of these proposals, charging 7 - 50 % of the total grant ask to e.g., DAOstar, Unitap, BrightID, Metagame, Fair Data Society, and Dappnode – often conditional on the grant’s passage
Although the claim has been that part of this is to help add capacity for an onerous grant process, the pitch also states that part of the value added is “our vast network of connections from the Giveth Galaxy, and Public Goods space.”
General Magic provides contract work to grant proposers:
Season 4 Feedback Thread
The hard part is, that General Magic is a for-hire consultant, and has contracts with over 20 different teams in the space to do work for them (everything from accounting to solidity development). GM is usually hired when teams have short term projects that need extra support, and many of these Optimism proposals really fit that use case.
Griff, a delegate with approval power, is providing upfront funding to several of these proposers in anticipation of grants being approved.
Season 4 Feedback Thread
This is probably the most important thing to mention, and what enabled the projects I founded to apply for a larger percentage of the grants than other teams. I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral so that they can have the short term liquidity they need to pay their employees. Honestly, this is a huge risk on my part, but it’s ok, I’m an Optimist. I want all of my teams to work with Optimism.
Griff is directly a team member of several proposing projects, almost all of which put in proposals this round.
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I started/cofounded:
Giveth in 2016
Dappnode in 2017
Commons Stack in 2019
Token Engineering Commons in 2019
Praise in 2020
Trusted Seed in 2020
General Magic in 2021
Pairwise in 2022
Griff used his status as a delegate to put forward to a vote the following selected proposals, several of which (not all here) are affiliated:
Giveth
Unitap
REGEN Score
Pairwise
ITU Blockchain
Rumbo Optimista
Bankless Dao
Bankless Academy
ThriveCoin
Optimistic Womxn
Espacio Crypto
DAOStar
Bankless Academy 2
So there are a few questions to ask:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Are affiliated proposals whose approval for a vote depend on him actually eligible for voting?
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
Netrim: Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video.
jackanorak:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
As stated in your video, you are working with a lot of projects and you disclosed it after the fact.
GaaS looks like conflict of interest between Griff (delegate) for Optimism and General Magic services.
The ENS example doesn’t apply unless you are a delegate on the ENS DAO and you voted in favor of the swag shop.
jackanorak:
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
It has now
jackanorak:
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
jackanorak:
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
There is a conflict of interest if you are able to temp check, move something to vote or even altogether approve
jackanorak:
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
More projects would apply for grants, more % that GM takes?
As a personal note, the issue with videos is that they do not get indexed in the forum so there is no way to reference your answers.
A lot to talk about @jackanorak
Want to have a call? We can record it and post it here?
A lot to talk about @jackanorak
Want to have a call? We can record it and post it here?
I think it’s best simply to discuss entirely on here, as this isn’t a conversation just with me
I think it’s best simply to discuss entirely on here, as this isn’t a conversation just with me
I think a video that we post here would be a lot more efficient… I am not a fast typer, and honestl…
I think a video that we post here would be a lot more efficient… I am not a fast typer, and honestly my calendar is booked, I will need to do it by video, either by recording it with you or without you. That said, you have been the only person to bring up this conversation.
No one else has reached out to me in public or private (that I know about) about this… so if there are others, they are all working with you about it it seems, and I am out of the loop.
Pr0: Is it not a little ironic to project a shadowy cabal when being accused of running a shadowy cabal?
To be honest theres a buncha weird aspects to this that need to be addressed, especially given the amount of proposals, the scopes, the grant recipients and the intermingling. Like the grant writing fees is especially concerning given that none of the grants mention this, which is misleading at best and fraudulant at worst since they state usually they are for dev, community or expenses but if the funds are going to grant writing, then obviously not being used for those purposes.
Also specifically brought up token loans before multiple times to the foundation/others as had been pushing for it to be addressed as to whether this is considered fine as it definately has benefits for helping teams actually build, but after seeing a pretty clear push against it from the Foundation atleast, and seeing this seems to be pretty prevelant aswell as directly stated by you for projects you’re involved with, hard to assume good faith here rather than asking about it openly
Season 4 Feedback Thread
Metagovernance
Posting this here, ran it through GPT 4 to make it more understandable and clean than the Discord discussion but I think its a pretty core consideration that needs to be addressed by the foundation for actual growth and getting quality devs and proposals. I firmly believe that the primary limitation for quality proposals is the token lock, particularly considering it applies to the entire allocation. There are co-grants, of course, but altogether, they only total to around 120k, distributed acr…
These token agreements on loans, fees for grant writing and not disclosing any of this is highly questionable. This becomes worse as a delegate/someone that can approve projects. Are you willing to disclose the details for these loans, any discount on the loans, optionality in keeping collateral and conditions of the loans?
AxlVaz: I agree with @jackanorak I think it is something that should be discussed here in the forum.
Gonna.eth: What I say here is my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council.
Hey @Griff I’m interested in these answers. Thank you for the transparency you have so far we have much to learn from this.
Netrim: I think there is enough interest within this thread to keep it here. So we will wait for your answer
OPUser: Hi Griff, saw you comment on other thread, here, and I appreciate the transparency.
But I would like to echo points raised by Jack and await your answer.
Is it not a little ironic to project a shadowy cabal when being accused of running a shadowy cabal?…
Is it not a little ironic to project a shadowy cabal when being accused of running a shadowy cabal?
To be honest theres a buncha weird aspects to this that need to be addressed, especially given the amount of proposals, the scopes, the grant recipients and the intermingling. Like the grant writing fees is especially concerning given that none of the grants mention this, which is misleading at best and fraudulant at worst since they state usually they are for dev, community or expenses but if the funds are going to grant writing, then obviously not being used for those purposes.
Also specifically brought up token loans before multiple times to the foundation/others as had been pushing for it to be addressed as to whether this is considered fine as it definately has benefits for helping teams actually build, but after seeing a pretty clear push against it from the Foundation atleast, and seeing this seems to be pretty prevelant aswell as directly stated by you for projects you’re involved with, hard to assume good faith here rather than asking about it openly
Season 4 Feedback Thread Metagovernance
Posting this here, ran it through GPT 4 to make it more understandable and clean than the Discord discussion but I think its a pretty core consideration that needs to be addressed by the foundation for actual growth and getting quality devs and proposals.
I firmly believe that the primary limitation for quality proposals is the token lock, particularly considering it applies to the entire allocation. There are co-grants, of course, but altogether, they only total to around 120 k, distributed acr…
These token agreements on loans, fees for grant writing and not disclosing any of this is highly questionable. This becomes worse as a delegate/someone that can approve projects. Are you willing to disclose the details for these loans, any discount on the loans, optionality in keeping collateral and conditions of the loans?
To be clear @Pr 0 , I’m not making any accusations - just repeating facts that Griff and affiliates…
To be clear @Pr 0 , I’m not making any accusations - just repeating facts that Griff and affiliates have provided and raising what I think are critical questions
As a delegate, this information is definitely concerning. It looks like these actions violate the s…
As a delegate, this information is definitely concerning. It looks like these actions violate the self dealing clause of the code of conduct below. This would be the same thing as me helping one of my portfolio companies write a grant, promote them in the forum, approve them for voting, then also take a portion of the grant they received. Maybe I’m looking at this the wrong way, happy to be proven wrong here.
Code of Conduct
No Self-Dealing
Mandatory (Violation 10 ): Optimists must avoid conflicts of interest where possible and mitigate their impact when not possible. We recommend over-communicating and disclosing potential conflicts of interest even when they do not warrant abstaining from a vote.
10 a. Any actual or reasonably anticipated conflicts of interest must be disclosed in writing and prominently displayed ahead of any voting (i.e. when submitting delegate commitments, when running for an elected position, when making public recommendations, etc.).
10 b. Any offer for external compensation relating to delegation or external compensation relating to the Optimism Protocol must be promptly disclosed.
10 c. Delegates are prohibited from approving and voting on their own proposals. Delegates may not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In the case of approval/ranked choice votes, delegates may vote for themselves, so long as they also cast votes for the remaining elected positions.
Example: I can vote for my own candidacy on the Growth Experiments committee, so long as I also cast 4 additional votes (a total of 5 votes, as there are 5 open positions on the sub-committee.)
10 d. Badgeholders should not vote for organizations where they expect any portion of funds to flow to them or any projects they are affiliated with. At a minimum, badgeholders must disclose any project they have a meaningful financial or reputational stake in.
Additionally, protocols participating in the Protocol Delegation Program must:
Mandatory (Violation 11 ): Abstain from using voting power delegated via the Protocol Delegation Program on any proposals that directly involve themselves or a direct competitor.
Mandatory (Violation 12 ): Abstain from providing voting recommendations to the general public, separate from any representative’s participation on the Grants Council.
We all need to operate a way to ensure the grants program is fair and equitable for everyone, other…
We all need to operate a way to ensure the grants program is fair and equitable for everyone, otherwise we are no better than traditional organizations.
I agree with @jackanorak I think it is something that should be discussed here in the forum.
I agree with @jackanorak I think it is something that should be discussed here in the forum.
What I say here is my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council.
Hey @Griff I’m interes…
What I say here is my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council.
Hey @Griff I’m interested in these answers. Thank you for the transparency you have so far we have much to learn from this.
I think there is enough interest within this thread to keep it here. So we will wait for your answer
I think there is enough interest within this thread to keep it here. So we will wait for your answer
In the course of this season, some investigation surfaced a few links across several Mission propos…
In the course of this season, some investigation surfaced a few links across several Mission proposals, ultimately resulting in a few revelations. There’s been discussion on one of these revelations throughout several threads, so I’d like to centralize that here. Here is the background: General Magic, led by @Griff , has been connected to several mission proposals, some of which Griff himself voted to advance. Examples of these connections are as follows (all direct quotes) General Magic provides grantwriting services 22 to many of these proposals, charging 7 - 50 % of the total grant ask to e.g., DAOstar, Unitap, BrightID, Metagame, Fair Data Society, and Dappnode 8 – often conditional on the grant’s passage Although the claim has been that part of this is to help add capacity for an onerous grant process, the pitch also states that part of the value added is “our vast network of connections from the Giveth Galaxy, and Public Goods space.” General Magic provides contract work to grant proposers: Season 4 Feedback Thread The hard part is, that General Magic is a for-hire consultant, and has contracts with over 20 different teams in the space to do work for them (everything from accounting to solidity development). GM is usually hired when teams have short term projects that need extra support, and many of these Optimism proposals really fit that use case. Griff, a delegate with approval power, is providing upfront funding to several of these proposers in anticipation of grants being approved. Season 4 Feedback Thread This is probably the most important thing to mention, and what enabled the projects I founded to apply for a larger percentage of the grants than other teams. I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral so that they can have the short term liquidity they need to pay their employees. Honestly, this is a huge risk on my part, but it’s ok, I’m an Optimist. I want all of my teams to work with Optimism. Griff is directly a team member of several proposing projects, almost all of which put in proposals this round. Season 4 Feedback Thread I started/cofounded: Giveth in 2016 Dappnode in 2017 Commons Stack in 2019 Token Engineering Commons in 2019 Praise in 2020 Trusted Seed in 2020 General Magic in 2021 Pairwise in 2022 Griff used his status as a delegate to put forward to a vote the following selected proposals, several of which (not all here) are affiliated: Giveth 7 Unitap 5 REGEN Score 6 Pairwise 6 ITU Blockchain 7 Rumbo Optimista 6 Bankless Dao 7 Bankless Academy 6 ThriveCoin 6 Optimistic Womxn 5 Espacio Crypto 5 DAOStar 5 Bankless Academy 2 7 So there are a few questions to ask: Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices? If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance? What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures? Are affiliated proposals whose approval for a vote depend on him actually eligible for voting? What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure? Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
Netrim: Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video.
jackanorak:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
As stated in your video, you are working with a lot of projects and you disclosed it after the fact.
GaaS looks like conflict of interest between Griff (delegate) for Optimism and General Magic services.
The ENS example doesn’t apply unless you are a delegate on the ENS DAO and you voted in favor of the swag shop.
jackanorak:
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
It has now
jackanorak:
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
jackanorak:
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
There is a conflict of interest if you are able to temp check, move something to vote or even altogether approve
jackanorak:
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
More projects would apply for grants, more % that GM takes?
As a personal note, the issue with videos is that they do not get indexed in the forum so there is no way to reference your answers.
In the course of this season, some investigation surfaced a few links across several Mission propos…
In the course of this season, some investigation surfaced a few links across several Mission proposals, ultimately resulting in a few revelations. There’s been discussion on one of these revelations throughout several threads, so I’d like to centralize that here. Here is the background: General Magic, led by @Griff , has been connected to several mission proposals, some of which Griff himself voted to advance. Examples of these connections are as follows (all direct quotes) General Magic provides grantwriting services 23 to many of these proposals, charging 7 - 50 % of the total grant ask to e.g., DAOstar, Unitap, BrightID, Metagame, Fair Data Society, and Dappnode 8 – often conditional on the grant’s passage Although the claim has been that part of this is to help add capacity for an onerous grant process, the pitch also states that part of the value added is “our vast network of connections from the Giveth Galaxy, and Public Goods space.” General Magic provides contract work to grant proposers: Season 4 Feedback Thread The hard part is, that General Magic is a for-hire consultant, and has contracts with over 20 different teams in the space to do work for them (everything from accounting to solidity development). GM is usually hired when teams have short term projects that need extra support, and many of these Optimism proposals really fit that use case. Griff, a delegate with approval power, is providing upfront funding to several of these proposers in anticipation of grants being approved. Season 4 Feedback Thread This is probably the most important thing to mention, and what enabled the projects I founded to apply for a larger percentage of the grants than other teams. I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral so that they can have the short term liquidity they need to pay their employees. Honestly, this is a huge risk on my part, but it’s ok, I’m an Optimist. I want all of my teams to work with Optimism. Griff is directly a team member of several proposing projects, almost all of which put in proposals this round. Season 4 Feedback Thread I started/cofounded: Giveth in 2016 Dappnode in 2017 Commons Stack in 2019 Token Engineering Commons in 2019 Praise in 2020 Trusted Seed in 2020 General Magic in 2021 Pairwise in 2022 Griff used his status as a delegate to put forward to a vote the following selected proposals, several of which (not all here) are affiliated: Giveth 7 Unitap 5 REGEN Score Pairwise 6 ITU Blockchain 7 Rumbo Optimista 6 Bankless Dao 7 Bankless Academy 6 ThriveCoin 6 Optimistic Womxn 5 Espacio Crypto 5 DAOStar 5 Bankless Academy 2 7 So there are a few questions to ask: Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices? If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance? What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures? Are affiliated proposals whose approval for a vote depend on him actually eligible for voting? What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure? Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
Netrim: Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video.
jackanorak:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
As stated in your video, you are working with a lot of projects and you disclosed it after the fact.
GaaS looks like conflict of interest between Griff (delegate) for Optimism and General Magic services.
The ENS example doesn’t apply unless you are a delegate on the ENS DAO and you voted in favor of the swag shop.
jackanorak:
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
It has now
jackanorak:
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
jackanorak:
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
There is a conflict of interest if you are able to temp check, move something to vote or even altogether approve
jackanorak:
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
More projects would apply for grants, more % that GM takes?
As a personal note, the issue with videos is that they do not get indexed in the forum so there is no way to reference your answers.
Would specifically want to see the loan agreements and grant writing agreements/conditions/benefits…
Would specifically want to see the loan agreements and grant writing agreements/conditions/benefits given the site explicitly mentions relationships. Think those alone would give a lot of clarity since its not really only about self dealing but also the actual requests/uses and implied uses.
A lot to talk about @jackanorak Want to have a call? We can record it and post it here?
A lot to talk about @jackanorak Want to have a call? We can record it and post it here?
I think it’s best simply to discuss entirely on here, as this isn’t a conversation just with me
I think it’s best simply to discuss entirely on here, as this isn’t a conversation just with me
I think a video that we post here would be a lot more efficient… I am not a fast typer, and honestl…
I think a video that we post here would be a lot more efficient… I am not a fast typer, and honestly my calendar is booked, I will need to do it by video, either by recording it with you or without you. That said, you have been the only person to bring up this conversation. No one else has reached out to me in public or private (that I know about) about this… so if there are others, they are all working with you about it it seems, and I am out of the loop.
Pr0: Is it not a little ironic to project a shadowy cabal when being accused of running a shadowy cabal?
To be honest theres a buncha weird aspects to this that need to be addressed, especially given the amount of proposals, the scopes, the grant recipients and the intermingling. Like the grant writing fees is especially concerning given that none of the grants mention this, which is misleading at best and fraudulant at worst since they state usually they are for dev, community or expenses but if the funds are going to grant writing, then obviously not being used for those purposes.
Also specifically brought up token loans before multiple times to the foundation/others as had been pushing for it to be addressed as to whether this is considered fine as it definately has benefits for helping teams actually build, but after seeing a pretty clear push against it from the Foundation atleast, and seeing this seems to be pretty prevelant aswell as directly stated by you for projects you’re involved with, hard to assume good faith here rather than asking about it openly
Season 4 Feedback Thread
Metagovernance
Posting this here, ran it through GPT 4 to make it more understandable and clean than the Discord discussion but I think its a pretty core consideration that needs to be addressed by the foundation for actual growth and getting quality devs and proposals. I firmly believe that the primary limitation for quality proposals is the token lock, particularly considering it applies to the entire allocation. There are co-grants, of course, but altogether, they only total to around 120k, distributed acr…
These token agreements on loans, fees for grant writing and not disclosing any of this is highly questionable. This becomes worse as a delegate/someone that can approve projects. Are you willing to disclose the details for these loans, any discount on the loans, optionality in keeping collateral and conditions of the loans?
AxlVaz: I agree with @jackanorak I think it is something that should be discussed here in the forum.
Gonna.eth: What I say here is my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council.
Hey @Griff I’m interested in these answers. Thank you for the transparency you have so far we have much to learn from this.
Netrim: I think there is enough interest within this thread to keep it here. So we will wait for your answer
OPUser: Hi Griff, saw you comment on other thread, here, and I appreciate the transparency.
But I would like to echo points raised by Jack and await your answer.
Is it not a little ironic to project a shadowy cabal when being accused of running a shadowy cabal?…
Is it not a little ironic to project a shadowy cabal when being accused of running a shadowy cabal? To be honest theres a buncha weird aspects to this that need to be addressed, especially given the amount of proposals, the scopes, the grant recipients and the intermingling. Like the grant writing fees is especially concerning given that none of the grants mention this, which is misleading at best and fraudulant at worst since they state usually they are for dev, community or expenses but if the funds are going to grant writing, then obviously not being used for those purposes. Also specifically brought up token loans before multiple times to the foundation/others as had been pushing for it to be addressed as to whether this is considered fine as it definately has benefits for helping teams actually build, but after seeing a pretty clear push against it from the Foundation atleast, and seeing this seems to be pretty prevelant aswell as directly stated by you for projects you’re involved with, hard to assume good faith here rather than asking about it openly Season 4 Feedback Thread Metagovernance Posting this here, ran it through GPT 4 to make it more understandable and clean than the Discord discussion but I think its a pretty core consideration that needs to be addressed by the foundation for actual growth and getting quality devs and proposals. I firmly believe that the primary limitation for quality proposals is the token lock, particularly considering it applies to the entire allocation. There are co-grants, of course, but altogether, they only total to around 120 k, distributed acr… These token agreements on loans, fees for grant writing and not disclosing any of this is highly questionable. This becomes worse as a delegate/someone that can approve projects. Are you willing to disclose the details for these loans, any discount on the loans, optionality in keeping collateral and conditions of the loans?
To be clear @Pr 0 , I’m not making any accusations - just repeating facts that Griff and affiliates…
To be clear @Pr 0 , I’m not making any accusations - just repeating facts that Griff and affiliates have provided and raising what I think are critical questions
As a delegate, this information is definitely concerning. It looks like these actions violate the s…
As a delegate, this information is definitely concerning. It looks like these actions violate the self dealing clause of the code of conduct below. This would be the same thing as me helping one of my portfolio companies write a grant, promote them in the forum, approve them for voting, then also take a portion of the grant they received. Maybe I’m looking at this the wrong way, happy to be proven wrong here. Code of Conduct No Self-Dealing Mandatory (Violation 10 ): Optimists must avoid conflicts of interest where possible and mitigate their impact when not possible. We recommend over-communicating and disclosing potential conflicts of interest even when they do not warrant abstaining from a vote. 10 a. Any actual or reasonably anticipated conflicts of interest must be disclosed in writing and prominently displayed ahead of any voting (i.e. when submitting delegate commitments, when running for an elected position, when making public recommendations, etc.). 10 b. Any offer for external compensation relating to delegation or external compensation relating to the Optimism Protocol must be promptly disclosed. 10 c. Delegates are prohibited from approving and voting on their own proposals. Delegates may not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In the case of approval/ranked choice votes, delegates may vote for themselves, so long as they also cast votes for the remaining elected positions. Example: I can vote for my own candidacy on the Growth Experiments committee, so long as I also cast 4 additional votes (a total of 5 votes, as there are 5 open positions on the sub-committee.) 10 d. Badgeholders should not vote for organizations where they expect any portion of funds to flow to them or any projects they are affiliated with. At a minimum, badgeholders must disclose any project they have a meaningful financial or reputational stake in. Additionally, protocols participating in the Protocol Delegation Program must: Mandatory (Violation 11 ): Abstain from using voting power delegated via the Protocol Delegation Program on any proposals that directly involve themselves or a direct competitor. Mandatory (Violation 12 ): Abstain from providing voting recommendations to the general public, separate from any representative’s participation on the Grants Council.
We all need to operate a way to ensure the grants program is fair and equitable for everyone, other…
We all need to operate a way to ensure the grants program is fair and equitable for everyone, otherwise we are no better than traditional organizations.
I agree with @jackanorak I think it is something that should be discussed here in the forum.
I agree with @jackanorak I think it is something that should be discussed here in the forum.
What I say here is my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council. Hey @Griff I’m interes…
What I say here is my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council. Hey @Griff I’m interested in these answers. Thank you for the transparency you have so far we have much to learn from this.
I think there is enough interest within this thread to keep it here. So we will wait for your answer
I think there is enough interest within this thread to keep it here. So we will wait for your answer
Hi Griff, saw you comment on other thread, here 15 , and I appreciate the transparency.
But I woul…
Hi Griff, saw you comment on other thread, here 15 , and I appreciate the transparency.
But I would like to echo points raised by Jack and await your answer.
Hi Griff, saw you comment on other thread, here, and I appreciate the transparency.
But I would lik…
Hi Griff, saw you comment on other thread, here, and I appreciate the transparency.
But I would like to echo points raised by Jack and await your answer.
Would specifically want to see the loan agreements and grant writing agreements/conditions/benefits…
Would specifically want to see the loan agreements and grant writing agreements/conditions/benefits given the site explicitly mentions relationships. Think those alone would give a lot of clarity since its not really only about self dealing but also the actual requests/uses and implied uses.
General Magic & Optimism Reply
Sorry for the delay, I would…
General Magic & Optimism Reply
Sorry for the delay, I would love to talk more about this if more clarity is needed, I feel like synchronous communication would be a lot better than forum posts tho, a quick call that can be recorded and shared here would go a long way IMO.
Netrim: Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video.
jackanorak:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
As stated in your video, you are working with a lot of projects and you disclosed it after the fact.
GaaS looks like conflict of interest between Griff (delegate) for Optimism and General Magic services.
The ENS example doesn’t apply unless you are a delegate on the ENS DAO and you voted in favor of the swag shop.
jackanorak:
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
It has now
jackanorak:
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
jackanorak:
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
There is a conflict of interest if you are able to temp check, move something to vote or even altogether approve
jackanorak:
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
More projects would apply for grants, more % that GM takes?
As a personal note, the issue with videos is that they do not get indexed in the forum so there is no way to reference your answers.
brichis: Firstly, it’s essential to remember that our efforts stem from noble intentions. Instead of competing, public good projects should cooperate. While disagreements are sometimes inevitable, they provide an opportunity for finding common ground, a process I appreciate. I personally favor video over forum posts as they provide a more human connection. In a text, the tone can be misinterpreted.
Here are some areas of concern causing uncertainty, my interpretation of their causes, and possible solutions:
Concerning GM Fundraising writing
Problems:
Small teams or individual developers find grant applications challenging.
It is tough to stay updated with all grant opportunities.
Solutions:
As a Collective, we need to define rules for an unprecedented situation like this. My personal belief is that everything around such agreements must be textually expressed in any mission or grant.
We should simplify the process for Alliance participation.
More opportunities under Optimism should be promoted to attract those outside the Optimism ecosystem.
Public goods are a niche sector, and overlapping involvements in multiple projects are common. Therefore, generating best practices and reporting potential conflicts of interest is crucial.
Concerning Lending
Problems:
The OP is locked for one year.
Many teams can’t afford to work without upfront payment and wait for a year to be paid with a governance token lacking a demand motive beyond governance use.
Solutions:
Make Grants / Missions liquid and RetroPGF blocked as suggested by Griff.
There have been intriguing proposals to generate APR with the OP delegated. Despite legal barriers, it could be beneficial to find a solution that doesn’t affect the legality or creates demand beyond governance.
These issues amplify the uncertainty already associated with the requirement for four approvals and votes.
Regarding my involvement with Espacio Cripto and H.E.R. LATAM, I must say that the Mexican community is tightly-knit. In my spare time, I strive to provide them access to these opportunities. I’ve done the same for other projects and aim to expand my help scope. My hope is for more countries to apply here in the future. Optimism is unique, and it would be phenomenal to see its reach extend globally. Ideally, the application process will be simplified to the point where no external help is needed.
Let’s progress, find common ground, create agreements, and make public goods victorious. Stay optimistic!
katie: Hey Griff, thank you for the video. I would love to have a call but my calendar usually doesn’t allow additional meetings so asynchronous communication works better, but hopefully we will have the opportunity to meet IRL at ETH CC! I hope I’m not coming across as attacking you directly, that’s definitely not my intention. I feel VERY strongly about everyone operating in a fair way so that the grants program is providing equal opportunities for anyone that applies. One of my favorite things about the space is that it’s inherently open and everyone has access to the same opportunities. It’s very important to me to preserve this aspect of the space.
I don’t really understand the details of all of the agreements you have with these different projects, but overall, it looks like you’re helping multiple projects you’ve founded through the grants process and participating in aspects the governance process of various projects you’ve founded/are advising/have some kind of relationship with. I understand that you have good intentions, and feel very strongly about about what you’re building, but every founder feels the exact same way. No project should be viewed as more important than any other project, simply because it’s considered a public good. There are TONS of people building what they think is the most important thing, and they should all have the same opportunities as everyone else. Having one of the biggest delegates publicly support a project and help them move forward in the governance process is definitely a unfair advantage imo.
Like I said, this really isn’t an attack on you as a person, but behavior that looks like it’s giving multiple projects an unfair advantage in a space that is trying to overcome these types of traditional behaviors and do better.
Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video.
jackanorak:
Does Griff or General Magic have a f…
Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video.
jackanorak:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
As stated in your video, you are working with a lot of projects and you disclosed it after the fact.
GaaS looks like conflict of interest between Griff (delegate) for Optimism and General Magic services.
The ENS example doesn’t apply unless you are a delegate on the ENS DAO and you voted in favor of the swag shop.
jackanorak:
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
It has now
jackanorak:
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
jackanorak:
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
There is a conflict of interest if you are able to temp check, move something to vote or even altogether approve
jackanorak:
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
More projects would apply for grants, more % that GM takes?
As a personal note, the issue with videos is that they do not get indexed in the forum so there is no way to reference your answers.
Griff: Netrim:
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
I don’t have any deals written, and am surprised that this breaks any policies as this is very aligned with at least the idea behind RetroPGF:
From: Retroactive Public Goods Funding. Note: The Optimism team has long been… | by Optimism | Optimism PBC Blog | Medium
The results oracle can send rewards to any address. Here are a few possible ideas for what kinds of addresses it can send rewards to:
A single individual or organization that was primarily responsible for making the project happen
A smart contract representing a fixed allocation table splitting funds between multiple individuals and/or organizations who had contributed time and/or funding to the project
A project token, whose supply is distributed among one or more individuals and/or organizations who contributed time and/or money to the project, but which can be traded
The idea from that blog post was that teams could find creative ways of funding their project.
As I said in the video, I don’t have any actual deals in place with any teams, but I am the main donor for many of these teams, and I verbally committed to making sure their salaries will get paid so they can complete these projects, during the lock up, and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical. But for all of those teams, I was listed on the grant as a member of the team and that is fully disclosed.
I just now found this:
Collective Grant Policies
Effective Sale
An effective sale includes selling, offering to sell, contracting or agreeing to sell, hypothecate, pledge, use as collateral, or creating derivatives of the OP tokens. It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens.
You can read more about the reasoning behind the token locks here .
Which sounds like that is also forbidden.
I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:
It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens.
There are some projects that are an Alliance between multiple groups, and there was an expectation that one group would get a specific # of OP for their part and the other group would get a specific # of OP for their part… is that ok?
Firstly, it’s essential to remember that our efforts stem from noble intentions. Instead of competi…
Firstly, it’s essential to remember that our efforts stem from noble intentions. Instead of competing, public good projects should cooperate. While disagreements are sometimes inevitable, they provide an opportunity for finding common ground, a process I appreciate. I personally favor video over forum posts as they provide a more human connection. In a text, the tone can be misinterpreted.
Here are some areas of concern causing uncertainty, my interpretation of their causes, and possible solutions:
Concerning GM Fundraising writing
Problems:
Small teams or individual developers find grant applications challenging.
It is tough to stay updated with all grant opportunities.
Solutions:
As a Collective, we need to define rules for an unprecedented situation like this. My personal belief is that everything around such agreements must be textually expressed in any mission or grant.
We should simplify the process for Alliance participation.
More opportunities under Optimism should be promoted to attract those outside the Optimism ecosystem.
Public goods are a niche sector, and overlapping involvements in multiple projects are common. Therefore, generating best practices and reporting potential conflicts of interest is crucial.
Concerning Lending
Problems:
The OP is locked for one year.
Many teams can’t afford to work without upfront payment and wait for a year to be paid with a governance token lacking a demand motive beyond governance use.
Solutions:
Make Grants / Missions liquid and RetroPGF blocked as suggested by Griff.
There have been intriguing proposals to generate APR with the OP delegated. Despite legal barriers, it could be beneficial to find a solution that doesn’t affect the legality or creates demand beyond governance.
These issues amplify the uncertainty already associated with the requirement for four approvals and votes.
Regarding my involvement with Espacio Cripto and H.E.R. LATAM, I must say that the Mexican community is tightly-knit. In my spare time, I strive to provide them access to these opportunities. I’ve done the same for other projects and aim to expand my help scope. My hope is for more countries to apply here in the future. Optimism is unique, and it would be phenomenal to see its reach extend globally. Ideally, the application process will be simplified to the point where no external help is needed.
Let’s progress, find common ground, create agreements, and make public goods victorious. Stay optimistic!
Hi Griff, saw you comment on other thread, here 15 , and I appreciate the transparency. But I woul…
Hi Griff, saw you comment on other thread, here 15 , and I appreciate the transparency. But I would like to echo points raised by Jack and await your answer.
General Magic & Optimism Reply Sorry for the delay, I would love to…
General Magic & Optimism Reply Sorry for the delay, I would love to talk more about this if more clarity is needed, I feel like synchronous communication would be a lot better than forum posts tho, a quick call that can be recorded and shared here would go a long way IMO.
Netrim: Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video.
jackanorak:
Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices?
As stated in your video, you are working with a lot of projects and you disclosed it after the fact.
GaaS looks like conflict of interest between Griff (delegate) for Optimism and General Magic services.
The ENS example doesn’t apply unless you are a delegate on the ENS DAO and you voted in favor of the swag shop.
jackanorak:
If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance?
It has now
jackanorak:
What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures?
Season 4 Feedback Thread
I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
jackanorak:
What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure?
There is a conflict of interest if you are able to temp check, move something to vote or even altogether approve
jackanorak:
Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks?
More projects would apply for grants, more % that GM takes?
As a personal note, the issue with videos is that they do not get indexed in the forum so there is no way to reference your answers.
brichis: Firstly, it’s essential to remember that our efforts stem from noble intentions. Instead of competing, public good projects should cooperate. While disagreements are sometimes inevitable, they provide an opportunity for finding common ground, a process I appreciate. I personally favor video over forum posts as they provide a more human connection. In a text, the tone can be misinterpreted.
Here are some areas of concern causing uncertainty, my interpretation of their causes, and possible solutions:
Concerning GM Fundraising writing
Problems:
Small teams or individual developers find grant applications challenging.
It is tough to stay updated with all grant opportunities.
Solutions:
As a Collective, we need to define rules for an unprecedented situation like this. My personal belief is that everything around such agreements must be textually expressed in any mission or grant.
We should simplify the process for Alliance participation.
More opportunities under Optimism should be promoted to attract those outside the Optimism ecosystem.
Public goods are a niche sector, and overlapping involvements in multiple projects are common. Therefore, generating best practices and reporting potential conflicts of interest is crucial.
Concerning Lending
Problems:
The OP is locked for one year.
Many teams can’t afford to work without upfront payment and wait for a year to be paid with a governance token lacking a demand motive beyond governance use.
Solutions:
Make Grants / Missions liquid and RetroPGF blocked as suggested by Griff.
There have been intriguing proposals to generate APR with the OP delegated. Despite legal barriers, it could be beneficial to find a solution that doesn’t affect the legality or creates demand beyond governance.
These issues amplify the uncertainty already associated with the requirement for four approvals and votes.
Regarding my involvement with Espacio Cripto and H.E.R. LATAM, I must say that the Mexican community is tightly-knit. In my spare time, I strive to provide them access to these opportunities. I’ve done the same for other projects and aim to expand my help scope. My hope is for more countries to apply here in the future. Optimism is unique, and it would be phenomenal to see its reach extend globally. Ideally, the application process will be simplified to the point where no external help is needed.
Let’s progress, find common ground, create agreements, and make public goods victorious. Stay optimistic!
katie: Hey Griff, thank you for the video. I would love to have a call but my calendar usually doesn’t allow additional meetings so asynchronous communication works better, but hopefully we will have the opportunity to meet IRL at ETH CC! I hope I’m not coming across as attacking you directly, that’s definitely not my intention. I feel VERY strongly about everyone operating in a fair way so that the grants program is providing equal opportunities for anyone that applies. One of my favorite things about the space is that it’s inherently open and everyone has access to the same opportunities. It’s very important to me to preserve this aspect of the space.
I don’t really understand the details of all of the agreements you have with these different projects, but overall, it looks like you’re helping multiple projects you’ve founded through the grants process and participating in aspects the governance process of various projects you’ve founded/are advising/have some kind of relationship with. I understand that you have good intentions, and feel very strongly about about what you’re building, but every founder feels the exact same way. No project should be viewed as more important than any other project, simply because it’s considered a public good. There are TONS of people building what they think is the most important thing, and they should all have the same opportunities as everyone else. Having one of the biggest delegates publicly support a project and help them move forward in the governance process is definitely a unfair advantage imo.
Like I said, this really isn’t an attack on you as a person, but behavior that looks like it’s giving multiple projects an unfair advantage in a space that is trying to overcome these types of traditional behaviors and do better.
Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video. jackanorak: Does Griff or General Magic have a f…
Hi Griff, I took the time to check the video. jackanorak: Does Griff or General Magic have a financial interest in getting all of these applications approved? If so, what are the implications with regard to the Code of Conduct and general governance practices? As stated in your video, you are working with a lot of projects and you disclosed it after the fact. GaaS looks like conflict of interest between Griff (delegate) for Optimism and General Magic services. The ENS example doesn’t apply unless you are a delegate on the ENS DAO and you voted in favor of the swag shop. jackanorak: If there is a financial interest, has it been properly disclosed to Optimism Governance? It has now jackanorak: What are the terms of this upfront lending to these projects? Do the lenders have an opportunity to capture financial gains though these structures? Season 4 Feedback Thread I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today. jackanorak: What sort of policy do we / ought we to have regarding this type of third-party work and disclosure? There is a conflict of interest if you are able to temp check, move something to vote or even altogether approve jackanorak: Do such pay-for-propose schemes impose a ‘tax’ on governance distributions, effectively inflating governance asks? More projects would apply for grants, more % that GM takes? As a personal note, the issue with videos is that they do not get indexed in the forum so there is no way to reference your answers.
Griff: Netrim:
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
I don’t have any deals written, and am surprised that this breaks any policies as this is very aligned with at least the idea behind RetroPGF:
From: Retroactive Public Goods Funding. Note: The Optimism team has long been… | by Optimism | Optimism PBC Blog | Medium
The results oracle can send rewards to any address. Here are a few possible ideas for what kinds of addresses it can send rewards to:
A single individual or organization that was primarily responsible for making the project happen
A smart contract representing a fixed allocation table splitting funds between multiple individuals and/or organizations who had contributed time and/or funding to the project
A project token, whose supply is distributed among one or more individuals and/or organizations who contributed time and/or money to the project, but which can be traded
The idea from that blog post was that teams could find creative ways of funding their project.
As I said in the video, I don’t have any actual deals in place with any teams, but I am the main donor for many of these teams, and I verbally committed to making sure their salaries will get paid so they can complete these projects, during the lock up, and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical. But for all of those teams, I was listed on the grant as a member of the team and that is fully disclosed.
I just now found this:
Collective Grant Policies
Effective Sale
An effective sale includes selling, offering to sell, contracting or agreeing to sell, hypothecate, pledge, use as collateral, or creating derivatives of the OP tokens. It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens.
You can read more about the reasoning behind the token locks here .
Which sounds like that is also forbidden.
I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:
It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens.
There are some projects that are an Alliance between multiple groups, and there was an expectation that one group would get a specific # of OP for their part and the other group would get a specific # of OP for their part… is that ok?
Firstly, it’s essential to remember that our efforts stem from noble intentions. Instead of competi…
Firstly, it’s essential to remember that our efforts stem from noble intentions. Instead of competing, public good projects should cooperate. While disagreements are sometimes inevitable, they provide an opportunity for finding common ground, a process I appreciate. I personally favor video over forum posts as they provide a more human connection. In a text, the tone can be misinterpreted. Here are some areas of concern causing uncertainty, my interpretation of their causes, and possible solutions: Concerning GM Fundraising writing Problems: Small teams or individual developers find grant applications challenging. It is tough to stay updated with all grant opportunities. Solutions: As a Collective, we need to define rules for an unprecedented situation like this. My personal belief is that everything around such agreements must be textually expressed in any mission or grant. We should simplify the process for Alliance participation. More opportunities under Optimism should be promoted to attract those outside the Optimism ecosystem. Public goods are a niche sector, and overlapping involvements in multiple projects are common. Therefore, generating best practices and reporting potential conflicts of interest is crucial. Concerning Lending Problems: The OP is locked for one year. Many teams can’t afford to work without upfront payment and wait for a year to be paid with a governance token lacking a demand motive beyond governance use. Solutions: Make Grants / Missions liquid and RetroPGF blocked as suggested by Griff. There have been intriguing proposals to generate APR with the OP delegated. Despite legal barriers, it could be beneficial to find a solution that doesn’t affect the legality or creates demand beyond governance. These issues amplify the uncertainty already associated with the requirement for four approvals and votes. Regarding my involvement with Espacio Cripto and H.E.R. LATAM, I must say that the Mexican community is tightly-knit. In my spare time, I strive to provide them access to these opportunities. I’ve done the same for other projects and aim to expand my help scope. My hope is for more countries to apply here in the future. Optimism is unique, and it would be phenomenal to see its reach extend globally. Ideally, the application process will be simplified to the point where no external help is needed. Let’s progress, find common ground, create agreements, and make public goods victorious. Stay optimistic!
Netrim:
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
I…
Netrim:
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
I don’t have any deals written, and am surprised that this breaks any policies as this is very aligned with at least the idea behind RetroPGF:
From: Retroactive Public Goods Funding. Note: The Optimism team has long been… | by Optimism | Optimism PBC Blog | Medium 5
The results oracle can send rewards to any address. Here are a few possible ideas for what kinds of addresses it can send rewards to:
A single individual or organization that was primarily responsible for making the project happen
A smart contract representing a fixed allocation table splitting funds between multiple individuals and/or organizations who had contributed time and/or funding to the project
A project token, whose supply is distributed among one or more individuals and/or organizations who contributed time and/or money to the project, but which can be traded
The idea from that blog post was that teams could find creative ways of funding their project.
As I said in the video, I don’t have any actual deals in place with any teams, but I am the main donor for many of these teams, and I verbally committed to making sure their salaries will get paid so they can complete these projects, during the lock up, and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical. But for all of those teams, I was listed on the grant as a member of the team and that is fully disclosed.
I just now found this:
Collective Grant Policies
Effective Sale
An effective sale includes selling, offering to sell, contracting or agreeing to sell, hypothecate, pledge, use as collateral, or creating derivatives of the OP tokens. It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens.
You can read more about the reasoning behind the token locks here .
Which sounds like that is also forbidden.
I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:
It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens.
There are some projects that are an Alliance between multiple groups, and there was an expectation that one group would get a specific # of OP for their part and the other group would get a specific # of OP for their part… is that ok?
Netrim:
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
I…
Netrim:
This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today.
I don’t have any deals written, and am surprised that this breaks any policies as this is very aligned with at least the idea behind RetroPGF:
From: Retroactive Public Goods Funding. Note: The Optimism team has long been… | by Optimism | Optimism PBC Blog | Medium
The results oracle can send rewards to any address. Here are a few possible ideas for what kinds of addresses it can send rewards to:
A single individual or organization that was primarily responsible for making the project happen
A smart contract representing a fixed allocation table splitting funds between multiple individuals and/or organizations who had contributed time and/or funding to the project
A project token, whose supply is distributed among one or more individuals and/or organizations who contributed time and/or money to the project, but which can be traded
The idea from that blog post was that teams could find creative ways of funding their project.
As I said in the video, I don’t have any actual deals in place with any teams, but I am the main donor for many of these teams, and I verbally committed to making sure their salaries will get paid so they can complete these projects, during the lock up, and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical. But for all of those teams, I was listed on the grant as a member of the team and that is fully disclosed.
I just now found this:
Collective Grant Policies
Effective Sale
An effective sale includes selling, offering to sell, contracting or agreeing to sell, hypothecate, pledge, use as collateral, or creating derivatives of the OP tokens. It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens.
You can read more about the reasoning behind the token locks here .
Which sounds like that is also forbidden.
I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:
It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens.
There are some projects that are an Alliance between multiple groups, and there was an expectation that one group would get a specific # of OP for their part and the other group would get a specific # of OP for their part… is that ok?
Alright so I’m willing to give the benefit of the doubt here 1 - 2 / 4 - 6 . The language around…
Alright so I’m willing to give the benefit of the doubt here 1 - 2 / 4 - 6 . The language around the conflicts for voting with own proposals vs affiliations/how deep those affiliations are and the scope of the relationship as far as self dealing/personal gains vs the gains of affiliated companies. While yes you do not gain any funds directly companies you have stake/affiliation do which should be treated as the same, but in some contexts this may not be clear and so fine am willing to accept it wasnt malicious. But the loans and the response given is a huge red flag. Effectively the response was, look its business so its private, you dont think it should be disclosed anyway and that you have no idea about any of the details about these deal, effectively the SBF defence
‘‘This is probably the most important thing to mention, and what enabled the projects I founded to apply for a larger percentage of the grants than other teams. I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral so that they can have the short term liquidity they need to pay their employees. Honestly, this is a huge risk on my part, but it’s ok, I’m an Optimist. I want all of my teams to work with Optimism. Also I do believe in the long term value of the OP token and am hoping to work with the community to add utility to the OP token, see my comments in Economic Co-design of Gas Fees for the OP Stack for more details on my thoughts here.’’
I dont see any way in which you’d not have any details about these deals, that you have no claim on the collateral of these loans and that they will retain the OP, which having an agreement that says I will loan x USD to you for 12 m, at this interest rate to be repaid in USD after selling the OP, or should the OP not be worth the loan value to sell all the OP to repay in USD is no different to, just give me the OP if the values under the loan amount. And saying ‘but we’ll make it and i dont really feel like they should be in the open’ with the context that you’ll disclose aslong as its good for the projects and in their interest. This is in my opinion the core problem and the biggest red flag here because it shows that if you’re not granted approval to do this you’ll do it anyway privately.
‘and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical’
This directly goes against you having just said you will not receive their OP allocations.
‘I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:’
This makes it even more clear to me that you’re going to do this anyway, saying that you will abide by it you think just says oh well if i dont like it i wont follow this and do it anyway.
This needs to be seen btw with me being the largest supporter of having these tokens be unlocked anyway, because bad actors WILL act in bad faith while honest actors are given hard restrictions that affect them more, effectively rewarding private, effectively malicious and misleading deals that go against the ToC.
Netrim: This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today. I…
Netrim: This needs to be disclosed since it actually breaks the policy updates done today. I don’t have any deals written, and am surprised that this breaks any policies as this is very aligned with at least the idea behind RetroPGF: From: Retroactive Public Goods Funding. Note: The Optimism team has long been… | by Optimism | Optimism PBC Blog | Medium 5 The results oracle can send rewards to any address. Here are a few possible ideas for what kinds of addresses it can send rewards to: A single individual or organization that was primarily responsible for making the project happen A smart contract representing a fixed allocation table splitting funds between multiple individuals and/or organizations who had contributed time and/or funding to the project A project token, whose supply is distributed among one or more individuals and/or organizations who contributed time and/or money to the project, but which can be traded The idea from that blog post was that teams could find creative ways of funding their project. As I said in the video, I don’t have any actual deals in place with any teams, but I am the main donor for many of these teams, and I verbally committed to making sure their salaries will get paid so they can complete these projects, during the lock up, and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical. But for all of those teams, I was listed on the grant as a member of the team and that is fully disclosed. I just now found this: Collective Grant Policies Effective Sale An effective sale includes selling, offering to sell, contracting or agreeing to sell, hypothecate, pledge, use as collateral, or creating derivatives of the OP tokens. It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens. You can read more about the reasoning behind the token locks here . Which sounds like that is also forbidden. I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this: It also includes entering into any arrangement that transfers to another person or entity, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of owning the OP tokens. There are some projects that are an Alliance between multiple groups, and there was an expectation that one group would get a specific # of OP for their part and the other group would get a specific # of OP for their part… is that ok?
Alright so I’m willing to give the benefit of the doubt here 1 - 2 / 4 - 6 . The language around…
Alright so I’m willing to give the benefit of the doubt here 1 - 2 / 4 - 6 . The language around the conflicts for voting with own proposals vs affiliations/how deep those affiliations are and the scope of the relationship as far as self dealing/personal gains vs the gains of affiliated companies. While yes you do not gain any funds directly companies you have stake/affiliation do which should be treated as the same, but in some contexts this may not be clear and so fine am willing to accept it wasnt malicious. But the loans and the response given is a huge red flag. Effectively the response was, look its business so its private, you dont think it should be disclosed anyway and that you have no idea about any of the details about these deal, effectively the SBF defence ‘‘This is probably the most important thing to mention, and what enabled the projects I founded to apply for a larger percentage of the grants than other teams. I am working with those teams to loan them funds and take the OP that is locked as collateral so that they can have the short term liquidity they need to pay their employees. Honestly, this is a huge risk on my part, but it’s ok, I’m an Optimist. I want all of my teams to work with Optimism. Also I do believe in the long term value of the OP token and am hoping to work with the community to add utility to the OP token, see my comments in Economic Co-design of Gas Fees for the OP Stack for more details on my thoughts here.’’ I dont see any way in which you’d not have any details about these deals, that you have no claim on the collateral of these loans and that they will retain the OP, which having an agreement that says I will loan x USD to you for 12 m, at this interest rate to be repaid in USD after selling the OP, or should the OP not be worth the loan value to sell all the OP to repay in USD is no different to, just give me the OP if the values under the loan amount. And saying ‘but we’ll make it and i dont really feel like they should be in the open’ with the context that you’ll disclose aslong as its good for the projects and in their interest. This is in my opinion the core problem and the biggest red flag here because it shows that if you’re not granted approval to do this you’ll do it anyway privately. ‘and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical’ This directly goes against you having just said you will not receive their OP allocations. ‘I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:’ This makes it even more clear to me that you’re going to do this anyway, saying that you will abide by it you think just says oh well if i dont like it i wont follow this and do it anyway. This needs to be seen btw with me being the largest supporter of having these tokens be unlocked anyway, because bad actors WILL act in bad faith while honest actors are given hard restrictions that affect them more, effectively rewarding private, effectively malicious and misleading deals that go against the ToC.
Pr 0 :
I dont see any way in which you’d not have any details about these deals, that you have…
Pr 0 :
I dont see any way in which you’d not have any details about these deals, that you have no claim on the collateral of these loans and that they will retain the OP, which having an agreement that says I will loan x USD to you for 12 m, at this interest rate to be repaid in USD after selling the OP, or should the OP not be worth the loan value to sell all the OP to repay in USD is no different to, just give me the OP if the values under the loan amount. And saying ‘but we’ll make it and i dont really feel like they should be in the open’ with the context that you’ll disclose aslong as its good for the projects and in their interest. This is in my opinion the core problem and the biggest red flag here because it shows that if you’re not granted approval to do this you’ll do it anyway privately.
There is no loan agreement, it was something that would be sorted out when we get the grant. If you knew me, you would believe me, I am not a business man, I am a very engaged philanthropist/impact angel investor trying to get my projects engaged in the Optimism Ecosystem.
The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people (not all) in several of the projects, they get regular monthly salaries from the Giveth DAO or General Magic. Then, after the 1 year lock up, portions of the OP would be split up between people in the project and the orgs that pay their salaries so that the have the economic security they need to pay rent and be available to do the work.
Most of the Giveth & General Magic teams hail from low income countries like Turkey, Columbia, Philippines, Mexico, etc around 80 % of the Giveth team is DEI. These are not teams that can just not be paid for a few months sabbatical and can wait a year for payment. We are trying to bring web 3 to this part of the world, and regular salaries are an important part of that, so that is how we are structured. In general, I backstop these teams and would make deals to make their financials easy.
The details about the one year lock up and how it is supposed to be executed is still murky for me, but all the teams I am associated with will follow whatever direction is expected, with an understanding that OP is governance rights, despite the emergent market value (my new catchline).
I am just making an effort to be overly transparent, and I’m glad I am as it is helping me understand the space that we can play in. It sometimes feels in these public forums that I am talking to traffic cops and not DAO members that are assuming positive intent and understand we are all just trying to navigate in this big experiment, and I hope that you can understand that the Giveth and GM teams are also experimenting within the experiment!
I’ve been around the block and understand this is how forum posts go, and that there is a silent majority that is more understanding and not excited to take sides in what could be perceived as tense public discussions.
Pr 0 :
‘and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical’
This directly goes against you having just said you will not receive their OP allocations.
Any team that I would have expected to get some OP allocation for any contribution, I was a member of the team and listed explicitly in the proposal.
Pr 0 :
‘I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:’
This makes it even more clear to me that you’re going to do this anyway, saying that you will abide by it you think just says oh well if i dont like it i wont follow this and do it anyway.
This needs to be seen btw with me being the largest supporter of having these tokens be unlocked anyway, because bad actors WILL act in bad faith while honest actors are given hard restrictions that affect them more, effectively rewarding private, effectively malicious and misleading deals that go against the ToC.
I think the ToC are very murky, and I am trying to be overly transparent. I am in no way a bad actor in the space. I have helped to rescue 100 ’s of Millions of dollars worth of crypto multiple times as well as starting project after project in the public goods space. I would appreciate an assumption of positive intent.
I just clearly had different expectations from what was stated in the terms of these grants (because I thought Optimism was about making investment strategies for Public Goods as is stated in this blog post 1 and that is naturally what I am trying to experiment with), and am happy to have ridiculously public and transparent dealings for where the OP goes that follows the expectations of the Foundation or any other stakeholders.
I hope to build public goods focused economies that are modeling the Impact = Profit mantra, as was done with the Token Engineering Commons but maybe I am running too fast for that in the OP space. I am happy to slow down, and play by the rules.
Again, there is no deal anywhere with any of the teams to provide financial capital in return for OP. I have been very transparent and straight forward in these conversations, apparently to my own detriment. I was expecting to make some deal around the OP that would help these teams, but I never did and I won’t do it if there is clarity given that it is against the rules.
IMO, just to be practical, I think it would be great to enable people who contribute financially to making sure that projects can be executed on can be rewarded with OP as well (this is one of the places where I would add value to these teams), financial contribution is a contribution that should be considered alongside labor, expertise and time, but if that is not an option, we can abide by the clarity given, and I won’t create any deal for being rewarded with OP for financial contributions.
The other thing that needs clarity is…
When the 1 year lock up is over, the OP can be split up amongst the team members correct? And different team members can receive different amounts based on their contributions to the project?
For instance, in the RetroPGF marketing proposal, Bankless Academy has their role, and the Giveth & General Magic teams have their role.
Are we allowed to set expectations between the teams on how much OP goes to Bankless Academy for building the course, and how much goes to Giveth for running the booths, coordinating the sponsorships in person and supervising the content production & how much goes to GM for doing the design work, brand guidelines, shooting/editing videos and doing the general project coordination?
I assume that is ok, and want to confirm, because this is how I assumed Alliances would work, that they would form for the life of the project and after the year they could split the OP amongst the contributing teams.
lavande: hi griff- yes, after the 1 year lock-up is over, the OP can be split among the Alliance members listed in the proposal (ideally the split would be outlined in the proposal, but wasn’t specified in advance as a requirement.) however, there is a stipulation in the Code of Conduct that grants must be used as outlined in the proposal; any deviation from what was disclosed in the proposal could be considered grant misusage.
jackanorak: I’m glad this is spawning a bunch of discussion. To be honest, I’m still just developing a view on what’s okay or not okay, and at least personally this sort of back and forth is helping me shape my understanding. I agree that while we have locked up OP there ought to be some way to support devs in the interim. My gut says that this sort of support ought to come from us, but we probably should collectively find some other workarounds—the effectiveness of these grants matters.
I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20-minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time.
Griff:
I am just making an effort to be overly transparent, and I’m glad I am as it is helping me understand the space that we can play in. It sometimes feels in these public forums that I am talking to traffic cops and not DAO members that are assuming positive intent and understand we are all just trying to navigate in this big experiment, and I hope that you can understand that the Giveth and GM teams are also experimenting within the experiment!
Frankly, nobody here is a traffic cop, and I kind of resent the characterization if it’s being directed at this inquiry in general. The fact is that this round we’re seeing grant requests for redundant missions, some for products with questionable utility, some that, after careful examination, had tried and failed to get funding in previous rounds, and several whose asks are in my view nowhere near competitive, like multiples over market rates. And there are requests asking for after-the-fact funding for initiatives ostensibly in support of RPGF, which seems to me to be at best an implicit admission of a lack in faith in that process.
If my appraisal is accurate, much of this activity doesn’t seem to advance Optimism’s near- or long-term interests, and now we’re learning—only once questions have been asked—that embedded in several of these asks are several streams of revenue going to a single entity, an economic interest that had up to now not been disclosed—and an effective allocation of OP that had never been factored into budgeting. If that’s not something worth raising questions about, I’m not sure what we’re supposed to be about here.
Pr 0 :
I dont see any way in which you’d not have any details about these deals, that you have…
Pr 0 :
I dont see any way in which you’d not have any details about these deals, that you have no claim on the collateral of these loans and that they will retain the OP, which having an agreement that says I will loan x USD to you for 12 m, at this interest rate to be repaid in USD after selling the OP, or should the OP not be worth the loan value to sell all the OP to repay in USD is no different to, just give me the OP if the values under the loan amount. And saying ‘but we’ll make it and i dont really feel like they should be in the open’ with the context that you’ll disclose aslong as its good for the projects and in their interest. This is in my opinion the core problem and the biggest red flag here because it shows that if you’re not granted approval to do this you’ll do it anyway privately.
There is no loan agreement, it was something that would be sorted out when we get the grant. If you knew me, you would believe me, I am not a business man, I am a very engaged philanthropist/impact angel investor trying to get my projects engaged in the Optimism Ecosystem.
The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people (not all) in several of the projects, they get regular monthly salaries from the Giveth DAO or General Magic. Then, after the 1 year lock up, portions of the OP would be split up between people in the project and the orgs that pay their salaries so that the have the economic security they need to pay rent and be available to do the work.
Most of the Giveth & General Magic teams hail from low income countries like Turkey, Columbia, Philippines, Mexico, etc around 80 % of the Giveth team is DEI. These are not teams that can just not be paid for a few months sabbatical and can wait a year for payment. We are trying to bring web 3 to this part of the world, and regular salaries are an important part of that, so that is how we are structured. In general, I backstop these teams and would make deals to make their financials easy.
The details about the one year lock up and how it is supposed to be executed is still murky for me, but all the teams I am associated with will follow whatever direction is expected, with an understanding that OP is governance rights, despite the emergent market value (my new catchline).
I am just making an effort to be overly transparent, and I’m glad I am as it is helping me understand the space that we can play in. It sometimes feels in these public forums that I am talking to traffic cops and not DAO members that are assuming positive intent and understand we are all just trying to navigate in this big experiment, and I hope that you can understand that the Giveth and GM teams are also experimenting within the experiment!
I’ve been around the block and understand this is how forum posts go, and that there is a silent majority that is more understanding and not excited to take sides in what could be perceived as tense public discussions.
Pr 0 :
‘and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical’
This directly goes against you having just said you will not receive their OP allocations.
Any team that I would have expected to get some OP allocation for any contribution, I was a member of the team and listed explicitly in the proposal.
Pr 0 :
‘I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:’
This makes it even more clear to me that you’re going to do this anyway, saying that you will abide by it you think just says oh well if i dont like it i wont follow this and do it anyway.
This needs to be seen btw with me being the largest supporter of having these tokens be unlocked anyway, because bad actors WILL act in bad faith while honest actors are given hard restrictions that affect them more, effectively rewarding private, effectively malicious and misleading deals that go against the ToC.
I think the ToC are very murky, and I am trying to be overly transparent. I am in no way a bad actor in the space. I have helped to rescue 100 ’s of Millions of dollars worth of crypto multiple times as well as starting project after project in the public goods space. I would appreciate an assumption of positive intent.
I just clearly had different expectations from what was stated in the terms of these grants (because I thought Optimism was about making investment strategies for Public Goods as is stated in this blog post and that is naturally what I am trying to experiment with), and am happy to have ridiculously public and transparent dealings for where the OP goes that follows the expectations of the Foundation or any other stakeholders.
I hope to build public goods focused economies that are modeling the Impact = Profit mantra, as was done with the Token Engineering Commons but maybe I am running too fast for that in the OP space. I am happy to slow down, and play by the rules.
Again, there is no deal anywhere with any of the teams to provide financial capital in return for OP. I have been very transparent and straight forward in these conversations, apparently to my own detriment. I was expecting to make some deal around the OP that would help these teams, but I never did and I won’t do it if there is clarity given that it is against the rules.
IMO, just to be practical, I think it would be great to enable people who contribute financially to making sure that projects can be executed on can be rewarded with OP as well (this is one of the places where I would add value to these teams), financial contribution is a contribution that should be considered alongside labor, expertise and time, but if that is not an option, we can abide by the clarity given, and I won’t create any deal for being rewarded with OP for financial contributions.
The other thing that needs clarity is…
When the 1 year lock up is over, the OP can be split up amongst the team members correct? And different team members can receive different amounts based on their contributions to the project?
For instance, in the RetroPGF marketing proposal, Bankless Academy has their role, and the Giveth & General Magic teams have their role.
Are we allowed to set expectations between the teams on how much OP goes to Bankless Academy for building the course, and how much goes to Giveth for running the booths, coordinating the sponsorships in person and supervising the content production & how much goes to GM for doing the design work, brand guidelines, shooting/editing videos and doing the general project coordination?
I assume that is ok, and want to confirm, because this is how I assumed Alliances would work, that they would form for the life of the project and after the year they could split the OP amongst the contributing teams.
lavande: hi griff- yes, after the 1 year lock-up is over, the OP can be split among the Alliance members listed in the proposal (ideally the split would be outlined in the proposal, but wasn’t specified in advance as a requirement.) however, there is a stipulation in the Code of Conduct that grants must be used as outlined in the proposal; any deviation from what was disclosed in the proposal could be considered grant misusage.
jackanorak: I’m glad this is spawning a bunch of discussion. To be honest, I’m still just developing a view on what’s okay or not okay, and at least personally this sort of back and forth is helping me shape my understanding. I agree that while we have locked up OP there ought to be some way to support devs in the interim. My gut says that this sort of support ought to come from us, but we probably should collectively find some other workarounds—the effectiveness of these grants matters.
I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20-minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time.
Griff:
I am just making an effort to be overly transparent, and I’m glad I am as it is helping me understand the space that we can play in. It sometimes feels in these public forums that I am talking to traffic cops and not DAO members that are assuming positive intent and understand we are all just trying to navigate in this big experiment, and I hope that you can understand that the Giveth and GM teams are also experimenting within the experiment!
Frankly, nobody here is a traffic cop, and I kind of resent the characterization if it’s being directed at this inquiry in general. The fact is that this round we’re seeing grant requests for redundant missions, some for products with questionable utility, some that, after careful examination, had tried and failed to get funding in previous rounds, and several whose asks are in my view nowhere near competitive, like multiples over market rates. And there are requests asking for after-the-fact funding for initiatives ostensibly in support of RPGF, which seems to me to be at best an implicit admission of a lack in faith in that process.
If my appraisal is accurate, much of this activity doesn’t seem to advance Optimism’s near- or long-term interests, and now we’re learning—only once questions have been asked—that embedded in several of these asks are several streams of revenue going to a single entity, an economic interest that had up to now not been disclosed—and an effective allocation of OP that had never been factored into budgeting. If that’s not something worth raising questions about, I’m not sure what we’re supposed to be about here.
What I say here it’s my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council.
First, let’s stop th…
What I say here it’s my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council.
First, let’s stop the negative vibe. Accusations and a hostile environment will drive away many delegates and make everyone feel they have to take sides.
We have a very active delegate, I don’t want to lose that, being as transparent as he can. Let’s try to envision all of us sitting at a table, peacefully talking about how to make Public goods better. Here comes someone who took action and maybe now (after spending his own money) broke a rule.
I believe:
It’s ok if you want to give financial aid
it’s ok to represent those projects as a delegate
It’s not ok to give approval for a vote or vote for them
It’s not ok to vote on this project as Badgeholder for RPGF. (this didn’t happen but is good to add it here)
It’s ok if you provide financial aid to a project, they accomplish the critical milestones And after 1 yr lock, you get some OP from that project.
btw I know Griff can dm multiple delegates with power enough to make a proposal pass to vote. You might do it next time to act by the rules.
I don’t like the 7 % to 10 % tax for helping a proposal. This means every proposal will have 7 % to 10 % OP added on request. I believe a deal on future project revenue could be better aligned. Or an alliance mission requesting a fixed amount of OP to help any project make a better proposal on grants could be a better path.
I’m not taking any sides here. I do thank the time, effort, and transparency Griff, Jack and the collective are taking. I acknowledge he broke a rule. I also value him as a delegate.
In the end, the mission will get fair treatment on the token house and grant proposals will be fairly scored by the council. No harm other than Griff’s financial risk so far and a lot of good feedback for future form/mission templates.
Pr0: But thats the problem have here, because the ToCs state that
It’s ok if you provide financial aid to a project, they accomplish the critical milestones And after 1yr lock, you get some OP from that project.
Is specifically not allowed for other projects. This was made clear to me and it’s just concerning to me that statement be made about
“We can abide by this I think”
And that there are currently agreements as stated by the following, with no consequence or previous disclosure.
Further
There is no loan agreement, it was something that would be sorted out when we get the grant.
VS
The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people (not all) in several of the projects, they get regular monthly salaries from the Giveth DAO or General Magic. Then, after the 1 year lock up, portions of the OP would be split up between people in the project and the orgs that pay their salaries so that the have the economic security they need to pay rent and be available to do the work.
This is an agreement for an upfront payment in exchange for OP later on, which is a loan. You just stated '‘the agreements that are in place’ and that ‘there are no agreements’. Want to make this clear I WANT this to be possible and for parties to have tools to be able to hedge volatility risk in holding these tokens for grants. My problem only comes in that it HASNT been allowed so far, and has been done, and only now coming to light after I had specifically raised for it to be noted so OTHER projects would have the same and equitable access to the same tools.
For clarity then and over transparency are you willing to disclose who the teams are that have such agreements or are looking for such agreements/loans from you? Especially
[DRAFT] Unitap : Optimism governance Learning by doing
ARCHIVED Mission Proposals
Mission Proposal S4 Intent: Governance Accessibility (Intent 4) Proposed Mission: Optimism governance Learning by doing the program [Proposal Tier](Collective Trust Tiers - #2 33): Ember Baseline grant amount: 90k OP % of total available Intent budget: 3% Alliance: Unitap Alliance Lead: Ali Contact info: Telegram: @alariarch - Email: team@unitap.app L2 recipient address: 0x95F2177022e7B34D84498F2D9dd63a7457ab5793 Please list the members of your Alliance and link to any previous work: …
If there are already agreements as stated by
‘The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people’
Are you willing to provide these agreements to be looked at for transparency?
Further my other concern was why these disclosures and loans/fees were not disclosed at all beforehand in the allocationn amounts, as it surely would be relevant to deciding eligibility.
This isnt an attack just to be clear, but am just trying to ensure that everyone has to follow the same guidelines and that the tools that everyone has access to and equitable without external advantage, unless all are afforded the same access to the tools.
Hey Griff, thank you for the video. I would love to have a call but my calendar usually doesn’t all…
Hey Griff, thank you for the video. I would love to have a call but my calendar usually doesn’t allow additional meetings so asynchronous communication works better, but hopefully we will have the opportunity to meet IRL at ETH CC! I hope I’m not coming across as attacking you directly, that’s definitely not my intention. I feel VERY strongly about everyone operating in a fair way so that the grants program is providing equal opportunities for anyone that applies. One of my favorite things about the space is that it’s inherently open and everyone has access to the same opportunities. It’s very important to me to preserve this aspect of the space.
I don’t really understand the details of all of the agreements you have with these different projects, but overall, it looks like you’re helping multiple projects you’ve founded through the grants process and participating in aspects the governance process of various projects you’ve founded/are advising/have some kind of relationship with. I understand that you have good intentions, and feel very strongly about about what you’re building, but every founder feels the exact same way. No project should be viewed as more important than any other project, simply because it’s considered a public good. There are TONS of people building what they think is the most important thing, and they should all have the same opportunities as everyone else. Having one of the biggest delegates publicly support a project and help them move forward in the governance process is definitely a unfair advantage imo.
Like I said, this really isn’t an attack on you as a person, but behavior that looks like it’s giving multiple projects an unfair advantage in a space that is trying to overcome these types of traditional behaviors and do better.
Pr 0 : I dont see any way in which you’d not have any details about these deals, that you have…
Pr 0 : I dont see any way in which you’d not have any details about these deals, that you have no claim on the collateral of these loans and that they will retain the OP, which having an agreement that says I will loan x USD to you for 12 m, at this interest rate to be repaid in USD after selling the OP, or should the OP not be worth the loan value to sell all the OP to repay in USD is no different to, just give me the OP if the values under the loan amount. And saying ‘but we’ll make it and i dont really feel like they should be in the open’ with the context that you’ll disclose aslong as its good for the projects and in their interest. This is in my opinion the core problem and the biggest red flag here because it shows that if you’re not granted approval to do this you’ll do it anyway privately. There is no loan agreement, it was something that would be sorted out when we get the grant. If you knew me, you would believe me, I am not a business man, I am a very engaged philanthropist/impact angel investor trying to get my projects engaged in the Optimism Ecosystem. The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people (not all) in several of the projects, they get regular monthly salaries from the Giveth DAO or General Magic. Then, after the 1 year lock up, portions of the OP would be split up between people in the project and the orgs that pay their salaries so that the have the economic security they need to pay rent and be available to do the work. Most of the Giveth & General Magic teams hail from low income countries like Turkey, Columbia, Philippines, Mexico, etc around 80 % of the Giveth team is DEI. These are not teams that can just not be paid for a few months sabbatical and can wait a year for payment. We are trying to bring web 3 to this part of the world, and regular salaries are an important part of that, so that is how we are structured. In general, I backstop these teams and would make deals to make their financials easy. The details about the one year lock up and how it is supposed to be executed is still murky for me, but all the teams I am associated with will follow whatever direction is expected, with an understanding that OP is governance rights, despite the emergent market value (my new catchline). I am just making an effort to be overly transparent, and I’m glad I am as it is helping me understand the space that we can play in. It sometimes feels in these public forums that I am talking to traffic cops and not DAO members that are assuming positive intent and understand we are all just trying to navigate in this big experiment, and I hope that you can understand that the Giveth and GM teams are also experimenting within the experiment! I’ve been around the block and understand this is how forum posts go, and that there is a silent majority that is more understanding and not excited to take sides in what could be perceived as tense public discussions. Pr 0 : ‘and there would likely will be a deal with me to get the OP as that would be logical’ This directly goes against you having just said you will not receive their OP allocations. Any team that I would have expected to get some OP allocation for any contribution, I was a member of the team and listed explicitly in the proposal. Pr 0 : ‘I mean this is really a tough one to navigate. We can abide by this I think, if we can clarify this:’ This makes it even more clear to me that you’re going to do this anyway, saying that you will abide by it you think just says oh well if i dont like it i wont follow this and do it anyway. This needs to be seen btw with me being the largest supporter of having these tokens be unlocked anyway, because bad actors WILL act in bad faith while honest actors are given hard restrictions that affect them more, effectively rewarding private, effectively malicious and misleading deals that go against the ToC. I think the ToC are very murky, and I am trying to be overly transparent. I am in no way a bad actor in the space. I have helped to rescue 100 ’s of Millions of dollars worth of crypto multiple times as well as starting project after project in the public goods space. I would appreciate an assumption of positive intent. I just clearly had different expectations from what was stated in the terms of these grants (because I thought Optimism was about making investment strategies for Public Goods as is stated in this blog post 1 and that is naturally what I am trying to experiment with), and am happy to have ridiculously public and transparent dealings for where the OP goes that follows the expectations of the Foundation or any other stakeholders. I hope to build public goods focused economies that are modeling the Impact = Profit mantra, as was done with the Token Engineering Commons but maybe I am running too fast for that in the OP space. I am happy to slow down, and play by the rules. Again, there is no deal anywhere with any of the teams to provide financial capital in return for OP. I have been very transparent and straight forward in these conversations, apparently to my own detriment. I was expecting to make some deal around the OP that would help these teams, but I never did and I won’t do it if there is clarity given that it is against the rules. IMO, just to be practical, I think it would be great to enable people who contribute financially to making sure that projects can be executed on can be rewarded with OP as well (this is one of the places where I would add value to these teams), financial contribution is a contribution that should be considered alongside labor, expertise and time, but if that is not an option, we can abide by the clarity given, and I won’t create any deal for being rewarded with OP for financial contributions. The other thing that needs clarity is… When the 1 year lock up is over, the OP can be split up amongst the team members correct? And different team members can receive different amounts based on their contributions to the project? For instance, in the RetroPGF marketing proposal, Bankless Academy has their role, and the Giveth & General Magic teams have their role. Are we allowed to set expectations between the teams on how much OP goes to Bankless Academy for building the course, and how much goes to Giveth for running the booths, coordinating the sponsorships in person and supervising the content production & how much goes to GM for doing the design work, brand guidelines, shooting/editing videos and doing the general project coordination? I assume that is ok, and want to confirm, because this is how I assumed Alliances would work, that they would form for the life of the project and after the year they could split the OP amongst the contributing teams.
lavande: hi griff- yes, after the 1 year lock-up is over, the OP can be split among the Alliance members listed in the proposal (ideally the split would be outlined in the proposal, but wasn’t specified in advance as a requirement.) however, there is a stipulation in the Code of Conduct that grants must be used as outlined in the proposal; any deviation from what was disclosed in the proposal could be considered grant misusage.
jackanorak: I’m glad this is spawning a bunch of discussion. To be honest, I’m still just developing a view on what’s okay or not okay, and at least personally this sort of back and forth is helping me shape my understanding. I agree that while we have locked up OP there ought to be some way to support devs in the interim. My gut says that this sort of support ought to come from us, but we probably should collectively find some other workarounds—the effectiveness of these grants matters.
I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20-minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time.
Griff:
I am just making an effort to be overly transparent, and I’m glad I am as it is helping me understand the space that we can play in. It sometimes feels in these public forums that I am talking to traffic cops and not DAO members that are assuming positive intent and understand we are all just trying to navigate in this big experiment, and I hope that you can understand that the Giveth and GM teams are also experimenting within the experiment!
Frankly, nobody here is a traffic cop, and I kind of resent the characterization if it’s being directed at this inquiry in general. The fact is that this round we’re seeing grant requests for redundant missions, some for products with questionable utility, some that, after careful examination, had tried and failed to get funding in previous rounds, and several whose asks are in my view nowhere near competitive, like multiples over market rates. And there are requests asking for after-the-fact funding for initiatives ostensibly in support of RPGF, which seems to me to be at best an implicit admission of a lack in faith in that process.
If my appraisal is accurate, much of this activity doesn’t seem to advance Optimism’s near- or long-term interests, and now we’re learning—only once questions have been asked—that embedded in several of these asks are several streams of revenue going to a single entity, an economic interest that had up to now not been disclosed—and an effective allocation of OP that had never been factored into budgeting. If that’s not something worth raising questions about, I’m not sure what we’re supposed to be about here.
hi griff- yes, after the 1 year lock-up is over, the OP can be split among the Alliance members l…
hi griff- yes, after the 1 year lock-up is over, the OP can be split among the Alliance members listed in the proposal (ideally the split would be outlined in the proposal, but wasn’t specified in advance as a requirement.) however, there is a stipulation in the Code of Conduct that grants must be used as outlined in the proposal; any deviation from what was disclosed in the proposal could be considered grant misusage.
But thats the problem have here, because the ToCs state that
It’s ok if you provide financial aid …
But thats the problem have here, because the ToCs state that
It’s ok if you provide financial aid to a project, they accomplish the critical milestones And after 1 yr lock, you get some OP from that project.
Is specifically not allowed for other projects. This was made clear to me and it’s just concerning to me that statement be made about
“We can abide by this I think”
And that there are currently agreements as stated by the following, with no consequence or previous disclosure.
Further
There is no loan agreement, it was something that would be sorted out when we get the grant.
VS
The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people (not all) in several of the projects, they get regular monthly salaries from the Giveth DAO or General Magic. Then, after the 1 year lock up, portions of the OP would be split up between people in the project and the orgs that pay their salaries so that the have the economic security they need to pay rent and be available to do the work.
This is an agreement for an upfront payment in exchange for OP later on, which is a loan. You just stated '‘the agreements that are in place’ and that ‘there are no agreements’. Want to make this clear I WANT this to be possible and for parties to have tools to be able to hedge volatility risk in holding these tokens for grants. My problem only comes in that it HASNT been allowed so far, and has been done, and only now coming to light after I had specifically raised for it to be noted so OTHER projects would have the same and equitable access to the same tools.
For clarity then and over transparency are you willing to disclose who the teams are that have such agreements or are looking for such agreements/loans from you? Especially
[DRAFT] Unitap : Optimism governance Learning by doing ARCHIVED Mission Proposals
Mission Proposal
S 4 Intent: Governance Accessibility (Intent 4 )
Proposed Mission: Optimism governance Learning by doing the program
[Proposal Tier](Collective Trust Tiers - # 2 33 ): Ember
Baseline grant amount: 90 k OP
% of total available Intent budget: 3 %
Alliance: Unitap
Alliance Lead: Ali
Contact info: Telegram: @alariarch - Email: team@unitap.app
L 2 recipient address: 0 x 95 F 2177022 e 7 B 34 D 84498 F 2 D 9 dd 63 a 7457 ab 5793
Please list the members of your Alliance and link to any previous work:
…
If there are already agreements as stated by
‘The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people’
Are you willing to provide these agreements to be looked at for transparency?
Further my other concern was why these disclosures and loans/fees were not disclosed at all beforehand in the allocationn amounts, as it surely would be relevant to deciding eligibility.
This isnt an attack just to be clear, but am just trying to ensure that everyone has to follow the same guidelines and that the tools that everyone has access to and equitable without external advantage, unless all are afforded the same access to the tools.
What I say here it’s my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council. First, let’s stop th…
What I say here it’s my own opinion and has nothing to do with Grants Council. First, let’s stop the negative vibe. Accusations and a hostile environment will drive away many delegates and make everyone feel they have to take sides. We have a very active delegate, I don’t want to lose that, being as transparent as he can. Let’s try to envision all of us sitting at a table, peacefully talking about how to make Public goods better. Here comes someone who took action and maybe now (after spending his own money) broke a rule. I believe: It’s ok if you want to give financial aid it’s ok to represent those projects as a delegate It’s not ok to give approval for a vote or vote for them It’s not ok to vote on this project as Badgeholder for RPGF. (this didn’t happen but is good to add it here) It’s ok if you provide financial aid to a project, they accomplish the critical milestones And after 1 yr lock, you get some OP from that project. btw I know Griff can dm multiple delegates with power enough to make a proposal pass to vote. You might do it next time to act by the rules. I don’t like the 7 % to 10 % tax for helping a proposal. This means every proposal will have 7 % to 10 % OP added on request. I believe a deal on future project revenue could be better aligned. Or an alliance mission requesting a fixed amount of OP to help any project make a better proposal on grants could be a better path. I’m not taking any sides here. I do thank the time, effort, and transparency Griff, Jack and the collective are taking. I acknowledge he broke a rule. I also value him as a delegate. In the end, the mission will get fair treatment on the token house and grant proposals will be fairly scored by the council. No harm other than Griff’s financial risk so far and a lot of good feedback for future form/mission templates.
Pr0: But thats the problem have here, because the ToCs state that
It’s ok if you provide financial aid to a project, they accomplish the critical milestones And after 1yr lock, you get some OP from that project.
Is specifically not allowed for other projects. This was made clear to me and it’s just concerning to me that statement be made about
“We can abide by this I think”
And that there are currently agreements as stated by the following, with no consequence or previous disclosure.
Further
There is no loan agreement, it was something that would be sorted out when we get the grant.
VS
The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people (not all) in several of the projects, they get regular monthly salaries from the Giveth DAO or General Magic. Then, after the 1 year lock up, portions of the OP would be split up between people in the project and the orgs that pay their salaries so that the have the economic security they need to pay rent and be available to do the work.
This is an agreement for an upfront payment in exchange for OP later on, which is a loan. You just stated '‘the agreements that are in place’ and that ‘there are no agreements’. Want to make this clear I WANT this to be possible and for parties to have tools to be able to hedge volatility risk in holding these tokens for grants. My problem only comes in that it HASNT been allowed so far, and has been done, and only now coming to light after I had specifically raised for it to be noted so OTHER projects would have the same and equitable access to the same tools.
For clarity then and over transparency are you willing to disclose who the teams are that have such agreements or are looking for such agreements/loans from you? Especially
[DRAFT] Unitap : Optimism governance Learning by doing
ARCHIVED Mission Proposals
Mission Proposal S4 Intent: Governance Accessibility (Intent 4) Proposed Mission: Optimism governance Learning by doing the program [Proposal Tier](Collective Trust Tiers - #2 33): Ember Baseline grant amount: 90k OP % of total available Intent budget: 3% Alliance: Unitap Alliance Lead: Ali Contact info: Telegram: @alariarch - Email: team@unitap.app L2 recipient address: 0x95F2177022e7B34D84498F2D9dd63a7457ab5793 Please list the members of your Alliance and link to any previous work: …
If there are already agreements as stated by
‘The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people’
Are you willing to provide these agreements to be looked at for transparency?
Further my other concern was why these disclosures and loans/fees were not disclosed at all beforehand in the allocationn amounts, as it surely would be relevant to deciding eligibility.
This isnt an attack just to be clear, but am just trying to ensure that everyone has to follow the same guidelines and that the tools that everyone has access to and equitable without external advantage, unless all are afforded the same access to the tools.
So there seems there is some lack of clarity or confusion on the interpretation of the code of cond…
So there seems there is some lack of clarity or confusion on the interpretation of the code of conduct.
@lavande is there currently any body in charge of interpreting the 1 -year lock-up rule? Does the Foundation fill that role (I would assume it does, as it is primarily for legal protections)?
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a Mission for funding
This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to
The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission
The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers
I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to.
The thing is, if the situation I described is NOT okay, then essentially it is completely unfeasible for organizations to apply for funding through the Mission process. In order to not violate the lockup rule, organizations would have to take their workers off salary as they work on these Missions, which would be insane.
The other thing is, though, that essentially, @Pr 0 is right. This is basically just a 0 interest loan (pay workers now with the expectation of OP later). I think the best thing to do is to figure out how to allow stuff like this for independent developers not associated with an organization.
On a side note, I think it would be EXTREMELY helpful if the foundation could lead some type of session detailing the legal risk. Because I think we’re all confused.
Griff: chaselb:
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a Mission for funding
This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to
The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission
The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers
I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to.
Yes this would be the plan for most of my grants if it is allowed.
lavande: chaselb:
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a Mission for funding
This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to
The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission
The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers
I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to.
the scenario outlined here is permitted, so long as the parties receiving tokens were all identified in the proposal as Alliance members and the grant is distributed as outlined in the proposal
if a portion of the grant goes to General Magic, and that was not outlined in the proposal, that could be considered grant misusage under the Code of Conduct (and could also be considered an undisclosed financial interest for any delegate benefitting from that arrangement and approving or voting on related proposals.)
the mere existence of a grants-as-a-service arrangement is not a violation of the Code of Conduct, so the relevant issue is disclosure (albeit for a specific type of arrangement that norms had not been previously established around.)
in regards to individual devs, we’re working on an RFP to establish an ecosystem fund that could support this work with upfront capital, stay tuned for more details
chaselb:
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a M…
chaselb:
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a Mission for funding
This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to
The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission
The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers
I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to.
Yes this would be the plan for most of my grants if it is allowed.
Maybe my key concern here is that the grants then for organisations vs individuals favours orgs, be…
Maybe my key concern here is that the grants then for organisations vs individuals favours orgs, because they can front the costs through other means and use the OP as they wish later or at unlock to fulfill obligations without specifically using the OP for collateral or in agreements, because they can exercise the OP at unlock for any needs, without needing to commit specifically to the OP, and do not need such loan agreements, whereas individual devs could not source this internally and so would be at a disadvantage.
I’m glad this is spawning a bunch of discussion. To be honest, I’m still just developing a view on …
I’m glad this is spawning a bunch of discussion. To be honest, I’m still just developing a view on what’s okay or not okay, and at least personally this sort of back and forth is helping me shape my understanding. I agree that while we have locked up OP there ought to be some way to support devs in the interim. My gut says that this sort of support ought to come from us, but we probably should collectively find some other workarounds—the effectiveness of these grants matters.
I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20 -minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time.
Griff:
I am just making an effort to be overly transparent, and I’m glad I am as it is helping me understand the space that we can play in. It sometimes feels in these public forums that I am talking to traffic cops and not DAO members that are assuming positive intent and understand we are all just trying to navigate in this big experiment, and I hope that you can understand that the Giveth and GM teams are also experimenting within the experiment!
Frankly, nobody here is a traffic cop, and I kind of resent the characterization if it’s being directed at this inquiry in general. The fact is that this round we’re seeing grant requests for redundant missions, some for products with questionable utility, some that, after careful examination, had tried and failed to get funding in previous rounds, and several whose asks are in my view nowhere near competitive, like multiples over market rates. And there are requests asking for after-the-fact funding for initiatives ostensibly in support of RPGF, which seems to me to be at best an implicit admission of a lack in faith in that process.
If my appraisal is accurate, much of this activity doesn’t seem to advance Optimism’s near- or long-term interests, and now we’re learning—only once questions have been asked—that embedded in several of these asks are several streams of revenue going to a single entity, an economic interest that had up to now not been disclosed—and an effective allocation of OP that had never been factored into budgeting. If that’s not something worth raising questions about, I’m not sure what we’re supposed to be about here.
Gonna.eth: The words here are my own and have nothing to do with Grants Council.
jackanorak:
I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20-minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time.
I want to highlight this. Even if you don’t assist Grants office hours, many of the council members including myself are active on Discord and have DMs open on multiple platforms.
Hey Griff, thank you for the video. I would love to have a call but my calendar usually doesn’t all…
Hey Griff, thank you for the video. I would love to have a call but my calendar usually doesn’t allow additional meetings so asynchronous communication works better, but hopefully we will have the opportunity to meet IRL at ETH CC! I hope I’m not coming across as attacking you directly, that’s definitely not my intention. I feel VERY strongly about everyone operating in a fair way so that the grants program is providing equal opportunities for anyone that applies. One of my favorite things about the space is that it’s inherently open and everyone has access to the same opportunities. It’s very important to me to preserve this aspect of the space. I don’t really understand the details of all of the agreements you have with these different projects, but overall, it looks like you’re helping multiple projects you’ve founded through the grants process and participating in aspects the governance process of various projects you’ve founded/are advising/have some kind of relationship with. I understand that you have good intentions, and feel very strongly about about what you’re building, but every founder feels the exact same way. No project should be viewed as more important than any other project, simply because it’s considered a public good. There are TONS of people building what they think is the most important thing, and they should all have the same opportunities as everyone else. Having one of the biggest delegates publicly support a project and help them move forward in the governance process is definitely a unfair advantage imo. Like I said, this really isn’t an attack on you as a person, but behavior that looks like it’s giving multiple projects an unfair advantage in a space that is trying to overcome these types of traditional behaviors and do better.
hi griff- yes, after the 1 year lock-up is over, the OP can be split among the Alliance members l…
hi griff- yes, after the 1 year lock-up is over, the OP can be split among the Alliance members listed in the proposal (ideally the split would be outlined in the proposal, but wasn’t specified in advance as a requirement.) however, there is a stipulation in the Code of Conduct that grants must be used as outlined in the proposal; any deviation from what was disclosed in the proposal could be considered grant misusage.
But thats the problem have here, because the ToCs state that It’s ok if you provide financial aid …
But thats the problem have here, because the ToCs state that It’s ok if you provide financial aid to a project, they accomplish the critical milestones And after 1 yr lock, you get some OP from that project. Is specifically not allowed for other projects. This was made clear to me and it’s just concerning to me that statement be made about “We can abide by this I think” And that there are currently agreements as stated by the following, with no consequence or previous disclosure. Further There is no loan agreement, it was something that would be sorted out when we get the grant. VS The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people (not all) in several of the projects, they get regular monthly salaries from the Giveth DAO or General Magic. Then, after the 1 year lock up, portions of the OP would be split up between people in the project and the orgs that pay their salaries so that the have the economic security they need to pay rent and be available to do the work. This is an agreement for an upfront payment in exchange for OP later on, which is a loan. You just stated '‘the agreements that are in place’ and that ‘there are no agreements’. Want to make this clear I WANT this to be possible and for parties to have tools to be able to hedge volatility risk in holding these tokens for grants. My problem only comes in that it HASNT been allowed so far, and has been done, and only now coming to light after I had specifically raised for it to be noted so OTHER projects would have the same and equitable access to the same tools. For clarity then and over transparency are you willing to disclose who the teams are that have such agreements or are looking for such agreements/loans from you? Especially [DRAFT] Unitap : Optimism governance Learning by doing ARCHIVED Mission Proposals Mission Proposal S 4 Intent: Governance Accessibility (Intent 4 ) Proposed Mission: Optimism governance Learning by doing the program [Proposal Tier](Collective Trust Tiers - # 2 33 ): Ember Baseline grant amount: 90 k OP % of total available Intent budget: 3 % Alliance: Unitap Alliance Lead: Ali Contact info: Telegram: @alariarch - Email: team@unitap.app L 2 recipient address: 0 x 95 F 2177022 e 7 B 34 D 84498 F 2 D 9 dd 63 a 7457 ab 5793 Please list the members of your Alliance and link to any previous work: … If there are already agreements as stated by ‘The agreements that are in place are salary agreements for several of the people’ Are you willing to provide these agreements to be looked at for transparency? Further my other concern was why these disclosures and loans/fees were not disclosed at all beforehand in the allocationn amounts, as it surely would be relevant to deciding eligibility. This isnt an attack just to be clear, but am just trying to ensure that everyone has to follow the same guidelines and that the tools that everyone has access to and equitable without external advantage, unless all are afforded the same access to the tools.
So there seems there is some lack of clarity or confusion on the interpretation of the code of cond…
So there seems there is some lack of clarity or confusion on the interpretation of the code of conduct. @lavande is there currently any body in charge of interpreting the 1 -year lock-up rule? Does the Foundation fill that role (I would assume it does, as it is primarily for legal protections)? In my interpretation the following situation is okay: Some organization proposes a Mission for funding This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to. The thing is, if the situation I described is NOT okay, then essentially it is completely unfeasible for organizations to apply for funding through the Mission process. In order to not violate the lockup rule, organizations would have to take their workers off salary as they work on these Missions, which would be insane. The other thing is, though, that essentially, @Pr 0 is right. This is basically just a 0 interest loan (pay workers now with the expectation of OP later). I think the best thing to do is to figure out how to allow stuff like this for independent developers not associated with an organization. On a side note, I think it would be EXTREMELY helpful if the foundation could lead some type of session detailing the legal risk. Because I think we’re all confused.
Griff: chaselb:
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a Mission for funding
This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to
The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission
The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers
I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to.
Yes this would be the plan for most of my grants if it is allowed.
lavande: chaselb:
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a Mission for funding
This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to
The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission
The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers
I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to.
the scenario outlined here is permitted, so long as the parties receiving tokens were all identified in the proposal as Alliance members and the grant is distributed as outlined in the proposal
if a portion of the grant goes to General Magic, and that was not outlined in the proposal, that could be considered grant misusage under the Code of Conduct (and could also be considered an undisclosed financial interest for any delegate benefitting from that arrangement and approving or voting on related proposals.)
the mere existence of a grants-as-a-service arrangement is not a violation of the Code of Conduct, so the relevant issue is disclosure (albeit for a specific type of arrangement that norms had not been previously established around.)
in regards to individual devs, we’re working on an RFP to establish an ecosystem fund that could support this work with upfront capital, stay tuned for more details
chaselb: In my interpretation the following situation is okay: Some organization proposes a M…
chaselb: In my interpretation the following situation is okay: Some organization proposes a Mission for funding This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to. Yes this would be the plan for most of my grants if it is allowed.
Maybe my key concern here is that the grants then for organisations vs individuals favours orgs, be…
Maybe my key concern here is that the grants then for organisations vs individuals favours orgs, because they can front the costs through other means and use the OP as they wish later or at unlock to fulfill obligations without specifically using the OP for collateral or in agreements, because they can exercise the OP at unlock for any needs, without needing to commit specifically to the OP, and do not need such loan agreements, whereas individual devs could not source this internally and so would be at a disadvantage.
I’m glad this is spawning a bunch of discussion. To be honest, I’m still just developing a view on …
I’m glad this is spawning a bunch of discussion. To be honest, I’m still just developing a view on what’s okay or not okay, and at least personally this sort of back and forth is helping me shape my understanding. I agree that while we have locked up OP there ought to be some way to support devs in the interim. My gut says that this sort of support ought to come from us, but we probably should collectively find some other workarounds—the effectiveness of these grants matters. I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20 -minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time. Griff: I am just making an effort to be overly transparent, and I’m glad I am as it is helping me understand the space that we can play in. It sometimes feels in these public forums that I am talking to traffic cops and not DAO members that are assuming positive intent and understand we are all just trying to navigate in this big experiment, and I hope that you can understand that the Giveth and GM teams are also experimenting within the experiment! Frankly, nobody here is a traffic cop, and I kind of resent the characterization if it’s being directed at this inquiry in general. The fact is that this round we’re seeing grant requests for redundant missions, some for products with questionable utility, some that, after careful examination, had tried and failed to get funding in previous rounds, and several whose asks are in my view nowhere near competitive, like multiples over market rates. And there are requests asking for after-the-fact funding for initiatives ostensibly in support of RPGF, which seems to me to be at best an implicit admission of a lack in faith in that process. If my appraisal is accurate, much of this activity doesn’t seem to advance Optimism’s near- or long-term interests, and now we’re learning—only once questions have been asked—that embedded in several of these asks are several streams of revenue going to a single entity, an economic interest that had up to now not been disclosed—and an effective allocation of OP that had never been factored into budgeting. If that’s not something worth raising questions about, I’m not sure what we’re supposed to be about here.
Gonna.eth: The words here are my own and have nothing to do with Grants Council.
jackanorak:
I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20-minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time.
I want to highlight this. Even if you don’t assist Grants office hours, many of the council members including myself are active on Discord and have DMs open on multiple platforms.
chaselb:
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a M…
chaselb:
In my interpretation the following situation is okay:
Some organization proposes a Mission for funding
This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to
The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission
The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers
I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to.
the scenario outlined here is permitted, so long as the parties receiving tokens were all identified in the proposal as Alliance members and the grant is distributed as outlined in the proposal
if a portion of the grant goes to General Magic, and that was not outlined in the proposal, that could be considered grant misusage under the Code of Conduct (and could also be considered an undisclosed financial interest for any delegate benefitting from that arrangement and approving or voting on related proposals.)
the mere existence of a grants-as-a-service arrangement is not a violation of the Code of Conduct, so the relevant issue is disclosure (albeit for a specific type of arrangement that norms had not been previously established around.)
in regards to individual devs, we’re working on an RFP to establish an ecosystem fund that could support this work with upfront capital, stay tuned for more details
chaselb: In my interpretation the following situation is okay: Some organization proposes a M…
chaselb: In my interpretation the following situation is okay: Some organization proposes a Mission for funding This organization has workers that they give a regular salary to The organization keeps these workers on this salary in order for them to work on the Mission The OP funding, after 1 year, is released to the organization, NOT the individual workers I’m not sure if this is the type of agreement Griff is alluding to. the scenario outlined here is permitted, so long as the parties receiving tokens were all identified in the proposal as Alliance members and the grant is distributed as outlined in the proposal if a portion of the grant goes to General Magic, and that was not outlined in the proposal, that could be considered grant misusage under the Code of Conduct (and could also be considered an undisclosed financial interest for any delegate benefitting from that arrangement and approving or voting on related proposals.) the mere existence of a grants-as-a-service arrangement is not a violation of the Code of Conduct, so the relevant issue is disclosure (albeit for a specific type of arrangement that norms had not been previously established around.) in regards to individual devs, we’re working on an RFP to establish an ecosystem fund that could support this work with upfront capital, stay tuned for more details
The words here are my own and have nothing to do with Grants Council.
jackanorak:
I also think…
The words here are my own and have nothing to do with Grants Council.
jackanorak:
I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20 -minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time.
I want to highlight this. Even if you don’t assist Grants office hours, many of the council members including myself are active on Discord and have DMs open on multiple platforms.
Just getting caught up as I’ve been away, so I don’t want to comment on too much of this yet.
In ge…
Just getting caught up as I’ve been away, so I don’t want to comment on too much of this yet.
In general I am very sympathetic to @Griff’s position, I don’t think anyone honestly thinks that he has acted for the purposes of personal financial enrichment or other direct benefit, he’s been building in Ethereum ecosystem pretty much since there was an Ethereum ecosystem and contributing to public goods the whole time. As he said, not everyone is business minded, and in my opinion the community is better for it, however there are aspects of the corporate world such as the importance of explicit financial interest disclosures that we can benefit from adopting. It shouldn’t be an afterthought, that can be missed, even if that was maybe a little more flexible 6 or 7 years ago. For those of you to who this comes naturally, please do remember that not everyone has been trained in this stuff, so even of it seems like common sense to you, that is not the case for everyone!
If we’re expecting a bunch of suites who were drawn in by ‘number go up’ to care about slaying Moloch, then we should learn from them when they point to some of the easy ways they know to do so.
In a way this is seems like another issue qualitatively similar to Synthetix self-delegation where different people have interpreted the rules differently, so it’s probably worth focusing on how to prevent it in the future. In @jackanorak 's original post this would mean question 5 (on disclosures) . As a temporary solution that can be implemented easily, how about we introduce a social norm of including a little boilerplate describing the strength of link between project and delegate when discussing or supporting projects. As a really simple example:
Conflict of Interest Rating: [X]*
No link
No financial link but community member
Investment/tokenholder
Paid by or delegate for
Founder
(When interpreting expand each definition across past, present and future; as well as synonyms or plausible equivalents)
Readers would then be aware of potential causes of bias in the comment they are interacting with, while at the same time delegates would not have to fully disclose the precise nature of their relationships if in CIR 2 and 3 . Obviously, delegates can share more information, and would probably be expected to in many circumstances, but this would be a bare minimum. If you don’t include this in a general comment thread then you risk reputational damage at the very least, on top of any CoC sanctions for specific violations. On the other hand, if you omit a disclosure in an approval (etc) then it is not counted in the required tally. Just a thought to throw into the morass
The words here are my own and have nothing to do with Grants Council. jackanorak: I also think…
The words here are my own and have nothing to do with Grants Council. jackanorak: I also think that the notion that Grants are too cumbersome to apply for is somewhat strained, as—and I’ve said this many places—a 20 -minute conversation with me or other delegates (for free) gives you enough information to spend 20 more minutes filling out an application. And any sort of communication barrier is easily overcome with tools we’ve had for some time. I want to highlight this. Even if you don’t assist Grants office hours, many of the council members including myself are active on Discord and have DMs open on multiple platforms.
Just getting caught up as I’ve been away, so I don’t want to comment on too much of this yet. In ge…
Just getting caught up as I’ve been away, so I don’t want to comment on too much of this yet. In general I am very sympathetic to @Griff’s position, I don’t think anyone honestly thinks that he has acted for the purposes of personal financial enrichment or other direct benefit, he’s been building in Ethereum ecosystem pretty much since there was an Ethereum ecosystem and contributing to public goods the whole time. As he said, not everyone is business minded, and in my opinion the community is better for it, however there are aspects of the corporate world such as the importance of explicit financial interest disclosures that we can benefit from adopting. It shouldn’t be an afterthought, that can be missed, even if that was maybe a little more flexible 6 or 7 years ago. For those of you to who this comes naturally, please do remember that not everyone has been trained in this stuff, so even of it seems like common sense to you, that is not the case for everyone! If we’re expecting a bunch of suites who were drawn in by ‘number go up’ to care about slaying Moloch, then we should learn from them when they point to some of the easy ways they know to do so. In a way this is seems like another issue qualitatively similar to Synthetix self-delegation where different people have interpreted the rules differently, so it’s probably worth focusing on how to prevent it in the future. In @jackanorak 's original post this would mean question 5 (on disclosures) . As a temporary solution that can be implemented easily, how about we introduce a social norm of including a little boilerplate describing the strength of link between project and delegate when discussing or supporting projects. As a really simple example: Conflict of Interest Rating: [X]* No link No financial link but community member Investment/tokenholder Paid by or delegate for Founder (When interpreting expand each definition across past, present and future; as well as synonyms or plausible equivalents) Readers would then be aware of potential causes of bias in the comment they are interacting with, while at the same time delegates would not have to fully disclose the precise nature of their relationships if in CIR 2 and 3 . Obviously, delegates can share more information, and would probably be expected to in many circumstances, but this would be a bare minimum. If you don’t include this in a general comment thread then you risk reputational damage at the very least, on top of any CoC sanctions for specific violations. On the other hand, if you omit a disclosure in an approval (etc) then it is not counted in the required tally. Just a thought to throw into the morass
Some good learning here. This conversation raises some important points for clarification. Perhaps …
Some good learning here. This conversation raises some important points for clarification. Perhaps we could routinely discuss, clarify and build our shared understanding of the Code of Conduct.
I’d like to better understand the process and policy here and clarify responsibility/accountability because the learning here applies as much to me as to other delegates…
I’m highlighting what I understand may be indicated or applicable here in terms of Code of Conduct Self Dealing and Accountability I am adding italics where the application is still unclear to me or appears to contradict other terms.
Presuppositions
Does this seem a fair basis for shared understanding?
Undoubtedly many awesome public goods projects exist in this space thanks to the #GivethGalaxy of which @Griff is a leading light. Safe to assume well-meaning intent
Effective sale recent policy updates do not apply retroactively AND now apply to any future OP exchange. No exchange that I am yet aware of @Grif can you clarify?.
Delegates have a responsibility to uphold the Code of Conduct which prescribes mandatory obligations and enforcement response, IF an issue is reported AND a breach is proven
Application of the Code of Conduct
Code of Conduct
No Self Dealing
Mandatory (Violation 10 ): Optimists must avoid conflicts of interest where possible and mitigate their impact when not possible. We recommend over-communicating and disclosing potential conflicts of interest even when they do not warrant abstaining from a vote.
10 a. Any actual or reasonably anticipated conflicts of interest must be disclosed in writing and prominently displayed ahead of any voting (i.e. when submitting delegate commitments, when running for an elected position, when making public recommendations, etc.).
10 b. Any offer for external compensation relating to delegation or external compensation relating to the Optimism Protocol must be promptly disclosed.
10 c. Delegates are prohibited from approving and voting on their own proposals. Delegates may not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In the case of approval/ranked-choice votes, delegates may vote for themselves, so long as they also cast votes for the remaining elected positions…
10 d. Badge holders should not vote for organizations where they expect any portion of funds to flow to them or any projects they are affiliated with. At a minimum, badge holders must disclose any project they have a meaningful financial or reputational stake in.
Code of Conduct
Grant recipients:
Mandatory (Violation 6 ): Must abide by the grant policies, outlined here
Mandatory (Violation 7 ): Must execute the grant in accordance with what is outlined in the approved grant proposal. Grant recipients that wish to change the use of the grant from what is outlined in the proposal must submit a new proposal requesting approval for the change. To do so, they must follow the grants process in place at the time. If the change is not approved, the recipient must execute the grant as outlined in the original proposal or return the portion of grant funding affected by the unapproved change.
A couple of key points seem clear, at first
Delegates must provide 1 ) written Conflict of Interest (COI) disclosure 2 ) ahead of voting
Delegates are prohibited from 1 ) approving and 2 ) voting on their own proposals
Funding purposes must be stated OR a new proposal submitted for approval
Funding recipients must execute the grant as outlined in the original proposal, seek approval for changes or return funding affected by the unapproved distribution
AND then there’s confusion about how we interpret some conflicting terms. The difference between narrow or broad interpretation has a significant impact
Prohibited from approving and voting on own proposals BUT 1 ) where do we draw the line on ‘own proposal’
Prohibited from approving and voting on own proposals YET 2 ) with some exception where approval voting specified in relation to elections? Yet approval voting is also specified and the method applied for Collective Intents
Where Delegates are also Badgeholders, does this clause apply to Token House or RPGF only?
COI does not warrant abstaining from a vote. Why? When?
Goverance Process Clarification Request
@lavande can you clarify, please
For the proposals where Griff is a party as any of
a listed advisor &/or
where funding was expected to exist &/or
where GaaS agreement was expected to exist
1 . 1 Delegate Approval
1 . 1 . 1 Was Griff’s stated support material to any proposal advancing to vote?. Specifically where his vote counted as one of only four delegate approvals? Y/N
1 . 1 . 2 Who is accountable (sole or joint duty of care) for correctly identifying eligible proposals and moving them to the Agora vote?
1 . 1 . 3 With the hope that any OP holder can openly express support for ANY proposals, including our own. Is it simply the use of the explicit delegate approval format that crosses the line from support to approval, and are there mitigating factors e.g seeking clarification?
1 . 1 . 4 IF a proposal was incorrectly moved to vote, should that nullify the results of the entire vote and a new vote be established?
1 . 1 . 5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
1 . 2 Delegate Voting
Can you clarify the Foundation’s intent given
1 . 2 . 1 Delegate approval and voting are ‘prohibited’ closely followed by exception (s)
1 . 2 . 2 Delegate badge holder COI is very broad, should this apply to the person or to the House?
1 . 2 . 3 Did Grif vote on proposals he was a party to? And is this an intended exclusion due to the voting format?
1 . 2 . 4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
1 . 3 Grant Distribution
Given the disclosure of potential COI is not “prior to voting”
1 . 3 . 1 In this case is a new proposal a remedy to approve GaaS
1 . 3 . 2 Can a new proposal follow voting, to seek transparency and approval for GaaS.and which category of proposal would this be?
1 . 3 . 3 Does financial operational support raised here constitute “external compensation”
1 . 3 . 4 Does disclosure of these agreements prior to OP exchange meet the Foundation’s expectations/requirements for disclosure
lavande: Thanks @lee0007, you highlight some good areas for clarification
lee0007:
Effective sale recent policy updates do not apply retroactively AND now apply to any future OP exchange. No exchange that I am yet aware of @Grif can you clarify?.
To clarify, the effective sale policy has always been in place; but there was some confusion about it, so we recently defined it explicitly. Any effective sales that have occurred to date are a violation enforceable via the Code of Conduct. Going forward, the Foundation also has the ability to enforce the grant policies (but does not have that ability retroactively.)
Prohibited from approving and voting on own proposals YET 2) with some exception where approval voting specified in relation to elections? Yet approval voting is also specified and the method applied for Collective Intents
Although the Code of Conduct has not yet been updated to reflect this clarification, we clarified in Discord that the exception for approval voting for elections does not apply to Missions (Missions are not elections, therefore the exception does not apply. However, since this was not pre-specified, voting according to the policy outlined for elections should not be viewed as a violation of the Code of Conduct in Voting Cycle #13.)
Additional clarifications:
The Foundation counts delegate approvals (and verifies they are made by delegates with enough voting power) and adds proposals with the required approvals to a voting roundup 24 hours prior to the vote. That gives everyone time to correct any mistakes in including or not including a proposal. The Foundation did not count Griff’s approval in instances in which he explicitly highlighted his involvement with a proposal when providing an approval. There is no problem with a delegate expressing support for their own proposal; that is distinct from providing an explicit approval for the proposal to move to a vote.
As stated in Discord, delegates are prohibited from approving and voting on their own proposals, with the exception of voting in elections that utilize approval voting. Doing so is a violation of the approving delegate, not the proposer relying on their approval. I believe there are three approved proposals that were reliant on Griff’s approval to move to a vote; I do not believe they should be penalized.
The enforcement actions that apply for all of these violatons are to file a code of conduct violation report against the delegate that has violated the Code of Conduct.
Voting for one’s own proposal is a violation of the Code of Conduct, so if Griff voted for proposals in which he is listed as an Alliance member, that would be a violation. A delegate may have a COI on a proposal that is not their own; in that case, a delegate would be able to vote but should disclose the COI. Preventing a delegate from voting in all cases where a COI exists is not practical but the COI should be disclosed.
Disclosures need to be made prior to voting so that delegates fully understand what they are voting on. If the allocation to General Magic was not disclosed in a proposal, no portion of the grant may not be distributed to General Magic (I believe this only applies to one approved Mission.)
lee0007: lee0007:
1.1.5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
1.2.4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning?
It’s not the first time COI raises queries 100℅ it won’t be the last.
I’ve had several conversations in the discord and forum around defining conflicts of interest (RFPG2) and it remains unclear, with rather different approaches.
Could you help clarify?
Humans make mistakes, we have different interpretation of policy. Given the Foundation is defining the policy here it would be helpful to me (& may be helpful to others) to understand what enforcement action /resulting penalty applies if/when
conflicts of interest are not disclosed
delegates approve and/or vote on ‘own proposals’
I understand consequences may vary, subject to situational context. So using this situation as the applied example - could you share with us please the enforcement penalty that would apply for this situation IF reported and proven.
Is the enforcement action / penalty simply a warning or something more serious?? Is it different for say approval and voting vs COI??
Thanks @lee 0007 , you highlight some good areas for clarification
lee 0007 :
Effective sale r…
Thanks @lee 0007 , you highlight some good areas for clarification
lee 0007 :
Effective sale recent policy updates do not apply retroactively AND now apply to any future OP exchange. No exchange that I am yet aware of @Grif can you clarify?.
To clarify, the effective sale policy has always been in place; but there was some confusion about it, so we recently defined it explicitly. Any effective sales that have occurred to date are a violation enforceable via the Code of Conduct. Going forward, the Foundation also has the ability to enforce the grant policies (but does not have that ability retroactively.)
Prohibited from approving and voting on own proposals YET 2 ) with some exception where approval voting specified in relation to elections? Yet approval voting is also specified and the method applied for Collective Intents
Although the Code of Conduct has not yet been updated to reflect this clarification, we clarified in Discord that the exception for approval voting for elections does not apply to Missions (Missions are not elections, therefore the exception does not apply. However, since this was not pre-specified, voting according to the policy outlined for elections should not be viewed as a violation of the Code of Conduct in Voting Cycle # 13 .)
Additional clarifications:
The Foundation counts delegate approvals (and verifies they are made by delegates with enough voting power) and adds proposals with the required approvals to a voting roundup 24 hours prior to the vote. That gives everyone time to correct any mistakes in including or not including a proposal. The Foundation did not count Griff’s approval in instances in which he explicitly highlighted his involvement with a proposal when providing an approval. There is no problem with a delegate expressing support for their own proposal; that is distinct from providing an explicit approval for the proposal to move to a vote.
As stated in Discord, delegates are prohibited from approving and voting on their own proposals, with the exception of voting in elections that utilize approval voting. Doing so is a violation of the approving delegate, not the proposer relying on their approval. I believe there are three approved proposals that were reliant on Griff’s approval to move to a vote; I do not believe they should be penalized.
The enforcement actions that apply for all of these violatons are to file a code of conduct violation report against the delegate that has violated the Code of Conduct.
Voting for one’s own proposal is a violation of the Code of Conduct, so if Griff voted for proposals in which he is listed as an Alliance member, that would be a violation. A delegate may have a COI on a proposal that is not their own; in that case, a delegate would be able to vote but should disclose the COI. Preventing a delegate from voting in all cases where a COI exists is not practical but the COI should be disclosed.
Disclosures need to be made prior to voting so that delegates fully understand what they are voting on. If the allocation to General Magic was not disclosed in a proposal, no portion of the grant may not be distributed to General Magic (I believe this only applies to one approved Mission.)
Some good learning here. This conversation raises some important points for clarification. Perhaps …
Some good learning here. This conversation raises some important points for clarification. Perhaps we could routinely discuss, clarify and build our shared understanding of the Code of Conduct. I’d like to better understand the process and policy here and clarify responsibility/accountability because the learning here applies as much to me as to other delegates… I’m highlighting what I understand may be indicated or applicable here in terms of Code of Conduct Self Dealing and Accountability I am adding italics where the application is still unclear to me or appears to contradict other terms. Presuppositions Does this seem a fair basis for shared understanding? Undoubtedly many awesome public goods projects exist in this space thanks to the #GivethGalaxy of which @Griff is a leading light. Safe to assume well-meaning intent Effective sale recent policy updates do not apply retroactively AND now apply to any future OP exchange. No exchange that I am yet aware of @Grif can you clarify?. Delegates have a responsibility to uphold the Code of Conduct which prescribes mandatory obligations and enforcement response, IF an issue is reported AND a breach is proven Application of the Code of Conduct Code of Conduct No Self Dealing Mandatory (Violation 10 ): Optimists must avoid conflicts of interest where possible and mitigate their impact when not possible. We recommend over-communicating and disclosing potential conflicts of interest even when they do not warrant abstaining from a vote. 10 a. Any actual or reasonably anticipated conflicts of interest must be disclosed in writing and prominently displayed ahead of any voting (i.e. when submitting delegate commitments, when running for an elected position, when making public recommendations, etc.). 10 b. Any offer for external compensation relating to delegation or external compensation relating to the Optimism Protocol must be promptly disclosed. 10 c. Delegates are prohibited from approving and voting on their own proposals. Delegates may not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In the case of approval/ranked-choice votes, delegates may vote for themselves, so long as they also cast votes for the remaining elected positions… 10 d. Badge holders should not vote for organizations where they expect any portion of funds to flow to them or any projects they are affiliated with. At a minimum, badge holders must disclose any project they have a meaningful financial or reputational stake in. Code of Conduct Grant recipients: Mandatory (Violation 6 ): Must abide by the grant policies, outlined here Mandatory (Violation 7 ): Must execute the grant in accordance with what is outlined in the approved grant proposal. Grant recipients that wish to change the use of the grant from what is outlined in the proposal must submit a new proposal requesting approval for the change. To do so, they must follow the grants process in place at the time. If the change is not approved, the recipient must execute the grant as outlined in the original proposal or return the portion of grant funding affected by the unapproved change. A couple of key points seem clear, at first Delegates must provide 1 ) written Conflict of Interest (COI) disclosure 2 ) ahead of voting Delegates are prohibited from 1 ) approving and 2 ) voting on their own proposals Funding purposes must be stated OR a new proposal submitted for approval Funding recipients must execute the grant as outlined in the original proposal, seek approval for changes or return funding affected by the unapproved distribution AND then there’s confusion about how we interpret some conflicting terms. The difference between narrow or broad interpretation has a significant impact Prohibited from approving and voting on own proposals BUT 1 ) where do we draw the line on ‘own proposal’ Prohibited from approving and voting on own proposals YET 2 ) with some exception where approval voting specified in relation to elections? Yet approval voting is also specified and the method applied for Collective Intents Where Delegates are also Badgeholders, does this clause apply to Token House or RPGF only? COI does not warrant abstaining from a vote. Why? When? Goverance Process Clarification Request @lavande can you clarify, please For the proposals where Griff is a party as any of a listed advisor &/or where funding was expected to exist &/or where GaaS agreement was expected to exist 1 . 1 Delegate Approval 1 . 1 . 1 Was Griff’s stated support material to any proposal advancing to vote?. Specifically where his vote counted as one of only four delegate approvals? Y/N 1 . 1 . 2 Who is accountable (sole or joint duty of care) for correctly identifying eligible proposals and moving them to the Agora vote? 1 . 1 . 3 With the hope that any OP holder can openly express support for ANY proposals, including our own. Is it simply the use of the explicit delegate approval format that crosses the line from support to approval, and are there mitigating factors e.g seeking clarification? 1 . 1 . 4 IF a proposal was incorrectly moved to vote, should that nullify the results of the entire vote and a new vote be established? 1 . 1 . 5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach? 1 . 2 Delegate Voting Can you clarify the Foundation’s intent given 1 . 2 . 1 Delegate approval and voting are ‘prohibited’ closely followed by exception (s) 1 . 2 . 2 Delegate badge holder COI is very broad, should this apply to the person or to the House? 1 . 2 . 3 Did Grif vote on proposals he was a party to? And is this an intended exclusion due to the voting format? 1 . 2 . 4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach? 1 . 3 Grant Distribution Given the disclosure of potential COI is not “prior to voting” 1 . 3 . 1 In this case is a new proposal a remedy to approve GaaS 1 . 3 . 2 Can a new proposal follow voting, to seek transparency and approval for GaaS.and which category of proposal would this be? 1 . 3 . 3 Does financial operational support raised here constitute “external compensation” 1 . 3 . 4 Does disclosure of these agreements prior to OP exchange meet the Foundation’s expectations/requirements for disclosure
lavande: Thanks @lee0007, you highlight some good areas for clarification
lee0007:
Effective sale recent policy updates do not apply retroactively AND now apply to any future OP exchange. No exchange that I am yet aware of @Grif can you clarify?.
To clarify, the effective sale policy has always been in place; but there was some confusion about it, so we recently defined it explicitly. Any effective sales that have occurred to date are a violation enforceable via the Code of Conduct. Going forward, the Foundation also has the ability to enforce the grant policies (but does not have that ability retroactively.)
Prohibited from approving and voting on own proposals YET 2) with some exception where approval voting specified in relation to elections? Yet approval voting is also specified and the method applied for Collective Intents
Although the Code of Conduct has not yet been updated to reflect this clarification, we clarified in Discord that the exception for approval voting for elections does not apply to Missions (Missions are not elections, therefore the exception does not apply. However, since this was not pre-specified, voting according to the policy outlined for elections should not be viewed as a violation of the Code of Conduct in Voting Cycle #13.)
Additional clarifications:
The Foundation counts delegate approvals (and verifies they are made by delegates with enough voting power) and adds proposals with the required approvals to a voting roundup 24 hours prior to the vote. That gives everyone time to correct any mistakes in including or not including a proposal. The Foundation did not count Griff’s approval in instances in which he explicitly highlighted his involvement with a proposal when providing an approval. There is no problem with a delegate expressing support for their own proposal; that is distinct from providing an explicit approval for the proposal to move to a vote.
As stated in Discord, delegates are prohibited from approving and voting on their own proposals, with the exception of voting in elections that utilize approval voting. Doing so is a violation of the approving delegate, not the proposer relying on their approval. I believe there are three approved proposals that were reliant on Griff’s approval to move to a vote; I do not believe they should be penalized.
The enforcement actions that apply for all of these violatons are to file a code of conduct violation report against the delegate that has violated the Code of Conduct.
Voting for one’s own proposal is a violation of the Code of Conduct, so if Griff voted for proposals in which he is listed as an Alliance member, that would be a violation. A delegate may have a COI on a proposal that is not their own; in that case, a delegate would be able to vote but should disclose the COI. Preventing a delegate from voting in all cases where a COI exists is not practical but the COI should be disclosed.
Disclosures need to be made prior to voting so that delegates fully understand what they are voting on. If the allocation to General Magic was not disclosed in a proposal, no portion of the grant may not be distributed to General Magic (I believe this only applies to one approved Mission.)
lee0007: lee0007:
1.1.5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
1.2.4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning?
It’s not the first time COI raises queries 100℅ it won’t be the last.
I’ve had several conversations in the discord and forum around defining conflicts of interest (RFPG2) and it remains unclear, with rather different approaches.
Could you help clarify?
Humans make mistakes, we have different interpretation of policy. Given the Foundation is defining the policy here it would be helpful to me (& may be helpful to others) to understand what enforcement action /resulting penalty applies if/when
conflicts of interest are not disclosed
delegates approve and/or vote on ‘own proposals’
I understand consequences may vary, subject to situational context. So using this situation as the applied example - could you share with us please the enforcement penalty that would apply for this situation IF reported and proven.
Is the enforcement action / penalty simply a warning or something more serious?? Is it different for say approval and voting vs COI??
Thanks @lee 0007 , you highlight some good areas for clarification lee 0007 : Effective sale r…
Thanks @lee 0007 , you highlight some good areas for clarification lee 0007 : Effective sale recent policy updates do not apply retroactively AND now apply to any future OP exchange. No exchange that I am yet aware of @Grif can you clarify?. To clarify, the effective sale policy has always been in place; but there was some confusion about it, so we recently defined it explicitly. Any effective sales that have occurred to date are a violation enforceable via the Code of Conduct. Going forward, the Foundation also has the ability to enforce the grant policies (but does not have that ability retroactively.) Prohibited from approving and voting on own proposals YET 2 ) with some exception where approval voting specified in relation to elections? Yet approval voting is also specified and the method applied for Collective Intents Although the Code of Conduct has not yet been updated to reflect this clarification, we clarified in Discord that the exception for approval voting for elections does not apply to Missions (Missions are not elections, therefore the exception does not apply. However, since this was not pre-specified, voting according to the policy outlined for elections should not be viewed as a violation of the Code of Conduct in Voting Cycle # 13 .) Additional clarifications: The Foundation counts delegate approvals (and verifies they are made by delegates with enough voting power) and adds proposals with the required approvals to a voting roundup 24 hours prior to the vote. That gives everyone time to correct any mistakes in including or not including a proposal. The Foundation did not count Griff’s approval in instances in which he explicitly highlighted his involvement with a proposal when providing an approval. There is no problem with a delegate expressing support for their own proposal; that is distinct from providing an explicit approval for the proposal to move to a vote. As stated in Discord, delegates are prohibited from approving and voting on their own proposals, with the exception of voting in elections that utilize approval voting. Doing so is a violation of the approving delegate, not the proposer relying on their approval. I believe there are three approved proposals that were reliant on Griff’s approval to move to a vote; I do not believe they should be penalized. The enforcement actions that apply for all of these violatons are to file a code of conduct violation report against the delegate that has violated the Code of Conduct. Voting for one’s own proposal is a violation of the Code of Conduct, so if Griff voted for proposals in which he is listed as an Alliance member, that would be a violation. A delegate may have a COI on a proposal that is not their own; in that case, a delegate would be able to vote but should disclose the COI. Preventing a delegate from voting in all cases where a COI exists is not practical but the COI should be disclosed. Disclosures need to be made prior to voting so that delegates fully understand what they are voting on. If the allocation to General Magic was not disclosed in a proposal, no portion of the grant may not be distributed to General Magic (I believe this only applies to one approved Mission.)
Thanks for clarifying
lavande:
The enforcement actions that apply for all of these violations …
Thanks for clarifying
lavande:
The enforcement actions that apply for all of these violations are to file a code of conduct violation report against the delegate that has violated the Code of Conduct.
What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning?
Given that you indicate three proposals that were advanced to vote effectively with only three eligible delegate approvals. For the legitimacy of the vote at what point do process errors require a new vote?
lavande: I believe we should respect the outcome of the vote as Griff’s approvals only determined whether a small number of proposals were moved to a vote. These proposals still had to receive enough “yes” votes to pass. I do not believe there were any proposals that were prevented from moving to a vote by just one approval (not counting Griff’s approvals, for consistency), so the proposals that did not move to a vote should not have been disadvantaged by Griff’s approval being counted in a few cases.
There were definitely a lot of learnings from this, on all sides, and it’s the first time we’ve had to work through defining conflicts of interests and how they should be handled (and there is clearly more work to do on that), but I do not think we should punish proposers for being part of the first iteration of this experiment.
Open to suggestions on how to improve/automate the approval counting/verification process in the future, in addition to additional clarifications that need to be made in the Code of Conduct.
lee0007: lee0007:
1.1.5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
1.2.4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning?
It’s not the first time COI raises queries 100℅ it won’t be the last.
I’ve had several conversations in the discord and forum around defining conflicts of interest (RFPG2) and it remains unclear, with rather different approaches.
Could you help clarify?
Humans make mistakes, we have different interpretation of policy. Given the Foundation is defining the policy here it would be helpful to me (& may be helpful to others) to understand what enforcement action /resulting penalty applies if/when
conflicts of interest are not disclosed
delegates approve and/or vote on ‘own proposals’
I understand consequences may vary, subject to situational context. So using this situation as the applied example - could you share with us please the enforcement penalty that would apply for this situation IF reported and proven.
Is the enforcement action / penalty simply a warning or something more serious?? Is it different for say approval and voting vs COI??
I believe we should respect the outcome of the vote as Griff’s approvals only determined whether a …
I believe we should respect the outcome of the vote as Griff’s approvals only determined whether a small number of proposals were moved to a vote. These proposals still had to receive enough “yes” votes to pass. I do not believe there were any proposals that were prevented from moving to a vote by just one approval (not counting Griff’s approvals, for consistency), so the proposals that did not move to a vote should not have been disadvantaged by Griff’s approval being counted in a few cases.
There were definitely a lot of learnings from this, on all sides, and it’s the first time we’ve had to work through defining conflicts of interests and how they should be handled (and there is clearly more work to do on that), but I do not think we should punish proposers for being part of the first iteration of this experiment.
Open to suggestions on how to improve/automate the approval counting/verification process in the future, in addition to additional clarifications that need to be made in the Code of Conduct.
LeChiffre: Why are my messages being censored on this forum?
jackanorak: yeah, for what it’s worth i think this whole thing falls pretty neatly into ‘no harm no foul’ territory, especially considering griff was never the marginal vote on any of these, and a whole lot of proposals didn’t even make it to this round. i think the way GaaS was constructed, though, it was a colossal tax on grant proposals and probably ought be flagged when it’s used.
without doubt the move here’s to look forward but make sure we’re continuing to spot this kinda stuff. def mindful of the call by @MinimalGravitas to strike the right balance between too little and too much oversight (tho who exactly are the suits in their vision?). the goal’s to use our capacity to get the most, best stuff done for the Collective, and this sort of investigation has to be considered in the service of that, not just as its own end, if that makes sense
lee0007: lee0007:
1.1.5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
1.2.4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning?
It’s not the first time COI raises queries 100℅ it won’t be the last.
I’ve had several conversations in the discord and forum around defining conflicts of interest (RFPG2) and it remains unclear, with rather different approaches.
Could you help clarify?
Humans make mistakes, we have different interpretation of policy. Given the Foundation is defining the policy here it would be helpful to me (& may be helpful to others) to understand what enforcement action /resulting penalty applies if/when
conflicts of interest are not disclosed
delegates approve and/or vote on ‘own proposals’
I understand consequences may vary, subject to situational context. So using this situation as the applied example - could you share with us please the enforcement penalty that would apply for this situation IF reported and proven.
Is the enforcement action / penalty simply a warning or something more serious?? Is it different for say approval and voting vs COI??
Thanks for clarifying lavande: The enforcement actions that apply for all of these violations …
Thanks for clarifying lavande: The enforcement actions that apply for all of these violations are to file a code of conduct violation report against the delegate that has violated the Code of Conduct. What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning? Given that you indicate three proposals that were advanced to vote effectively with only three eligible delegate approvals. For the legitimacy of the vote at what point do process errors require a new vote?
lavande: I believe we should respect the outcome of the vote as Griff’s approvals only determined whether a small number of proposals were moved to a vote. These proposals still had to receive enough “yes” votes to pass. I do not believe there were any proposals that were prevented from moving to a vote by just one approval (not counting Griff’s approvals, for consistency), so the proposals that did not move to a vote should not have been disadvantaged by Griff’s approval being counted in a few cases.
There were definitely a lot of learnings from this, on all sides, and it’s the first time we’ve had to work through defining conflicts of interests and how they should be handled (and there is clearly more work to do on that), but I do not think we should punish proposers for being part of the first iteration of this experiment.
Open to suggestions on how to improve/automate the approval counting/verification process in the future, in addition to additional clarifications that need to be made in the Code of Conduct.
lee0007: lee0007:
1.1.5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
1.2.4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning?
It’s not the first time COI raises queries 100℅ it won’t be the last.
I’ve had several conversations in the discord and forum around defining conflicts of interest (RFPG2) and it remains unclear, with rather different approaches.
Could you help clarify?
Humans make mistakes, we have different interpretation of policy. Given the Foundation is defining the policy here it would be helpful to me (& may be helpful to others) to understand what enforcement action /resulting penalty applies if/when
conflicts of interest are not disclosed
delegates approve and/or vote on ‘own proposals’
I understand consequences may vary, subject to situational context. So using this situation as the applied example - could you share with us please the enforcement penalty that would apply for this situation IF reported and proven.
Is the enforcement action / penalty simply a warning or something more serious?? Is it different for say approval and voting vs COI??
I believe we should respect the outcome of the vote as Griff’s approvals only determined whether a …
I believe we should respect the outcome of the vote as Griff’s approvals only determined whether a small number of proposals were moved to a vote. These proposals still had to receive enough “yes” votes to pass. I do not believe there were any proposals that were prevented from moving to a vote by just one approval (not counting Griff’s approvals, for consistency), so the proposals that did not move to a vote should not have been disadvantaged by Griff’s approval being counted in a few cases. There were definitely a lot of learnings from this, on all sides, and it’s the first time we’ve had to work through defining conflicts of interests and how they should be handled (and there is clearly more work to do on that), but I do not think we should punish proposers for being part of the first iteration of this experiment. Open to suggestions on how to improve/automate the approval counting/verification process in the future, in addition to additional clarifications that need to be made in the Code of Conduct.
LeChiffre: Why are my messages being censored on this forum?
jackanorak: yeah, for what it’s worth i think this whole thing falls pretty neatly into ‘no harm no foul’ territory, especially considering griff was never the marginal vote on any of these, and a whole lot of proposals didn’t even make it to this round. i think the way GaaS was constructed, though, it was a colossal tax on grant proposals and probably ought be flagged when it’s used.
without doubt the move here’s to look forward but make sure we’re continuing to spot this kinda stuff. def mindful of the call by @MinimalGravitas to strike the right balance between too little and too much oversight (tho who exactly are the suits in their vision?). the goal’s to use our capacity to get the most, best stuff done for the Collective, and this sort of investigation has to be considered in the service of that, not just as its own end, if that makes sense
lee0007: lee0007:
1.1.5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
1.2.4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee0007:
What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning?
It’s not the first time COI raises queries 100℅ it won’t be the last.
I’ve had several conversations in the discord and forum around defining conflicts of interest (RFPG2) and it remains unclear, with rather different approaches.
Could you help clarify?
Humans make mistakes, we have different interpretation of policy. Given the Foundation is defining the policy here it would be helpful to me (& may be helpful to others) to understand what enforcement action /resulting penalty applies if/when
conflicts of interest are not disclosed
delegates approve and/or vote on ‘own proposals’
I understand consequences may vary, subject to situational context. So using this situation as the applied example - could you share with us please the enforcement penalty that would apply for this situation IF reported and proven.
Is the enforcement action / penalty simply a warning or something more serious?? Is it different for say approval and voting vs COI??
yeah, for what it’s worth i think this whole thing falls pretty neatly into ‘no harm no foul’ terri…
yeah, for what it’s worth i think this whole thing falls pretty neatly into ‘no harm no foul’ territory, especially considering griff was never the marginal vote on any of these, and a whole lot of proposals didn’t even make it to this round. i think the way GaaS was constructed, though, it was a colossal tax on grant proposals and probably ought be flagged when it’s used.
without doubt the move here’s to look forward but make sure we’re continuing to spot this kinda stuff. def mindful of the call by @MinimalGravitas to strike the right balance between too little and too much oversight (tho who exactly are the suits in their vision?). the goal’s to use our capacity to get the most, best stuff done for the Collective, and this sort of investigation has to be considered in the service of that, not just as its own end, if that makes sense
lee 0007 :
1 . 1 . 5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
…
lee 0007 :
1 . 1 . 5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee 0007 :
1 . 2 . 4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach?
lee 0007 :
What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning?
It’s not the first time COI raises queries 7 100 ℅ it won’t be the last.
I’ve had several conversations in the discord and forum around defining conflicts of interest (RFPG 2 ) 7 and it remains unclear, with rather different approaches.
Could you help clarify?
Humans make mistakes, we have different interpretation of policy. Given the Foundation is defining the policy here it would be helpful to me (& may be helpful to others) to understand what enforcement action /resulting penalty applies if/when
conflicts of interest are not disclosed
delegates approve and/or vote on ‘own proposals’
I understand consequences may vary, subject to situational context. So using this situation as the applied example - could you share with us please the enforcement penalty that would apply for this situation IF reported and proven.
Is the enforcement action / penalty simply a warning or something more serious?? Is it different for say approval and voting vs COI??
yeah, for what it’s worth i think this whole thing falls pretty neatly into ‘no harm no foul’ terri…
yeah, for what it’s worth i think this whole thing falls pretty neatly into ‘no harm no foul’ territory, especially considering griff was never the marginal vote on any of these, and a whole lot of proposals didn’t even make it to this round. i think the way GaaS was constructed, though, it was a colossal tax on grant proposals and probably ought be flagged when it’s used. without doubt the move here’s to look forward but make sure we’re continuing to spot this kinda stuff. def mindful of the call by @MinimalGravitas to strike the right balance between too little and too much oversight (tho who exactly are the suits in their vision?). the goal’s to use our capacity to get the most, best stuff done for the Collective, and this sort of investigation has to be considered in the service of that, not just as its own end, if that makes sense
lee 0007 : 1 . 1 . 5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach? …
lee 0007 : 1 . 1 . 5 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach? lee 0007 : 1 . 2 . 4 What enforcement action applies if there is this type of breach? lee 0007 : What is the enforcement action? i.e First Warning? It’s not the first time COI raises queries 6 100 ℅ it won’t be the last. I’ve had several conversations in the discord and forum around defining conflicts of interest (RFPG 2 ) 6 and it remains unclear, with rather different approaches. Could you help clarify? Humans make mistakes, we have different interpretation of policy. Given the Foundation is defining the policy here it would be helpful to me (& may be helpful to others) to understand what enforcement action /resulting penalty applies if/when conflicts of interest are not disclosed delegates approve and/or vote on ‘own proposals’ I understand consequences may vary, subject to situational context. So using this situation as the applied example - could you share with us please the enforcement penalty that would apply for this situation IF reported and proven. Is the enforcement action / penalty simply a warning or something more serious?? Is it different for say approval and voting vs COI??
The Foundation currently manages the Code of Conduct, incorporating community feedback and input. U…
The Foundation currently manages the Code of Conduct, incorporating community feedback and input. Ultimately, norms will be established through its usage by the community. Since this is a first offense, it would be processed as a warning, according to the current procedure. If the community would like to further define the specific violations that require a temporary suspension (as we have done with severe violations), that can be incorporated as feedback. If the community would like stricter definitions around conflicts of interest, I would encourage those interested to lead a community discussion around what those should be, and leave suggestions as feedback for incorporation.
Zooming out to gain perspective, the Code of Conduct is meant to be a tool the community can use to create accountability, guide transparent conversations like the one we’ve had here, and to keep community interactions healthy. That is what the community has done in this instance and it’s encouraging to see the dramatic improvement in how this issue was discussed relative to previous incidents. We will soon be working with Gravity DAO and rnDAO (via RFP # 2 6 ) to further develop the community’s ability to have these types of conversations and avoid having to escalate to Code of Conduct enforcement.
Those are very relevant informations. Not nice to have more monopolies over Defi as well! Let’s hop…
Those are very relevant informations. Not nice to have more monopolies over Defi as well! Let’s hope some competition jumps in!
The Foundation currently manages the Code of Conduct, incorporating community feedback and input. U…
The Foundation currently manages the Code of Conduct, incorporating community feedback and input. Ultimately, norms will be established through its usage by the community. Since this is a first offense, it would be processed as a warning, according to the current procedure. If the community would like to further define the specific violations that require a temporary suspension (as we have done with severe violations), that can be incorporated as feedback. If the community would like stricter definitions around conflicts of interest, I would encourage those interested to lead a community discussion around what those should be, and leave suggestions as feedback for incorporation. Zooming out to gain perspective, the Code of Conduct is meant to be a tool the community can use to create accountability, guide transparent conversations like the one we’ve had here, and to keep community interactions healthy. That is what the community has done in this instance and it’s encouraging to see the dramatic improvement in how this issue was discussed relative to previous incidents. We will soon be working with Gravity DAO and rnDAO (via RFP # 2 6 ) to further develop the community’s ability to have these types of conversations and avoid having to escalate to Code of Conduct enforcement.
Those are very relevant informations. Not nice to have more monopolies over Defi as well! Let’s hop…
Those are very relevant informations. Not nice to have more monopolies over Defi as well! Let’s hope some competition jumps in!
This sort of behavior is not limited to Optimism. There are various large groups who seem to do thi…
This sort of behavior is not limited to Optimism. There are various large groups who seem to do this sorta “service” across the board. They offer influence for grants in exchange for a percentage of the money raised. From an outsider’s perspective it looks nothing short of corruption as usual but given how openly it happens I am a bit shocked that none of the large DAOs that grant funds have caught on.
I want to recommend that the DAO hire a 3 rd party investigator to look into these “public goods” organization before we continue to allow DAOs to be used as cash cows by them. In particular, there has been a recent spike of recipients of “Public Goods” that have absolutely no track record of doing any good yet by some miracle and with the use of the right charm have managed to walk away with tens of thousands of dollars.
One instance in particular comes from members that are backed by ETH foundation in South America who have crafted a clever way of raising money for groups and requiring those groups to spend most if not all of it to hire them. And now it seems they are gaming the system to their advantage with no end in sight.
We should all be asking ourselves:
What is the extent of this sorta behavior?
What other places/ protocols are also granting them money (ENS, ARBITRUM, etc…)?
What is their actual track record of doing public goods before and after receiving grants?
How effective have they used their funding in the past?
I’ve kept a close eye on the ecosystem for some time now and I agree that humans make mistakes. But let us not be blind to the facts. The fact is that DAOs are systems and those systems are being played like a guitar by a select few for the long term benefit of a select few in the name of “Public goods”.
I call for a private investigation by a third party because it is hard to determine the extent of the influences and quid pro quo of the dealings. As a person who worked at an enforcement agency in the past, these dealings do look criminal in nature.
This sort of behavior is not limited to Optimism. There are various large groups who seem to do thi…
This sort of behavior is not limited to Optimism. There are various large groups who seem to do this sorta “service” across the board. They offer influence for grants in exchange for a percentage of the money raised. From an outsider’s perspective it looks nothing short of corruption as usual but given how openly it happens I am a bit shocked that none of the large DAOs that grant funds have caught on. I want to recommend that the DAO hire a 3 rd party investigator to look into these “public goods” organization before we continue to allow DAOs to be used as cash cows by them. In particular, there has been a recent spike of recipients of “Public Goods” that have absolutely no track record of doing any good yet by some miracle and with the use of the right charm have managed to walk away with tens of thousands of dollars. One instance in particular comes from members that are backed by ETH foundation in South America who have crafted a clever way of raising money for groups and requiring those groups to spend most if not all of it to hire them. And now it seems they are gaming the system to their advantage with no end in sight. We should all be asking ourselves: What is the extent of this sorta behavior? What other places/ protocols are also granting them money (ENS, ARBITRUM, etc…)? What is their actual track record of doing public goods before and after receiving grants? How effective have they used their funding in the past? I’ve kept a close eye on the ecosystem for some time now and I agree that humans make mistakes. But let us not be blind to the facts. The fact is that DAOs are systems and those systems are being played like a guitar by a select few for the long term benefit of a select few in the name of “Public goods”. I call for a private investigation by a third party because it is hard to determine the extent of the influences and quid pro quo of the dealings. As a person who worked at an enforcement agency in the past, these dealings do look criminal in nature.
I have similar concerns but don’t think a 3 rd party investigation will be useful in this case. So…
I have similar concerns but don’t think a 3 rd party investigation will be useful in this case. Something that may be of use is making badgeholder votes public to allow for better analysis of potential collusion, and measure impact stemming from badgehodler decisions. Many entities are taking an interest in measuring grantee impact, the teams and individuals deciding on how funds are allocated should be subject to the same level of impact review. I believe attestations could serve wall for this use case.
I have similar concerns but don’t think a 3 rd party investigation will be useful in this case. So…
I have similar concerns but don’t think a 3 rd party investigation will be useful in this case. Something that may be of use is making badgeholder votes public to allow for better analysis of potential collusion, and measure impact stemming from badgehodler decisions. Many entities are taking an interest in measuring grantee impact, the teams and individuals deciding on how funds are allocated should be subject to the same level of impact review. I believe attestations could serve wall for this use case.
Really great points. Thanks for adding this and shedding some light on an important subject.
Really great points. Thanks for adding this and shedding some light on an important subject.
Really great points. Thanks for adding this and shedding some light on an important subject.
Really great points. Thanks for adding this and shedding some light on an important subject.
I know there has been some time since the last comment in this discussion, and even more time since…
I know there has been some time since the last comment in this discussion, and even more time since it started. However, I recently interviewed @Griff in the context of Delegate Corner and we used the opportunity to talk about this topic at the end of the episode.
You can catch the conversation here: https://youtu.be/-Cpdllo 9 sao?t= 2058 15
I know there has been some time since the last comment in this discussion, and even more time since…
I know there has been some time since the last comment in this discussion, and even more time since it started. However, I recently interviewed @Griff in the context of Delegate Corner and we used the opportunity to talk about this topic at the end of the episode. You can catch the conversation here: https://youtu.be/-Cpdllo 9 sao?t= 2058 8