I have finished my votes for Gov Fund Phase 1 Season 1 .
My general impression thus far is that most proposals are a mixed bag, with very few high-quality projects I’d be excited to support without reservations. Since Optimism is a new collective & ecosystem, I have been very lenient as I’ve thought it’s OK to give mediocre or unproven protocols the benefit of doubt. Of course, over the 4 cycles I have become gradually more strict about my votes. For Season 2 , I’ll only be voting for proposals by a) protocols that have proven themselves over a reasonable period of time (e.g. > 1 year); b) have a very clear case for incentivizing usage directly on Optimism, and c) a co-incentives program with an amount you can safely match (I don’t want to see a $ 5 M market cap project asking for 500 , 000 OP). Of course, there can be exceptional proposals which contribute to the Optimism ecosystem another way. I realize this is going to be unpopular, and I’m going to receive some hate mail, but that’s OK. I believe granting of $OP tokens through Gov Fund must be earned, rather than being a bet. There are other funds like the Seed Fund or RPGF that may be more appropriate for a lot of proposals.
I also continue to be very uncomfortable granting OP tokens and building an ecosystem while Optimism is a de-facto centralized sidechain, just with 7 days of social disputes available. I’d like to see Optimism urgently have a) permissionless fraud proofs, b) decentralized contract upgradability 4 , including emergency.
I’d only be truly comfortable when we also have decentralized sequencers 7 and economic sustainability for $OP 13 .
I’m not going to do anything drastic like protest by voting everything Against, however I’ll be much more careful with my votes until Optimism itself is in an acceptable place. I’d like to see the OP Labs and Optimism Foundation teams provide a detailed roadmap update on where they are with the above-mentioned decentralization goals.
I generally agree with the learnings and steps being taken for Season 2 and look forward to participating in the discussions during the Reflection Period ™. I also hope to see some accountability and results data for previously approved proposals around this time.
The writer shares their voting experience and observations from participating in the Gov Fund Phase 1 Season 1, highlighting a mix of quality in the proposals reviewed. Their leniency towards new projects on Optimism gradually shifted to strictness as they emphasize voting for established protocols in Season 2. They express the criteria for proposals they will support and share concerns regarding centralization on Optimism, outlining the necessary decentralization features they hope to see. The writer calls for transparency in the governance process and progress updates from OP Labs and Optimism Foundation moving forward.
I have finished my votes for Gov Fund Phase 1 Season 1 .
My general impression thus far is that …
I have finished my votes for Gov Fund Phase 1 Season 1 .
My general impression thus far is that most proposals are a mixed bag, with very few high-quality projects I’d be excited to support without reservations. Since Optimism is a new collective & ecosystem, I have been very lenient as I’ve thought it’s OK to give mediocre or unproven protocols the benefit of doubt. Of course, over the 4 cycles I have become gradually more strict about my votes. For Season 2 , I’ll only be voting for proposals by a) protocols that have proven themselves over a reasonable period of time (e.g. > 1 year); b) have a very clear case for incentivizing usage directly on Optimism, and c) a co-incentives program with an amount you can safely match (I don’t want to see a $ 5 M market cap project asking for 500 , 000 OP). Of course, there can be exceptional proposals which contribute to the Optimism ecosystem another way. I realize this is going to be unpopular, and I’m going to receive some hate mail, but that’s OK. I believe granting of $OP tokens through Gov Fund must be earned, rather than being a bet. There are other funds like the Seed Fund or RPGF that may be more appropriate for a lot of proposals.
I also continue to be very uncomfortable granting OP tokens and building an ecosystem while Optimism is a de-facto centralized sidechain, just with 7 days of social disputes available. I’d like to see Optimism urgently have a) permissionless fraud proofs, b) decentralized contract upgradability, including emergency.
I’d only be truly comfortable when we also have decentralized sequencers and economic sustainability for $OP.
I’m not going to do anything drastic like protest by voting everything Against, however I’ll be much more careful with my votes until Optimism itself is in an acceptable place. I’d like to see the OP Labs and Optimism Foundation teams provide a detailed roadmap update on where they are with the above-mentioned decentralization goals.
I generally agree with the learnings and steps being taken for Season 2 and look forward to participating in the discussions during the Reflection Period ™. I also hope to see some accountability and results data for previously approved proposals around this time.
I have finished my votes for Gov Fund Phase 1 Season 1 . My general impression thus far is that …
I have finished my votes for Gov Fund Phase 1 Season 1 . My general impression thus far is that most proposals are a mixed bag, with very few high-quality projects I’d be excited to support without reservations. Since Optimism is a new collective & ecosystem, I have been very lenient as I’ve thought it’s OK to give mediocre or unproven protocols the benefit of doubt. Of course, over the 4 cycles I have become gradually more strict about my votes. For Season 2 , I’ll only be voting for proposals by a) protocols that have proven themselves over a reasonable period of time (e.g. > 1 year); b) have a very clear case for incentivizing usage directly on Optimism, and c) a co-incentives program with an amount you can safely match (I don’t want to see a $ 5 M market cap project asking for 500 , 000 OP). Of course, there can be exceptional proposals which contribute to the Optimism ecosystem another way. I realize this is going to be unpopular, and I’m going to receive some hate mail, but that’s OK. I believe granting of $OP tokens through Gov Fund must be earned, rather than being a bet. There are other funds like the Seed Fund or RPGF that may be more appropriate for a lot of proposals. I also continue to be very uncomfortable granting OP tokens and building an ecosystem while Optimism is a de-facto centralized sidechain, just with 7 days of social disputes available. I’d like to see Optimism urgently have a) permissionless fraud proofs, b) decentralized contract upgradability 4 , including emergency. I’d only be truly comfortable when we also have decentralized sequencers 6 and economic sustainability for $OP 13 . I’m not going to do anything drastic like protest by voting everything Against, however I’ll be much more careful with my votes until Optimism itself is in an acceptable place. I’d like to see the OP Labs and Optimism Foundation teams provide a detailed roadmap update on where they are with the above-mentioned decentralization goals. I generally agree with the learnings and steps being taken for Season 2 and look forward to participating in the discussions during the Reflection Period ™. I also hope to see some accountability and results data for previously approved proposals around this time.
I’ll definitely update this as we go through the reflection period, but my initial guidelines for s…
I’ll definitely update this as we go through the reflection period, but my initial guidelines for supporting Gov Fund projects from Season 2 onwards are such:
Been live for over 1 year on other networks and has demonstrated adequate product-market fit, no dodgy history and such
Live on Optimism and seen some initial traction
Directly incentivizes lasting usage of the Optimism network, and onboarding new users
Temporary incentives attracting mercenary farmers and the like are discouraged
Co-incentives are a huge bonus, but the amount asked must be at most ~ 1 % of the project’s token’s market cap. So, projects should request an amount of OP commensurate with their market cap.
Not all projects fit these criteria, so subjective judgment will be used - but the project must directly benefit the Optimism ecosystem in some way or other
If Optimism grows too big without proofs and decentralized contract upgradability, I might consider proposing a longer pause. Something like, say, $XB in TVL is unreasonable for today’s Optimism’s de-facto centralized setup.
I’ll definitely update this as we go through the reflection period, but my initial guidelines for s…
I’ll definitely update this as we go through the reflection period, but my initial guidelines for supporting Gov Fund projects from Season 2 onwards are such: Been live for over 1 year on other networks and has demonstrated adequate product-market fit, no dodgy history and such Live on Optimism and seen some initial traction Directly incentivizes lasting usage of the Optimism network, and onboarding new users Temporary incentives attracting mercenary farmers and the like are discouraged Co-incentives are a huge bonus, but the amount asked must be at most ~ 1 % of the project’s token’s market cap. So, projects should request an amount of OP commensurate with their market cap. Not all projects fit these criteria, so subjective judgment will be used - but the project must directly benefit the Optimism ecosystem in some way or other If Optimism grows too big without proofs and decentralized contract upgradability, I might consider proposing a longer pause. Something like, say, $XB in TVL is unreasonable for today’s Optimism’s de-facto centralized setup.
I see I made the right decision delegating my tokens to you.
Without more sentiment like this, I’m …
I see I made the right decision delegating my tokens to you.
Without more sentiment like this, I’m concerned this experiment will be remembered as something that failed due to “Yes men” or ineptitude.
I also worry about never truly decentralizing, or if we do, that it’ll be too little too late. Optimism’s core values must reflect Ethereum’s.
Thanks for addressing these issues!
I see I made the right decision delegating my tokens to you. Without more sentiment like this, I’m …
I see I made the right decision delegating my tokens to you. Without more sentiment like this, I’m concerned this experiment will be remembered as something that failed due to “Yes men” or ineptitude. I also worry about never truly decentralizing, or if we do, that it’ll be too little too late. Optimism’s core values must reflect Ethereum’s. Thanks for addressing these issues!
These are some of the guidelines I’ll follow for Season 2 :
Doesn’t directly increase TVL and rel…
These are some of the guidelines I’ll follow for Season 2 :
Doesn’t directly increase TVL and related economic metrics, to minimize regulatory and security risk. Note: this will likely disqualify most DeFi proposals.
Related to the above, projects should not come with significant regulatory risk.
Been live for over 1 year on other networks and has demonstrated adequate product-market fit, no dodgy history and such
Live on Optimism and seen some initial traction
Directly incentivizes lasting usage of the Optimism network, and onboarding new users
Temporary incentives attracting mercenary farmers and the like are discouraged
Co-incentives are a huge bonus, but the amount asked must be at most ~ 1 % of the project’s token’s market cap. So, projects should request an amount of OP commensurate with their market cap.
Not all projects fit these criteria, so subjective judgment will be used - but the project must directly benefit the Optimism ecosystem in some way or other
These are some of the guidelines I’ll follow for Season 2 :
Doesn’t directly increase TVL and rel…
These are some of the guidelines I’ll follow for Season 2 :
Doesn’t directly increase TVL and related economic metrics, to minimize regulatory and security risk 4 . Note: this will likely disqualify most DeFi proposals.
Related to the above, projects should not come with significant regulatory risk.
Been live for over 1 year on other networks and has demonstrated adequate product-market fit, no dodgy history and such
Live on Optimism and seen some initial traction
Directly incentivizes lasting usage of the Optimism network, and onboarding new users
Temporary incentives attracting mercenary farmers and the like are discouraged
Co-incentives are a huge bonus, but the amount asked must be at most ~ 1 % of the project’s token’s market cap. So, projects should request an amount of OP commensurate with their market cap.
Not all projects fit these criteria, so subjective judgment will be used - but the project must directly benefit the Optimism ecosystem in some way or other
These are some of the guidelines I’ll follow for Season 2 : Doesn’t directly increase TVL and rel…
These are some of the guidelines I’ll follow for Season 2 : Doesn’t directly increase TVL and related economic metrics, to minimize regulatory and security risk 4 . Note: this will likely disqualify most DeFi proposals. Related to the above, projects should not come with significant regulatory risk. Been live for over 1 year on other networks and has demonstrated adequate product-market fit, no dodgy history and such Live on Optimism and seen some initial traction Directly incentivizes lasting usage of the Optimism network, and onboarding new users Temporary incentives attracting mercenary farmers and the like are discouraged Co-incentives are a huge bonus, but the amount asked must be at most ~ 1 % of the project’s token’s market cap. So, projects should request an amount of OP commensurate with their market cap. Not all projects fit these criteria, so subjective judgment will be used - but the project must directly benefit the Optimism ecosystem in some way or other
As the voting is now live, I’ll be following the guidelines I mentioned above; however I’ll be more…
As the voting is now live, I’ll be following the guidelines I mentioned above; however I’ll be more lenient as the TVL growth has cooled down. This is in part due to a less valuable $OP, but also many blockbuster incentives like Uniswap, Synthetix or Rocket Pool taking longer than I had anticipated to roll out. I’ve also seen positive reaction from the Optimism teams about prioritizing decentralization. I’ll be focusing more on the type of applications that generate sticky user activity without affecting TVL much, and take the TVL intensive proposals on a case-by-case basis. Needless to say, I’ll defer to committees’ opinion on most projects.
As the voting is now live, I’ll be following the guidelines I mentioned above; however I’ll be more…
As the voting is now live, I’ll be following the guidelines I mentioned above; however I’ll be more lenient as the TVL growth has cooled down. This is in part due to a less valuable $OP, but also many blockbuster incentives like Uniswap, Synthetix or Rocket Pool taking longer than I had anticipated to roll out. I’ve also seen positive reaction from the Optimism teams about prioritizing decentralization. I’ll be focusing more on the type of applications that generate sticky user activity without affecting TVL much, and take the TVL intensive proposals on a case-by-case basis. Needless to say, I’ll defer to committees’ opinion on most projects.
Thanks @polynya. Please do continue putting some healthy pressure on our goal to decentralize.
Thanks @polynya. Please do continue putting some healthy pressure on our goal to decentralize.
Thanks @polynya. Please do continue putting some healthy pressure on our goal to decentralize.
Thanks @polynya. Please do continue putting some healthy pressure on our goal to decentralize.
I have followed all committee recommendations for this cycle. I didn’t find any egregious proposals…
I have followed all committee recommendations for this cycle. I didn’t find any egregious proposals or risk of excessive TVL growth; neither any exceptional proposals for the ones vetoed by committees. I understand this was the first cycle with committees - I’m sure the recommendations will come on a more timely manner from the next cycle with better coordination. Overall, I’m happy with the committees’ work - their recommendations are clear, concise, and well considered.
I have followed all committee recommendations for this cycle. I didn’t find any egregious proposals…
I have followed all committee recommendations for this cycle. I didn’t find any egregious proposals or risk of excessive TVL growth; neither any exceptional proposals for the ones vetoed by committees. I understand this was the first cycle with committees - I’m sure the recommendations will come on a more timely manner from the next cycle with better coordination. Overall, I’m happy with the committees’ work - their recommendations are clear, concise, and well considered.
I have completed voting on Cycle 7 . Things were quite smooth this cycle, and hopefully it’ll be p…
I have completed voting on Cycle 7 . Things were quite smooth this cycle, and hopefully it’ll be perfect next one with timely recommendations from the Tooling committee. I voted with committee recommendations, except for Overtime. I also abstained from Dope Wars and Safe.
We’re going through a quiet time in the industry right now, and the incentives aren’t having much of an effect in incentivizing user growth. On the bright side, this has also calmed my fears of too much growth with centralization concerns - for now. Nevertheless, even without growth, it’s still a useful mechanism for distributing OP to enthusiast users and decentralizing the token house.
Now that we are 7 cycles and over a quarter in, I’d request commitees to start considering the results of previous incentives in greater depth. E.g. we don’t want to be approving the same type of incentives and/or same type of protocols if they are proving to be ineffective.
I have completed voting on Cycle 7 . Things were quite smooth this cycle, and hopefully it’ll be p…
I have completed voting on Cycle 7 . Things were quite smooth this cycle, and hopefully it’ll be perfect next one with timely recommendations from the Tooling committee. I voted with committee recommendations, except for Overtime. I also abstained from Dope Wars and Safe. We’re going through a quiet time in the industry right now, and the incentives aren’t having much of an effect in incentivizing user growth. On the bright side, this has also calmed my fears of too much growth with centralization concerns - for now. Nevertheless, even without growth, it’s still a useful mechanism for distributing OP to enthusiast users and decentralizing the token house. Now that we are 7 cycles and over a quarter in, I’d request commitees to start considering the results of previous incentives in greater depth. E.g. we don’t want to be approving the same type of incentives and/or same type of protocols if they are proving to be ineffective.
Hey great thread, I was intrigued about your Overtime vote.
I would love to know why you went again…
Hey great thread, I was intrigued about your Overtime vote.
I would love to know why you went against the committee recommendation. Specially if you see any technical stuff I missed or if it was simply because you like the project.
Big fan btw.
Hey great thread, I was intrigued about your Overtime vote. I would love to know why you went again…
Hey great thread, I was intrigued about your Overtime vote. I would love to know why you went against the committee recommendation. Specially if you see any technical stuff I missed or if it was simply because you like the project. Big fan btw.
For projects that have already received a grant before (whether through Gov or Partners Fund) - the…
For projects that have already received a grant before (whether through Gov or Partners Fund) - the repeat proposal has to be exceptional IMO. I don’t think the second proposal basically repeating the first one makes much sense. Here are my thoughts on the exceptions where a second grant may work:
The first grant was wildly successful and the protocol continues to grow with no slowdown: in this case, a substantially smaller grant (let’s say, < 50 % of the first) to continue incentives might be justified
Some amount of time has passed since the first grant, and there’s a strong reason to restart incentives (something like - the protocol managed to retain most of the growth the incentives brought, but there are new opportunities on the horizon worth capitalizing on for more growth)
A new approach with new methods & goals. E.g. the first grant was about liquidity incentives. With that bootstrapped, the second grant can be about achieving something different, e.g. improving the user experience, direct marketing to onboard users to Optimism, etc.
Likewise, as I mentioned previously, committees should also consider the effectiveness of similar types of proposals. E.g. if DEX A & DEX B ran some type of liquidity mining, and it was of limited benefit, then it doesn’t make sense granting DEX C with the same type of grant. At Cycle 8 , 9 , and going forward, we have to start being more selective about the grants, and targeting the types of programs that lead to sustained adoption and activity across a diversity of usecases. Also, being mindful of what the bottlenecks are. E.g. there’s plenty of liquidity on Optimism now given it’s early state, but not enough users & other usecases to leverage this.
For projects that have already received a grant before (whether through Gov or Partners Fund) - the…
For projects that have already received a grant before (whether through Gov or Partners Fund) - the repeat proposal has to be exceptional IMO. I don’t think the second proposal basically repeating the first one makes much sense. Here are my thoughts on the exceptions where a second grant may work: The first grant was wildly successful and the protocol continues to grow with no slowdown: in this case, a substantially smaller grant (let’s say, < 50 % of the first) to continue incentives might be justified Some amount of time has passed since the first grant, and there’s a strong reason to restart incentives (something like - the protocol managed to retain most of the growth the incentives brought, but there are new opportunities on the horizon worth capitalizing on for more growth) A new approach with new methods & goals. E.g. the first grant was about liquidity incentives. With that bootstrapped, the second grant can be about achieving something different, e.g. improving the user experience, direct marketing to onboard users to Optimism, etc. Likewise, as I mentioned previously, committees should also consider the effectiveness of similar types of proposals. E.g. if DEX A & DEX B ran some type of liquidity mining, and it was of limited benefit, then it doesn’t make sense granting DEX C with the same type of grant. At Cycle 8 , 9 , and going forward, we have to start being more selective about the grants, and targeting the types of programs that lead to sustained adoption and activity across a diversity of usecases. Also, being mindful of what the bottlenecks are. E.g. there’s plenty of liquidity on Optimism now given it’s early state, but not enough users & other usecases to leverage this.
For the last special voting cycle, I added my thoughts to its thread 7 , rather than here. I have …
For the last special voting cycle, I added my thoughts to its thread 7 , rather than here. I have followed the same principles for this voting cycle - focus on those that have been most engaged.
As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun 1 ESjn” / Twitter 4
Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to subsidize onboarding users and protocols. That said, there are plenty other metrics to look at, and it’s pretty clear the subsidies granted have been largely ineffective relative to the scope of said subsidies. Particularly the recurring subsidies that I argued strongly against in Season 3 (actually - see the last comment in this thread), and which passed anyway. As such, we should be very wary of second grants, and especially, third grants - no doubt the ones who had second grants successfully pass will come back for thirds quickly after the second runs out. Particularly for TVL-centric incentives, all it really does is subsidize users to keep their money on Optimism, and they’ll go elsewhere once the subsidies inevitably run out.
To be clear, I think it’s worthwhile to use large grants to distribute tokens anyway, even if it’s actually economically illogical to do so. But it should be clear that this is only because $OP’s tokenomics are atrocious to begin with.
jackanorak: polynya:
Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to subsidize onboarding users and protocols. That said, there are plenty other metrics to look at, and it’s pretty clear the subsidies granted have been largely ineffective relative to the scope of said subsidies. Particularly the recurring subsidies that I argued strongly against in Season 3 (actually - see the last comment in this thread), and which passed anyway. As such, we should be very wary of second grants, and especially, third grants - no doubt the ones who had second grants successfully pass will come back for thirds quickly after the second runs out. Particularly for TVL-centric incentives, all it really does is subsidize users to keep their money on Optimism, and they’ll go elsewhere once the subsidies inevitably run out.
My understanding of what you’re saying here is as follows:
OP spends a lot on incentives relative to fee generation.
That’s fine if we’ve shown growth.
But we haven’t shown enough growth in these grants.
In several cases where protocols have claimed growth from their grants [which frequently targeted TVL], that growth is illegitimate and unsustainable – so this is an inefficient use of OP.
The Grants Council is going to be weighing in on what sorts of growth outcomes we’d like to see, which makes this an opportune moment to think through them. I respect you greatly and think it would make your statement above more actionable to add what you believe does constitute legitimate, sustainable, timely, or otherwise useful growth.
I haven’t yet seen a convincing argument for why repeated grants are per se a bad thing. My position is that we should be encouraging repeat grants because this sort of structure allows for rapid testing and course correction and directs applicants to regard them more as for discrete projects rather than as handouts to their team. Certainly the same subsidy can continue to unlock new growth opportunities as market or ecosystem conditions warrant.
I’d love to have this discussion if you’re willing. We can start a new thread for the sake of keeping this one neat.
Oxytocin: Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as well as just reporting back on votes.
polynya:
As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun1ESjn” / Twitter
Like you already mentioned, it’s normal to have this kind of incentivisation early on in a project to encourage onboarding and growth, which I agree with. However, right now sequencer revenue does not directly relate to $OP (correct me if I am wrong, am basing this on the usecases shared in the help centre article). So, while it’s true that sequencer revenue is the only real way Optimism might accrue value directly, it’s still an indirect proxy for correlation, since currently $OP is not affected by network activity like Ether is, nor does the revenue somehow re-enter the collective treasury like in some DeFi tokens.
Currently, grants and other foundation-related activities (like quests and airdrop speculation) have mainly targeted increasing and chain activity and TVL, where the figures look a lot less dire than revenue vs spending. Personally, I think that as long as future allocations focus on stickier incentives, I don’t mind this strategy being kept, but I would also like to see other methods of revenue sustainaibility
polynya:
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree.
Got nothing to add here, agreed with you and @jackanorak that multiple iterative grants are better than either one monolithic grant, or a grant simply asking for more of the same.
For the last special voting cycle, I added my thoughts to its thread, rather than here. I have foll…
For the last special voting cycle, I added my thoughts to its thread, rather than here. I have followed the same principles for this voting cycle - focus on those that have been most engaged.
As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun 1 ESjn” / Twitter
Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to subsidize onboarding users and protocols. That said, there are plenty other metrics to look at, and it’s pretty clear the subsidies granted have been largely ineffective relative to the scope of said subsidies. Particularly the recurring subsidies that I argued strongly against in Season 3 (actually - see the last comment in this thread), and which passed anyway. As such, we should be very wary of second grants, and especially, third grants - no doubt the ones who had second grants successfully pass will come back for thirds quickly after the second runs out. Particularly for TVL-centric incentives, all it really does is subsidize users to keep their money on Optimism, and they’ll go elsewhere once the subsidies inevitably run out.
To be clear, I think it’s worthwhile to use large grants to distribute tokens anyway, even if it’s actually economically illogical to do so. But it should be clear that this is only because $OP’s tokenomics are atrocious to begin with.
jackanorak: polynya:
Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to subsidize onboarding users and protocols. That said, there are plenty other metrics to look at, and it’s pretty clear the subsidies granted have been largely ineffective relative to the scope of said subsidies. Particularly the recurring subsidies that I argued strongly against in Season 3 (actually - see the last comment in this thread), and which passed anyway. As such, we should be very wary of second grants, and especially, third grants - no doubt the ones who had second grants successfully pass will come back for thirds quickly after the second runs out. Particularly for TVL-centric incentives, all it really does is subsidize users to keep their money on Optimism, and they’ll go elsewhere once the subsidies inevitably run out.
My understanding of what you’re saying here is as follows:
OP spends a lot on incentives relative to fee generation.
That’s fine if we’ve shown growth.
But we haven’t shown enough growth in these grants.
In several cases where protocols have claimed growth from their grants [which frequently targeted TVL], that growth is illegitimate and unsustainable – so this is an inefficient use of OP.
The Grants Council is going to be weighing in on what sorts of growth outcomes we’d like to see, which makes this an opportune moment to think through them. I respect you greatly and think it would make your statement above more actionable to add what you believe does constitute legitimate, sustainable, timely, or otherwise useful growth.
I haven’t yet seen a convincing argument for why repeated grants are per se a bad thing. My position is that we should be encouraging repeat grants because this sort of structure allows for rapid testing and course correction and directs applicants to regard them more as for discrete projects rather than as handouts to their team. Certainly the same subsidy can continue to unlock new growth opportunities as market or ecosystem conditions warrant.
I’d love to have this discussion if you’re willing. We can start a new thread for the sake of keeping this one neat.
Oxytocin: Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as well as just reporting back on votes.
polynya:
As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun1ESjn” / Twitter
Like you already mentioned, it’s normal to have this kind of incentivisation early on in a project to encourage onboarding and growth, which I agree with. However, right now sequencer revenue does not directly relate to $OP (correct me if I am wrong, am basing this on the usecases shared in the help centre article). So, while it’s true that sequencer revenue is the only real way Optimism might accrue value directly, it’s still an indirect proxy for correlation, since currently $OP is not affected by network activity like Ether is, nor does the revenue somehow re-enter the collective treasury like in some DeFi tokens.
Currently, grants and other foundation-related activities (like quests and airdrop speculation) have mainly targeted increasing and chain activity and TVL, where the figures look a lot less dire than revenue vs spending. Personally, I think that as long as future allocations focus on stickier incentives, I don’t mind this strategy being kept, but I would also like to see other methods of revenue sustainaibility
polynya:
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree.
Got nothing to add here, agreed with you and @jackanorak that multiple iterative grants are better than either one monolithic grant, or a grant simply asking for more of the same.
For the last special voting cycle, I added my thoughts to its thread 7 , rather than here. I have …
For the last special voting cycle, I added my thoughts to its thread 7 , rather than here. I have followed the same principles for this voting cycle - focus on those that have been most engaged. As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun 1 ESjn” / Twitter 4 Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to subsidize onboarding users and protocols. That said, there are plenty other metrics to look at, and it’s pretty clear the subsidies granted have been largely ineffective relative to the scope of said subsidies. Particularly the recurring subsidies that I argued strongly against in Season 3 (actually - see the last comment in this thread), and which passed anyway. As such, we should be very wary of second grants, and especially, third grants - no doubt the ones who had second grants successfully pass will come back for thirds quickly after the second runs out. Particularly for TVL-centric incentives, all it really does is subsidize users to keep their money on Optimism, and they’ll go elsewhere once the subsidies inevitably run out. To be clear, I think it’s worthwhile to use large grants to distribute tokens anyway, even if it’s actually economically illogical to do so. But it should be clear that this is only because $OP’s tokenomics are atrocious to begin with.
jackanorak: polynya:
Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to subsidize onboarding users and protocols. That said, there are plenty other metrics to look at, and it’s pretty clear the subsidies granted have been largely ineffective relative to the scope of said subsidies. Particularly the recurring subsidies that I argued strongly against in Season 3 (actually - see the last comment in this thread), and which passed anyway. As such, we should be very wary of second grants, and especially, third grants - no doubt the ones who had second grants successfully pass will come back for thirds quickly after the second runs out. Particularly for TVL-centric incentives, all it really does is subsidize users to keep their money on Optimism, and they’ll go elsewhere once the subsidies inevitably run out.
My understanding of what you’re saying here is as follows:
OP spends a lot on incentives relative to fee generation.
That’s fine if we’ve shown growth.
But we haven’t shown enough growth in these grants.
In several cases where protocols have claimed growth from their grants [which frequently targeted TVL], that growth is illegitimate and unsustainable – so this is an inefficient use of OP.
The Grants Council is going to be weighing in on what sorts of growth outcomes we’d like to see, which makes this an opportune moment to think through them. I respect you greatly and think it would make your statement above more actionable to add what you believe does constitute legitimate, sustainable, timely, or otherwise useful growth.
I haven’t yet seen a convincing argument for why repeated grants are per se a bad thing. My position is that we should be encouraging repeat grants because this sort of structure allows for rapid testing and course correction and directs applicants to regard them more as for discrete projects rather than as handouts to their team. Certainly the same subsidy can continue to unlock new growth opportunities as market or ecosystem conditions warrant.
I’d love to have this discussion if you’re willing. We can start a new thread for the sake of keeping this one neat.
Oxytocin: Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as well as just reporting back on votes.
polynya:
As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun1ESjn” / Twitter
Like you already mentioned, it’s normal to have this kind of incentivisation early on in a project to encourage onboarding and growth, which I agree with. However, right now sequencer revenue does not directly relate to $OP (correct me if I am wrong, am basing this on the usecases shared in the help centre article). So, while it’s true that sequencer revenue is the only real way Optimism might accrue value directly, it’s still an indirect proxy for correlation, since currently $OP is not affected by network activity like Ether is, nor does the revenue somehow re-enter the collective treasury like in some DeFi tokens.
Currently, grants and other foundation-related activities (like quests and airdrop speculation) have mainly targeted increasing and chain activity and TVL, where the figures look a lot less dire than revenue vs spending. Personally, I think that as long as future allocations focus on stickier incentives, I don’t mind this strategy being kept, but I would also like to see other methods of revenue sustainaibility
polynya:
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree.
Got nothing to add here, agreed with you and @jackanorak that multiple iterative grants are better than either one monolithic grant, or a grant simply asking for more of the same.
polynya:
Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to su…
polynya:
Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to subsidize onboarding users and protocols. That said, there are plenty other metrics to look at, and it’s pretty clear the subsidies granted have been largely ineffective relative to the scope of said subsidies. Particularly the recurring subsidies that I argued strongly against in Season 3 (actually - see the last comment in this thread), and which passed anyway. As such, we should be very wary of second grants, and especially, third grants - no doubt the ones who had second grants successfully pass will come back for thirds quickly after the second runs out. Particularly for TVL-centric incentives, all it really does is subsidize users to keep their money on Optimism, and they’ll go elsewhere once the subsidies inevitably run out.
My understanding of what you’re saying here is as follows:
OP spends a lot on incentives relative to fee generation.
That’s fine if we’ve shown growth.
But we haven’t shown enough growth in these grants.
In several cases where protocols have claimed growth from their grants [which frequently targeted TVL], that growth is illegitimate and unsustainable – so this is an inefficient use of OP.
The Grants Council is going to be weighing in on what sorts of growth outcomes we’d like to see, which makes this an opportune moment to think through them. I respect you greatly and think it would make your statement above more actionable to add what you believe does constitute legitimate, sustainable, timely, or otherwise useful growth.
I haven’t yet seen a convincing argument for why repeated grants are per se a bad thing. My position is that we should be encouraging repeat grants because this sort of structure allows for rapid testing and course correction and directs applicants to regard them more as for discrete projects rather than as handouts to their team. Certainly the same subsidy can continue to unlock new growth opportunities as market or ecosystem conditions warrant.
I’d love to have this discussion if you’re willing. We can start a new thread for the sake of keeping this one neat.
polynya: Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to su…
polynya: Now, firstly, this doesn’t mean all that much at this early stage - the goal is to subsidize onboarding users and protocols. That said, there are plenty other metrics to look at, and it’s pretty clear the subsidies granted have been largely ineffective relative to the scope of said subsidies. Particularly the recurring subsidies that I argued strongly against in Season 3 (actually - see the last comment in this thread), and which passed anyway. As such, we should be very wary of second grants, and especially, third grants - no doubt the ones who had second grants successfully pass will come back for thirds quickly after the second runs out. Particularly for TVL-centric incentives, all it really does is subsidize users to keep their money on Optimism, and they’ll go elsewhere once the subsidies inevitably run out. My understanding of what you’re saying here is as follows: OP spends a lot on incentives relative to fee generation. That’s fine if we’ve shown growth. But we haven’t shown enough growth in these grants. In several cases where protocols have claimed growth from their grants [which frequently targeted TVL], that growth is illegitimate and unsustainable – so this is an inefficient use of OP. The Grants Council is going to be weighing in on what sorts of growth outcomes we’d like to see, which makes this an opportune moment to think through them. I respect you greatly and think it would make your statement above more actionable to add what you believe does constitute legitimate, sustainable, timely, or otherwise useful growth. I haven’t yet seen a convincing argument for why repeated grants are per se a bad thing. My position is that we should be encouraging repeat grants because this sort of structure allows for rapid testing and course correction and directs applicants to regard them more as for discrete projects rather than as handouts to their team. Certainly the same subsidy can continue to unlock new growth opportunities as market or ecosystem conditions warrant. I’d love to have this discussion if you’re willing. We can start a new thread for the sake of keeping this one neat.
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comm…
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree.
Oxytocin: Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as well as just reporting back on votes.
polynya:
As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun1ESjn” / Twitter
Like you already mentioned, it’s normal to have this kind of incentivisation early on in a project to encourage onboarding and growth, which I agree with. However, right now sequencer revenue does not directly relate to $OP (correct me if I am wrong, am basing this on the usecases shared in the help centre article). So, while it’s true that sequencer revenue is the only real way Optimism might accrue value directly, it’s still an indirect proxy for correlation, since currently $OP is not affected by network activity like Ether is, nor does the revenue somehow re-enter the collective treasury like in some DeFi tokens.
Currently, grants and other foundation-related activities (like quests and airdrop speculation) have mainly targeted increasing and chain activity and TVL, where the figures look a lot less dire than revenue vs spending. Personally, I think that as long as future allocations focus on stickier incentives, I don’t mind this strategy being kept, but I would also like to see other methods of revenue sustainaibility
polynya:
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree.
Got nothing to add here, agreed with you and @jackanorak that multiple iterative grants are better than either one monolithic grant, or a grant simply asking for more of the same.
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comm…
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree.
Oxytocin: Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as well as just reporting back on votes.
polynya:
As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun1ESjn” / Twitter
Like you already mentioned, it’s normal to have this kind of incentivisation early on in a project to encourage onboarding and growth, which I agree with. However, right now sequencer revenue does not directly relate to $OP (correct me if I am wrong, am basing this on the usecases shared in the help centre article). So, while it’s true that sequencer revenue is the only real way Optimism might accrue value directly, it’s still an indirect proxy for correlation, since currently $OP is not affected by network activity like Ether is, nor does the revenue somehow re-enter the collective treasury like in some DeFi tokens.
Currently, grants and other foundation-related activities (like quests and airdrop speculation) have mainly targeted increasing and chain activity and TVL, where the figures look a lot less dire than revenue vs spending. Personally, I think that as long as future allocations focus on stickier incentives, I don’t mind this strategy being kept, but I would also like to see other methods of revenue sustainaibility
polynya:
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree.
Got nothing to add here, agreed with you and @jackanorak that multiple iterative grants are better than either one monolithic grant, or a grant simply asking for more of the same.
Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as…
Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as well as just reporting back on votes.
polynya:
As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun 1 ESjn” / Twitter
Like you already mentioned, it’s normal to have this kind of incentivisation early on in a project to encourage onboarding and growth, which I agree with. However, right now sequencer revenue does not directly relate to $OP (correct me if I am wrong, am basing this on the usecases shared in the help centre article). So, while it’s true that sequencer revenue is the only real way Optimism might accrue value directly, it’s still an indirect proxy for correlation, since currently $OP is not affected by network activity like Ether is, nor does the revenue somehow re-enter the collective treasury like in some DeFi tokens.
Currently, grants and other foundation-related activities (like quests and airdrop speculation) have mainly targeted increasing and chain activity and TVL, where the figures look a lot less dire than revenue vs spending. Personally, I think that as long as future allocations focus on stickier incentives, I don’t mind this strategy being kept, but I would also like to see other methods of revenue sustainaibility
polynya:
Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree.
Got nothing to add here, agreed with you and @jackanorak that multiple iterative grants are better than either one monolithic grant, or a grant simply asking for more of the same.
Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as…
Hi Polynya, it’s great to see higher-levels discussions about $OP in these communication threads as well as just reporting back on votes. polynya: As an aside, I wish to discuss this thread: Token Terminal on Twitter: “Earnings: revenue minus token incentives https://t.co/dpNun 1 ESjn” / Twitter Like you already mentioned, it’s normal to have this kind of incentivisation early on in a project to encourage onboarding and growth, which I agree with. However, right now sequencer revenue does not directly relate to $OP (correct me if I am wrong, am basing this on the usecases shared in the help centre article). So, while it’s true that sequencer revenue is the only real way Optimism might accrue value directly, it’s still an indirect proxy for correlation, since currently $OP is not affected by network activity like Ether is, nor does the revenue somehow re-enter the collective treasury like in some DeFi tokens. Currently, grants and other foundation-related activities (like quests and airdrop speculation) have mainly targeted increasing and chain activity and TVL, where the figures look a lot less dire than revenue vs spending. Personally, I think that as long as future allocations focus on stickier incentives, I don’t mind this strategy being kept, but I would also like to see other methods of revenue sustainaibility polynya: Happy to discuss this further. I don’t think repeat grants are a bad thing - but if you see my comment here it’s only a good thing if the grant’s mechanisms have been deemed to be working in incrementing growth. My beef is more with the repeat grants which are a carbon copy of the first grant, but all it really does is maintain status quo. So, I think we mostly agree. Got nothing to add here, agreed with you and @jackanorak that multiple iterative grants are better than either one monolithic grant, or a grant simply asking for more of the same.
Another data point to highlight:
Since Optimism Quests ended, activity has tanked 50 %- 75 % acros…
Another data point to highlight:
Since Optimism Quests ended, activity has tanked 50 %- 75 % across multiple metrics: Address 0 x 429 f 9 ada 43 e 9 f 345 cbb 85 ec 88681 bb 70 df 808892 | Optimism (etherscan.io); Optimism Protocol Metrics :red_circle::sparkles: (dune.com)
What’s most interesting is that Optimism Quests drove more users and transactions than the rest of Optimism - with all of its OP incentives - combined. It would seem like the potential of unknown future rewards orchestrated in a fun manner is a much bigger driver of activity than same old $OP incentives. Of course, there’s some stuff like liquidity that doesn’t apply here.
As such, I’d like to see some Grants applications experiment with similar gamification and future rewards.
Another data point to highlight:
Since Optimism Quests ended, activity has tanked 50 %- 75 % acros…
Another data point to highlight:
Since Optimism Quests ended, activity has tanked 50 %- 75 % across multiple metrics: Address 0 x 429 f 9 ada 43 e 9 f 345 cbb 85 ec 88681 bb 70 df 808892 | Optimism (etherscan.io) 2 ; Optimism Protocol Metrics :red_circle::sparkles: (dune.com) 1
What’s most interesting is that Optimism Quests drove more users and transactions than the rest of Optimism - with all of its OP incentives - combined. It would seem like the potential of unknown future rewards orchestrated in a fun manner is a much bigger driver of activity than same old $OP incentives. Of course, there’s some stuff like liquidity that doesn’t apply here.
As such, I’d like to see some Grants applications experiment with similar gamification and future rewards.
Another data point to highlight: Since Optimism Quests ended, activity has tanked 50 %- 75 % acros…
Another data point to highlight: Since Optimism Quests ended, activity has tanked 50 %- 75 % across multiple metrics: Address 0 x 429 f 9 ada 43 e 9 f 345 cbb 85 ec 88681 bb 70 df 808892 | Optimism (etherscan.io) 2 ; Optimism Protocol Metrics :red_circle::sparkles: (dune.com) 1 What’s most interesting is that Optimism Quests drove more users and transactions than the rest of Optimism - with all of its OP incentives - combined. It would seem like the potential of unknown future rewards orchestrated in a fun manner is a much bigger driver of activity than same old $OP incentives. Of course, there’s some stuff like liquidity that doesn’t apply here. As such, I’d like to see some Grants applications experiment with similar gamification and future rewards.
I fully agree from my experience over the past few months. We have run a few very small OP token di…
I fully agree from my experience over the past few months. We have run a few very small OP token distribution programs to test the waters. Ultimately it was a big waste of time and energy having to manually approve each person for their proof of work entry to prove they were authentic. A lot of multiple accounts were created in an effort to farm the OP rewards which we distributed from our personal accounts with zero grant assistance.
On the other hand our free NFT claim system using Galxe or Quest 3 has proven to be an incredible tool for attracting users to layer 2 networks. We have had around 100 , 000 free claims on L 2 in the past 4 months since starting the experience. Some these claims requires the participation of being a holder or making a purchase from one of our designated collections just like the OP quests required which helps retain the users within our ecosystem.
On the other hand we also offer multiple claims for simple off chain & on chain tasks that are completed as an effective way to educate the user about the project during the claim process. We have also utilized this as a cross promotion for Optimism, Lattice, and Quix with amazing results to help grow the ecosystem. Which requires users to follow their social pages or even join the projects official discord server as a task to claim the free NFT.
I feel this methodology can continue to be iterated on by many creators or protocols at once creating a buzz on Optimism network due to heavy migration and activity attracting other creators or developers to the network. Without the activity on chain Optimism’s growth may become stagnant as users continue to rely on the chain solely as a financial resource with a potential airdrop now that the quests have ended. Currently we are faced with inflation in OP token price prior to the event as more speculation occurs and the only thing left for all these users from the quests to do is buy more tokens in preparation to sell off after the airdrop leveraging their position with current tokens being accumulated. It seems the quests provide a way for users to feel they have accomplished on chain activity for a potential airdrop without any sense of desperation occurring.
Token distribution to grow the network is also great but it certainly does need to be improved upon and have more retention built into the framework of these grants to ensure that users do not simply claim the OP, dump it, and leave the network.
Every protocol that does OP token rewards should also put out some sort of NFT claim system related to the OP token distribution if that is what the main factor is for user activity to continue growing. I myself want to see more focus on the retention of decentralized financial institution users at the protocol level using NFTs. The NFT & Gaming sector has a very long road ahead before gaining any sort of notoriety from the rest of the blockchain world. What better way to help fuel that movement of growth than asking the protocols that receive grants to implement a similar program.
I fully agree from my experience over the past few months. We have run a few very small OP token di…
I fully agree from my experience over the past few months. We have run a few very small OP token distribution programs to test the waters. Ultimately it was a big waste of time and energy having to manually approve each person for their proof of work entry to prove they were authentic. A lot of multiple accounts were created in an effort to farm the OP rewards which we distributed from our personal accounts with zero grant assistance. On the other hand our free NFT claim system using Galxe or Quest 3 has proven to be an incredible tool for attracting users to layer 2 networks. We have had around 100 , 000 free claims on L 2 in the past 4 months since starting the experience. Some these claims requires the participation of being a holder or making a purchase from one of our designated collections just like the OP quests required which helps retain the users within our ecosystem. On the other hand we also offer multiple claims for simple off chain & on chain tasks that are completed as an effective way to educate the user about the project during the claim process. We have also utilized this as a cross promotion for Optimism, Lattice, and Quix with amazing results to help grow the ecosystem. Which requires users to follow their social pages or even join the projects official discord server as a task to claim the free NFT. I feel this methodology can continue to be iterated on by many creators or protocols at once creating a buzz on Optimism network due to heavy migration and activity attracting other creators or developers to the network. Without the activity on chain Optimism’s growth may become stagnant as users continue to rely on the chain solely as a financial resource with a potential airdrop now that the quests have ended. Currently we are faced with inflation in OP token price prior to the event as more speculation occurs and the only thing left for all these users from the quests to do is buy more tokens in preparation to sell off after the airdrop leveraging their position with current tokens being accumulated. It seems the quests provide a way for users to feel they have accomplished on chain activity for a potential airdrop without any sense of desperation occurring. Token distribution to grow the network is also great but it certainly does need to be improved upon and have more retention built into the framework of these grants to ensure that users do not simply claim the OP, dump it, and leave the network. Every protocol that does OP token rewards should also put out some sort of NFT claim system related to the OP token distribution if that is what the main factor is for user activity to continue growing. I myself want to see more focus on the retention of decentralized financial institution users at the protocol level using NFTs. The NFT & Gaming sector has a very long road ahead before gaining any sort of notoriety from the rest of the blockchain world. What better way to help fuel that movement of growth than asking the protocols that receive grants to implement a similar program.
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here 4 . While it’s acceptab…
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here 4 . While it’s acceptable for these types of proposals in an early beta stage, I would like to see upgrade proposals actually be upgrade proposals, rather than just a vote of confidence to Optimism Foundation to execute the upgrade. I’d also like to see more external audits, and a long duration on testnets, exceeding strict go-live criteria, before the upgrade is proposed. It should be the last thing that happens once the upgrade is 100 % ready, and a successful proposal will in fact execute the upgrade rather than being just a vote. I know all of this will happen eventually, but as governance we need to keep the pressure on.
Separately, looking at the latest data on Dune, I continue to believe grants in their current form are largely ineffective, with few exceptions. Indeed, since the grants began, Arbitrum have actually extended their advantage significantly without any incentives. It’s still a reasonable way to distribute $OP to users, but really, I’d much rather see a drastic overhaul of $OP’s tokenomics in that case. Of course, there are targeted incentives are effective, but imo a vast majority simply do not for reasons discussed previously in this thread and elsewhere - particularly repeat grants.
polynya: polynya:
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here . While it’s acceptable for these types of proposals in an early beta stage, I would like to see upgrade proposals actually be upgrade proposals, rather than just a vote of confidence to Optimism Foundation to execute the upgrade. I’d also like to see more external audits, and a long duration on testnets, exceeding strict go-live criteria, before the upgrade is proposed. It should be the last thing that happens once the upgrade is 100% ready, and a successful proposal will in fact execute the upgrade rather than being just a vote. I know all of this will happen eventually, but as governance we need to keep the pressure on.
Looking back on the Bedrock proposal, and further delays that have since happened, next time I’m only going to vote “For” if it’s actually ready for mainnet exceeding all go-live criteria, and the upgrade proposed is identical to the one that goes live. Preferably, the upgrade code payload is part of the proposal itself. This Bedrock proposal was the last time I vote for an upgrade proposal as just a vote of confidence.
I look forward to Season 4 - happy to see the experimentation, so I won’t say much early on, though I have some concerns around over-complexity and verifying reputation/accountability of Mission leaders.
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here. While it’s acceptable f…
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here. While it’s acceptable for these types of proposals in an early beta stage, I would like to see upgrade proposals actually be upgrade proposals, rather than just a vote of confidence to Optimism Foundation to execute the upgrade. I’d also like to see more external audits, and a long duration on testnets, exceeding strict go-live criteria, before the upgrade is proposed. It should be the last thing that happens once the upgrade is 100 % ready, and a successful proposal will in fact execute the upgrade rather than being just a vote. I know all of this will happen eventually, but as governance we need to keep the pressure on.
Separately, looking at the latest data on Dune, I continue to believe grants in their current form are largely ineffective, with few exceptions. Indeed, since the grants began, Arbitrum have actually extended their advantage significantly without any incentives. It’s still a reasonable way to distribute $OP to users, but really, I’d much rather see a drastic overhaul of $OP’s tokenomics in that case. Of course, there are targeted incentives are effective, but imo a vast majority simply do not for reasons discussed previously in this thread and elsewhere - particularly repeat grants.
polynya: polynya:
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here . While it’s acceptable for these types of proposals in an early beta stage, I would like to see upgrade proposals actually be upgrade proposals, rather than just a vote of confidence to Optimism Foundation to execute the upgrade. I’d also like to see more external audits, and a long duration on testnets, exceeding strict go-live criteria, before the upgrade is proposed. It should be the last thing that happens once the upgrade is 100% ready, and a successful proposal will in fact execute the upgrade rather than being just a vote. I know all of this will happen eventually, but as governance we need to keep the pressure on.
Looking back on the Bedrock proposal, and further delays that have since happened, next time I’m only going to vote “For” if it’s actually ready for mainnet exceeding all go-live criteria, and the upgrade proposed is identical to the one that goes live. Preferably, the upgrade code payload is part of the proposal itself. This Bedrock proposal was the last time I vote for an upgrade proposal as just a vote of confidence.
I look forward to Season 4 - happy to see the experimentation, so I won’t say much early on, though I have some concerns around over-complexity and verifying reputation/accountability of Mission leaders.
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here 4 . While it’s acceptab…
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here 4 . While it’s acceptable for these types of proposals in an early beta stage, I would like to see upgrade proposals actually be upgrade proposals, rather than just a vote of confidence to Optimism Foundation to execute the upgrade. I’d also like to see more external audits, and a long duration on testnets, exceeding strict go-live criteria, before the upgrade is proposed. It should be the last thing that happens once the upgrade is 100 % ready, and a successful proposal will in fact execute the upgrade rather than being just a vote. I know all of this will happen eventually, but as governance we need to keep the pressure on. Separately, looking at the latest data on Dune, I continue to believe grants in their current form are largely ineffective, with few exceptions. Indeed, since the grants began, Arbitrum have actually extended their advantage significantly without any incentives. It’s still a reasonable way to distribute $OP to users, but really, I’d much rather see a drastic overhaul of $OP’s tokenomics in that case. Of course, there are targeted incentives are effective, but imo a vast majority simply do not for reasons discussed previously in this thread and elsewhere - particularly repeat grants.
polynya: polynya:
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here . While it’s acceptable for these types of proposals in an early beta stage, I would like to see upgrade proposals actually be upgrade proposals, rather than just a vote of confidence to Optimism Foundation to execute the upgrade. I’d also like to see more external audits, and a long duration on testnets, exceeding strict go-live criteria, before the upgrade is proposed. It should be the last thing that happens once the upgrade is 100% ready, and a successful proposal will in fact execute the upgrade rather than being just a vote. I know all of this will happen eventually, but as governance we need to keep the pressure on.
Looking back on the Bedrock proposal, and further delays that have since happened, next time I’m only going to vote “For” if it’s actually ready for mainnet exceeding all go-live criteria, and the upgrade proposed is identical to the one that goes live. Preferably, the upgrade code payload is part of the proposal itself. This Bedrock proposal was the last time I vote for an upgrade proposal as just a vote of confidence.
I look forward to Season 4 - happy to see the experimentation, so I won’t say much early on, though I have some concerns around over-complexity and verifying reputation/accountability of Mission leaders.
I have made multiple posts about decentralization and potential solutions towards them. I have also…
I have made multiple posts about decentralization and potential solutions towards them. I have also complained a lot about $OP’s tokenomics, but haven’t written a post about it. The truth is a retroactive change to token allocations etc is extremely unlikely to happen. But here, in the comfort of my communication thread, I thought I could at least run a thought experiment.
As I see it, there are three significant problems with $OP:
At least 37 % allocated to insiders (investors, team) is excessive, enough to dominate governance votes, or future consensus protocols if implemented
Arbitrary yearly cliffs for both team and investors. Normally not a big issue, but given the huge allocation, it’ll weigh heavily.
RPGF is extremely dilutionary
Ecosystem fund is relatively ineffective (for reasons mentioned above)
In an ideal world, here are some approaches:
While it’s too late now, ideally < 33 % to insiders (incl. partners) would work
Teams should have releases per performance. For example, instead of arbitrarily releasing a lot of OP to team next month, it should be after fraud proofs are live etc. Governance can vote on this. The four year thing is common practice for traditional startups, but the investors don’t really make sense. It’s much better for the market to find a fair price early than a 4 year shadow hanging over the token.
This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly diluting excisting tokenholders, simply have it as a % of sequencer/MEV revenues. This will be fully sustainable.
Likewise with Ecosystem Fund, instead of an arbitrarily huge 25 % - allocate smaller amounts upon analysis where it actually makes sense.
For both 3 ) and 4 ), and airdrops, it’s acceptable in the early days to distribute tokens, but it’s now nearly a year, and we still have > 100 % hyperinflation to look forward to over the next 4 years, which will just kill confidence in $OP over the long term. Maybe after 5 years $OP will emerge as a relatively well distributed, sustainable token, but that’s an eternity in crypto, and I fear it may be too late.
Anyway, these are just my thoughts, it’s probably too late to make drastic decisions like burning 40 % of intended supply which I allude to above, but maybe future projects can have more sustainable distributions.
PS: I forgot that I had done a post on sustainability ideas for $OP - Economic sustainability ideas for $OP - :sparkles: General - Optimism Collective
2yeah: “Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a mistake and transferred 1235 USDC to your address. Here is the txid: 0x8fcf7e25b8f9fad55e26a41b685a36c2a71ea14aecb6c1dad3c9b47e39d6dfa1. If you could return the USDC, you can keep 100 USDC as a token of my appreciation. Thank you very much!”
Axel_T: polynya:
This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly diluting excisting tokenholders, simply have it as a % of sequencer/MEV revenues. This will be fully sustainable.
This sounds really interesting.
And in theory, you might even be able to make these recurring payments indefinitely (or at least much longer/larger than originally planned). I.e. Instead of receiving x OP as a one-off, you could instead be entitled a recurring % of x OP for an indefinite period of time.
This ‘trailing commission’ for RPGD would also incentivise long term growth in OP, as receivers would desire a larger reward down the track as time & rewards extend out. This is in direct comparison to a time zero, one-off drop which can incentivise quick gains at other holders’ expense.
I’m keen to hear other’s thoughts, in particular from large delegates or Optimism insiders.
I have made multiple posts about decentralization and potential solutions towards them. I have also…
I have made multiple posts about decentralization and potential solutions towards them. I have also complained a lot about $OP’s tokenomics, but haven’t written a post about it. The truth is a retroactive change to token allocations etc is extremely unlikely to happen. But here, in the comfort of my communication thread, I thought I could at least run a thought experiment.
As I see it, there are three significant problems with $OP:
At least 37 % allocated to insiders (investors, team) is excessive, enough to dominate governance votes, or future consensus protocols if implemented
Arbitrary yearly cliffs for both team and investors. Normally not a big issue, but given the huge allocation, it’ll weigh heavily.
RPGF is extremely dilutionary
Ecosystem fund is relatively ineffective (for reasons mentioned above)
In an ideal world, here are some approaches:
While it’s too late now, ideally < 33 % to insiders (incl. partners) would work
Teams should have releases per performance. For example, instead of arbitrarily releasing a lot of OP to team next month, it should be after fraud proofs are live etc. Governance can vote on this. The four year thing is common practice for traditional startups, but the investors don’t really make sense. It’s much better for the market to find a fair price early than a 4 year shadow hanging over the token.
This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly diluting excisting tokenholders, simply have it as a % of sequencer/MEV revenues. This will be fully sustainable.
Likewise with Ecosystem Fund, instead of an arbitrarily huge 25 % - allocate smaller amounts upon analysis where it actually makes sense.
For both 3 ) and 4 ), and airdrops, it’s acceptable in the early days to distribute tokens, but it’s now nearly a year, and we still have > 100 % hyperinflation to look forward to over the next 4 years, which will just kill confidence in $OP over the long term. Maybe after 5 years $OP will emerge as a relatively well distributed, sustainable token, but that’s an eternity in crypto, and I fear it may be too late.
Anyway, these are just my thoughts, it’s probably too late to make drastic decisions like burning 40 % of intended supply which I allude to above, but maybe future projects can have more sustainable distributions.
PS: I forgot that I had done a post on sustainability ideas for $OP - Economic sustainability ideas for $OP - :sparkles: General - Optimism Collective 11
2yeah: “Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a mistake and transferred 1235 USDC to your address. Here is the txid: 0x8fcf7e25b8f9fad55e26a41b685a36c2a71ea14aecb6c1dad3c9b47e39d6dfa1. If you could return the USDC, you can keep 100 USDC as a token of my appreciation. Thank you very much!”
Axel_T: polynya:
This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly diluting excisting tokenholders, simply have it as a % of sequencer/MEV revenues. This will be fully sustainable.
This sounds really interesting.
And in theory, you might even be able to make these recurring payments indefinitely (or at least much longer/larger than originally planned). I.e. Instead of receiving x OP as a one-off, you could instead be entitled a recurring % of x OP for an indefinite period of time.
This ‘trailing commission’ for RPGD would also incentivise long term growth in OP, as receivers would desire a larger reward down the track as time & rewards extend out. This is in direct comparison to a time zero, one-off drop which can incentivise quick gains at other holders’ expense.
I’m keen to hear other’s thoughts, in particular from large delegates or Optimism insiders.
I have made multiple posts about decentralization and potential solutions towards them. I have also…
I have made multiple posts about decentralization and potential solutions towards them. I have also complained a lot about $OP’s tokenomics, but haven’t written a post about it. The truth is a retroactive change to token allocations etc is extremely unlikely to happen. But here, in the comfort of my communication thread, I thought I could at least run a thought experiment. As I see it, there are three significant problems with $OP: At least 37 % allocated to insiders (investors, team) is excessive, enough to dominate governance votes, or future consensus protocols if implemented Arbitrary yearly cliffs for both team and investors. Normally not a big issue, but given the huge allocation, it’ll weigh heavily. RPGF is extremely dilutionary Ecosystem fund is relatively ineffective (for reasons mentioned above) In an ideal world, here are some approaches: While it’s too late now, ideally < 33 % to insiders (incl. partners) would work Teams should have releases per performance. For example, instead of arbitrarily releasing a lot of OP to team next month, it should be after fraud proofs are live etc. Governance can vote on this. The four year thing is common practice for traditional startups, but the investors don’t really make sense. It’s much better for the market to find a fair price early than a 4 year shadow hanging over the token. This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly diluting excisting tokenholders, simply have it as a % of sequencer/MEV revenues. This will be fully sustainable. Likewise with Ecosystem Fund, instead of an arbitrarily huge 25 % - allocate smaller amounts upon analysis where it actually makes sense. For both 3 ) and 4 ), and airdrops, it’s acceptable in the early days to distribute tokens, but it’s now nearly a year, and we still have > 100 % hyperinflation to look forward to over the next 4 years, which will just kill confidence in $OP over the long term. Maybe after 5 years $OP will emerge as a relatively well distributed, sustainable token, but that’s an eternity in crypto, and I fear it may be too late. Anyway, these are just my thoughts, it’s probably too late to make drastic decisions like burning 40 % of intended supply which I allude to above, but maybe future projects can have more sustainable distributions. PS: I forgot that I had done a post on sustainability ideas for $OP - Economic sustainability ideas for $OP - :sparkles: General - Optimism Collective 11
2yeah: “Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a mistake and transferred 1235 USDC to your address. Here is the txid: 0x8fcf7e25b8f9fad55e26a41b685a36c2a71ea14aecb6c1dad3c9b47e39d6dfa1. If you could return the USDC, you can keep 100 USDC as a token of my appreciation. Thank you very much!”
Axel_T: polynya:
This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly diluting excisting tokenholders, simply have it as a % of sequencer/MEV revenues. This will be fully sustainable.
This sounds really interesting.
And in theory, you might even be able to make these recurring payments indefinitely (or at least much longer/larger than originally planned). I.e. Instead of receiving x OP as a one-off, you could instead be entitled a recurring % of x OP for an indefinite period of time.
This ‘trailing commission’ for RPGD would also incentivise long term growth in OP, as receivers would desire a larger reward down the track as time & rewards extend out. This is in direct comparison to a time zero, one-off drop which can incentivise quick gains at other holders’ expense.
I’m keen to hear other’s thoughts, in particular from large delegates or Optimism insiders.
“Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a …
“Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a mistake and transferred 1235 USDC to your address. Here is the txid: 0 x 8 fcf 7 e 25 b 8 f 9 fad 55 e 26 a 41 b 685 a 36 c 2 a 71 ea 14 aecb 6 c 1 dad 3 c 9 b 47 e 39 d 6 dfa 1 . If you could return the USDC, you can keep 100 USDC as a token of my appreciation. Thank you very much!”
“Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a …
“Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a mistake and transferred 1235 USDC to your address. Here is the txid: 0 x 8 fcf 7 e 25 b 8 f 9 fad 55 e 26 a 41 b 685 a 36 c 2 a 71 ea 14 aecb 6 c 1 dad 3 c 9 b 47 e 39 d 6 dfa 1 4 . If you could return the USDC, you can keep 100 USDC as a token of my appreciation. Thank you very much!”
“Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a …
“Very sorry to disturb you here, I am a newcomer. After I delegated the OP ticket to you, I made a mistake and transferred 1235 USDC to your address. Here is the txid: 0 x 8 fcf 7 e 25 b 8 f 9 fad 55 e 26 a 41 b 685 a 36 c 2 a 71 ea 14 aecb 6 c 1 dad 3 c 9 b 47 e 39 d 6 dfa 1 4 . If you could return the USDC, you can keep 100 USDC as a token of my appreciation. Thank you very much!”
Great cooperation by you and @polynya
Very positive vibes to see as an outsider.
Stay optimistic, b…
Great cooperation by you and @polynya
Very positive vibes to see as an outsider.
Stay optimistic, both of you :smiley:
polynya:
This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly…
polynya:
This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly diluting excisting tokenholders, simply have it as a % of sequencer/MEV revenues. This will be fully sustainable.
This sounds really interesting.
And in theory, you might even be able to make these recurring payments indefinitely (or at least much longer/larger than originally planned). I.e. Instead of receiving x OP as a one-off, you could instead be entitled a recurring % of x OP for an indefinite period of time.
This ‘trailing commission’ for RPGD would also incentivise long term growth in OP, as receivers would desire a larger reward down the track as time & rewards extend out. This is in direct comparison to a time zero, one-off drop which can incentivise quick gains at other holders’ expense.
I’m keen to hear other’s thoughts, in particular from large delegates or Optimism insiders.
Great cooperation by you and @polynya Very positive vibes to see as an outsider. Stay optimistic, b…
Great cooperation by you and @polynya Very positive vibes to see as an outsider. Stay optimistic, both of you :smiley:
polynya: This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly…
polynya: This one has a simple solution - RPGF should be earned. I.e. instead of significantly diluting excisting tokenholders, simply have it as a % of sequencer/MEV revenues. This will be fully sustainable. This sounds really interesting. And in theory, you might even be able to make these recurring payments indefinitely (or at least much longer/larger than originally planned). I.e. Instead of receiving x OP as a one-off, you could instead be entitled a recurring % of x OP for an indefinite period of time. This ‘trailing commission’ for RPGD would also incentivise long term growth in OP, as receivers would desire a larger reward down the track as time & rewards extend out. This is in direct comparison to a time zero, one-off drop which can incentivise quick gains at other holders’ expense. I’m keen to hear other’s thoughts, in particular from large delegates or Optimism insiders.
polynya:
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here . While it…
polynya:
I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here . While it’s acceptable for these types of proposals in an early beta stage, I would like to see upgrade proposals actually be upgrade proposals, rather than just a vote of confidence to Optimism Foundation to execute the upgrade. I’d also like to see more external audits, and a long duration on testnets, exceeding strict go-live criteria, before the upgrade is proposed. It should be the last thing that happens once the upgrade is 100 % ready, and a successful proposal will in fact execute the upgrade rather than being just a vote. I know all of this will happen eventually, but as governance we need to keep the pressure on.
Looking back on the Bedrock proposal, and further delays that have since happened, next time I’m only going to vote “For” if it’s actually ready for mainnet exceeding all go-live criteria, and the upgrade proposed is identical to the one that goes live. Preferably, the upgrade code payload is part of the proposal itself. This Bedrock proposal was the last time I vote for an upgrade proposal as just a vote of confidence.
I look forward to Season 4 - happy to see the experimentation, so I won’t say much early on, though I have some concerns around over-complexity and verifying reputation/accountability of Mission leaders.
polynya: I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here . While it…
polynya: I have voted for the Bedrock upgrade proposal. I have commented on it here . While it’s acceptable for these types of proposals in an early beta stage, I would like to see upgrade proposals actually be upgrade proposals, rather than just a vote of confidence to Optimism Foundation to execute the upgrade. I’d also like to see more external audits, and a long duration on testnets, exceeding strict go-live criteria, before the upgrade is proposed. It should be the last thing that happens once the upgrade is 100 % ready, and a successful proposal will in fact execute the upgrade rather than being just a vote. I know all of this will happen eventually, but as governance we need to keep the pressure on. Looking back on the Bedrock proposal, and further delays that have since happened, next time I’m only going to vote “For” if it’s actually ready for mainnet exceeding all go-live criteria, and the upgrade proposed is identical to the one that goes live. Preferably, the upgrade code payload is part of the proposal itself. This Bedrock proposal was the last time I vote for an upgrade proposal as just a vote of confidence. I look forward to Season 4 - happy to see the experimentation, so I won’t say much early on, though I have some concerns around over-complexity and verifying reputation/accountability of Mission leaders.
I didn’t know where to put this, but a short message to Missions proposers, as many have tagged me …
I didn’t know where to put this, but a short message to Missions proposers, as many have tagged me / DMed me - I have been going through proposals bit by bit every day over the last week. But I have limited bandwidth, and I approved as many as I could before the deadline. My activity in crypto now is mostly Optimism governance (quit Twitter a month ago) but this all I have bandwidth for - so I apologise if I couldn’t get to your proposal. We shall discuss how we can make future Mission Proposals, if it happens again, more seamless and scalable.
I didn’t know where to put this, but a short message to Missions proposers, as many have tagged me …
I didn’t know where to put this, but a short message to Missions proposers, as many have tagged me / DMed me - I have been going through proposals bit by bit every day over the last week. But I have limited bandwidth, and I approved as many as I could before the deadline. My activity in crypto now is mostly Optimism governance (quit Twitter a month ago) but this all I have bandwidth for - so I apologise if I couldn’t get to your proposal. We shall discuss how we can make future Mission Proposals, if it happens again, more seamless and scalable.
Due to the unique situation with Mission Proposals, the key metric to look out for is the approval …
Due to the unique situation with Mission Proposals, the key metric to look out for is the approval threshold of 5 . 897 M OP. Per my back-of-the-napkin preliminary calculations (please correct me if I’m wrong), pretty much every proposal that meets this threshold is guaranteed a grant, because the approved proposals are less than the overall budgets. Effectively, this means my vote will be roughly ~ 42 % of the way to funding a proposal. As a result, I’ll need to be more observant and strategic this voting cycle and I’ll be voting towards the end around 12 th of July. To proposers, please don’t send me DMs or tags, it will not sway my opinion - I’ll consider all proposals and vote accordingly given the overall situation described above. This will be my last update for this cycle - look forward to the next one!
Update: I have examined the proposals over the last week. Because the allocated budgets for all Intents are being significantly underallocated, I’ll be lenient and vote for as many proposals as possible, within reason. Obviously, we don’t have to complete the allocations, but it’s enough so we can take more of a risk - who knows, maybe some of the less convincing / more experimental proposals will make more headway into the specific Missions than expected.
Due to the unique situation with Mission Proposals, the key metric to look out for is the approval …
Due to the unique situation with Mission Proposals, the key metric to look out for is the approval threshold of 5 . 897 M OP. Per my back-of-the-napkin preliminary calculations (please correct me if I’m wrong), pretty much every proposal that meets this threshold is guaranteed a grant, because the approved proposals are less than the overall budgets. Effectively, this means my vote will be roughly ~ 42 % of the way to funding a proposal. As a result, I’ll need to be more observant and strategic this voting cycle and I’ll be voting towards the end around 12 th of July. To proposers, please don’t send me DMs or tags, it will not sway my opinion - I’ll consider all proposals and vote accordingly given the overall situation described above. This will be my last update for this cycle - look forward to the next one! Update: I have examined the proposals over the last week. Because the allocated budgets for all Intents are being significantly underallocated, I’ll be lenient and vote for as many proposals as possible, within reason. Obviously, we don’t have to complete the allocations, but it’s enough so we can take more of a risk - who knows, maybe some of the less convincing / more experimental proposals will make more headway into the specific Missions than expected.
Just wanted to say kudos. Think this was absolutely the right approach given the risk of under allo…
Just wanted to say kudos. Think this was absolutely the right approach given the risk of under allocating. Cheers, ser.
Seconding this. By more or less sacrificing the opportunity to be opinionated, @polynya has more or…
Seconding this. By more or less sacrificing the opportunity to be opinionated, @polynya has more or less saved this voting cycle from voter apathy risks.
Just wanted to say kudos. Think this was absolutely the right approach given the risk of under allo…
Just wanted to say kudos. Think this was absolutely the right approach given the risk of under allocating. Cheers, ser.
Seconding this. By more or less sacrificing the opportunity to be opinionated, @polynya has more or…
Seconding this. By more or less sacrificing the opportunity to be opinionated, @polynya has more or less saved this voting cycle from voter apathy risks.
I have voted For all proposals this voting cycle, except for the Code of Conduct violation, where I…
I have voted For all proposals this voting cycle, except for the Code of Conduct violation, where I’ve abstained. These proposals are certainly worth experimenting with, however, I’m now wary Optimism Collective may be heading down the path of over-governance. It’s right on the edge. I was glad to see Optimism embrace some governance tools from centuries of history, but with stuff like Code of Conduct Council or Anticapture Commission, we’re starting to play with fire.
One of the great learnings from centuries is that perfection is the enemy of democracy. For the simple reason that governance is subjective, and different people have different ideas. It’s OK to leave plenty of room on the table for imperfect outcomes, the trade-off of being less divisive is almost always worth it. For example, instead of an entire Code of Conduct Council where a few people are making difficult and potentially contentious calls that may breed contempt, we could just let the Token House and Citizen House keep the behaviour of delegates in mind for their future voting/delegation activities.
I would like to see Optimism Foundation take a more mature approach to organising governance, and look deeper into the consequences of over-governance.
On a separate note, I’m very disappointed by the cadence of token distribution, in particularly airdrops. I had symbolically voted Against the Treasury Appropriation proposal 1 , and despite commitments to do better 1 , somehow things have only gotten more lackadaisical. We’re going to be very far behind the projections going into Year 3 , and I’ll once again vote Against for the next Treasury Appropriation proposal. Things have to change dramatically now if there’s any hope for gaining my vote for Year 4 in 2025 . At this point, confidence in the $OP token has been greatly undermined, hurting the sustainability of the Token House.
I have voted For all proposals this voting cycle, except for the Code of Conduct violation, where I…
I have voted For all proposals this voting cycle, except for the Code of Conduct violation, where I’ve abstained. These proposals are certainly worth experimenting with, however, I’m now wary Optimism Collective may be heading down the path of over-governance. It’s right on the edge. I was glad to see Optimism embrace some governance tools from centuries of history, but with stuff like Code of Conduct Council or Anticapture Commission, we’re starting to play with fire. One of the great learnings from centuries is that perfection is the enemy of democracy. For the simple reason that governance is subjective, and different people have different ideas. It’s OK to leave plenty of room on the table for imperfect outcomes, the trade-off of being less divisive is almost always worth it. For example, instead of an entire Code of Conduct Council where a few people are making difficult and potentially contentious calls that may breed contempt, we could just let the Token House and Citizen House keep the behaviour of delegates in mind for their future voting/delegation activities. I would like to see Optimism Foundation take a more mature approach to organising governance, and look deeper into the consequences of over-governance. On a separate note, I’m very disappointed by the cadence of token distribution, in particularly airdrops. I had symbolically voted Against the Treasury Appropriation proposal, and despite commitments to do better, somehow things have only gotten more lackadaisical. We’re going to be very far behind the projections going into Year 3 , and I’ll once again vote Against for the next Treasury Appropriation proposal. Things have to change dramatically now if there’s any hope for gaining my vote for Year 4 in 2025 . At this point, confidence in the $OP token has been greatly undermined, hurting the sustainability of the Token House.
Many great points here. The collective is still young enough to let grow in an organic manner. The …
Many great points here. The collective is still young enough to let grow in an organic manner. The implementation of these councils have taken away a lot of energy from the main concern you bring up about tokens being further behind the projections going into year 3 .
I think looking back down the road there will be a lot of confusion as to how the OP governance has formed due to these quick decisions being made to put different councils into place.
3 years later and here we are. The balance of power between delegates is being discussed and many conflicts have already left people wondering if we should be voting on CoC violations. Which take away the focus from much more important issues.
There has been a lack of focus on Grantee accountability and that surely can’t help the token house understand how OP is making an impact. In my opinion there needs to be more data driven initiatives from these protocols. Instead of seeing large sums of OP tokens being distributed and never hearing about it ever again.
It’s great that Optimism has formed so many partnerships but it would even better if PROOF OF IMPACT 3 threads :thread: like the one I created on the governance forum were actually utilized by other members of the collective to show any impact at all… More community participation is needed from the grantees who are dedicated to showing others how to set a positive example.
I highly encourage others to take the initiative themselves. We are highly dedicated to building on the Optimism network and it has been extremely difficult to find the support for our project here despite our contributions directly to the network. It has made us think twice about whether this is the right approach to building. We have continued working together with our team and at a certain point in time it became apparent that our independence would carry our project forward.
Dumping all of our resources into building on Optimism from the funding we received in the RetroPGF round 2 did nothing to help us with a grant application for a builders grant either.
These types of opportunities appear to be hopeless no matter how deep your commitment goes. Especially if you are hit with one of these suspensions like Carlos is at the moment. We can also say that the CoC violation may have also contributed to the way that council review members evaluated our proposals during Cycle 14 & 15 of the application period for the formal grants process. We were denied for both cycles.
Not only that people have dropped off like flies when it comes down to the amount of contributions that were being made to the RetroPGF.eth address directly from a number of our projects which hurts the overall collective.
You can see how this relates in our dune analytics charts. There is a shear drop off that occurred when we were suspended for 3 months from the discord & governance forums.
https://dune.com/fractalvisions/rpgfdonations 2
During that time period we were not allowed :no_entry_sign: to apply for any grants & were completely excluded from forming our own alliance or mission for the collective.
So please :pray: take things like this into consideration when making big decisions. We are a small team of dedicated builders who had their spirit crushed by the governance here.
It’s amazing how things have changed over the last year.
Many great points here. The collective is still young enough to let grow in an organic manner. The …
Many great points here. The collective is still young enough to let grow in an organic manner. The implementation of these councils have taken away a lot of energy from the main concern you bring up about tokens being further behind the projections going into year 3 . I think looking back down the road there will be a lot of confusion as to how the OP governance has formed due to these quick decisions being made to put different councils into place. 3 years later and here we are. The balance of power between delegates is being discussed and many conflicts have already left people wondering if we should be voting on CoC violations. Which take away the focus from much more important issues. There has been a lack of focus on Grantee accountability and that surely can’t help the token house understand how OP is making an impact. In my opinion there needs to be more data driven initiatives from these protocols. Instead of seeing large sums of OP tokens being distributed and never hearing about it ever again. It’s great that Optimism has formed so many partnerships but it would even better if PROOF OF IMPACT 3 threads :thread: like the one I created on the governance forum were actually utilized by other members of the collective to show any impact at all… More community participation is needed from the grantees who are dedicated to showing others how to set a positive example. I highly encourage others to take the initiative themselves. We are highly dedicated to building on the Optimism network and it has been extremely difficult to find the support for our project here despite our contributions directly to the network. It has made us think twice about whether this is the right approach to building. We have continued working together with our team and at a certain point in time it became apparent that our independence would carry our project forward. Dumping all of our resources into building on Optimism from the funding we received in the RetroPGF round 2 did nothing to help us with a grant application for a builders grant either. These types of opportunities appear to be hopeless no matter how deep your commitment goes. Especially if you are hit with one of these suspensions like Carlos is at the moment. We can also say that the CoC violation may have also contributed to the way that council review members evaluated our proposals during Cycle 14 & 15 of the application period for the formal grants process. We were denied for both cycles. Not only that people have dropped off like flies when it comes down to the amount of contributions that were being made to the RetroPGF.eth address directly from a number of our projects which hurts the overall collective. You can see how this relates in our dune analytics charts. There is a shear drop off that occurred when we were suspended for 3 months from the discord & governance forums. https://dune.com/fractalvisions/rpgfdonations 1 During that time period we were not allowed :no_entry_sign: to apply for any grants & were completely excluded from forming our own alliance or mission for the collective. So please :pray: take things like this into consideration when making big decisions. We are a small team of dedicated builders who had their spirit crushed by the governance here. It’s amazing how things have changed over the last year.
Hi @FractalVisions - Your feedback is valuable, thank you! I would like to clarify a few things for…
Hi @FractalVisions - Your feedback is valuable, thank you! I would like to clarify a few things for accuracy:
The Collective currently only has one peristent Council: the Grants Council. This Season would add two additional Councils, a Security Council and a Code of Conduct Council, if the related votes are approved. Each Council goes through an initial period of experimentation and iterative evaluation, and is subject to renewal via governance before it can become a persistent Council. The approach to Councils is very intentional as the Collective can only support a few, high impact Councils. I recognize the feedback about the Code of Conduct Council and the best approach is being actively considered; it is very possible the Code of Conduct Council would not be continued in future Seasons if it is found to be ineffective or undesirable.
FractalVisions, the project, should not have been prohibited from applying to grants or submitting a Mission proposal as an Alliance during your individual delegate suspension. Delegate suspensions pertain to individual participation as a delegate within the Optimism community. The project you are associated with was not suspended, and therefore the associated project and/or other members of your project should not have been prohibited from participating in the community and/or applying for any grants, including Missions.
Hi @FractalVisions - Your feedback is valuable, thank you! I would like to clarify a few things for…
Hi @FractalVisions - Your feedback is valuable, thank you! I would like to clarify a few things for accuracy: The Collective currently only has one peristent Council: the Grants Council. This Season would add two additional Councils, a Security Council and a Code of Conduct Council, if the related votes are approved. Each Council goes through an initial period of experimentation and iterative evaluation, and is subject to renewal via governance before it can become a persistent Council. The approach to Councils is very intentional as the Collective can only support a few, high impact Councils. I recognize the feedback about the Code of Conduct Council and the best approach is being actively considered; it is very possible the Code of Conduct Council would not be continued in future Seasons if it is found to be ineffective or undesirable. FractalVisions, the project, should not have been prohibited from applying to grants or submitting a Mission proposal as an Alliance during your individual delegate suspension. Delegate suspensions pertain to individual participation as a delegate within the Optimism community. The project you are associated with was not suspended, and therefore the associated project and/or other members of your project should not have been prohibited from participating in the community and/or applying for any grants, including Missions.
I abstain from voting on any project or proposal I’ve had anything to do with. I sponsored a propos…
I abstain from voting on any project or proposal I’ve had anything to do with. I sponsored a proposal under Intent # 4 3 , given the threshold vote abstaining would be effectively a negative vote, plus I don’t stand to benefit from this proposal at all, so I think it’s fair to vote for it. As additional feedback, 1 week is not enough time for these threshold votes with dozens of proposals to examine - need a minimum of 2 weeks.
Separately, I haven’t made an update in a while, I have just made comment replies where required, or posted reasons in Agora. Part of it the governance maturing so my input isn’t necessary with plenty of active participants, but also, my personal disillusionment of decentralization taking way longer than projected or expected - in the forms of technical, token distribution and governance processes. I’ll continue to examine and vote on all proposals, and complete all delegate duties, but my participation beyond that will remain limited until sufficiently decentralized (IMO).
I abstain from voting on any project or proposal I’ve had anything to do with. I sponsored a propos…
I abstain from voting on any project or proposal I’ve had anything to do with. I sponsored a proposal under Intent # 4 2 , given the threshold vote abstaining would be effectively a negative vote, plus I don’t stand to benefit from this proposal at all, so I think it’s fair to vote for it. As additional feedback, 1 week is not enough time for these threshold votes with dozens of proposals to examine - need a minimum of 2 weeks. Separately, I haven’t made an update in a while, I have just made comment replies where required, or posted reasons in Agora. Part of it the governance maturing so my input isn’t necessary with plenty of active participants, but also, my personal disillusionment of decentralization taking way longer than projected or expected - in the forms of technical, token distribution and governance processes. I’ll continue to examine and vote on all proposals, and complete all delegate duties, but my participation beyond that will remain limited until sufficiently decentralized (IMO).
General feedback for Board/Council elections. As the collective grows, we’re seeing many applicatio…
General feedback for Board/Council elections. As the collective grows, we’re seeing many applications, and it may continue increasing. The key to a productive council is not necessary just throwing a bunch of qualified individuals together, but rather, a team that can collaborate together. Also, it’s difficult for us delegates to go through 20 + applicants, so it’s understandable most voters are sticking to the well-known applicants. I’m not sure how the election process can be reflected these, but something to consider.
Addendum: First, sorry for the poor grammar in the original comment. I’ve now voted for all proposals, and I’ve tried to mix in new voices for the election proposals. I found some great candidates who have received negligible votes - which goes back to what I was saying about too many applications, so delegates stick with the familiar names. But we need fresh insights, else we will stagnate. On a different note, I’m experimenting with the newly formed ZK Nation. It’ll have no impact on my role here at Optimism. These are the only two DAOs I participate in.
I’ve made a big mistake - I wrongly voted for the Intent # 3 B as Abstain (which is the default) in…
I’ve made a big mistake - I wrongly voted for the Intent # 3 B as Abstain (which is the default) instead of For. Sincerely apologise, and hope the quorum and approval threshold will now be met without my vote. In future, I hope to see the ability to revote like in other proposal types. Sorry again.
Update, 18 th Jul: The thresholds have been met, so my vote doesn’t matter - relieved!
As we don’t have “Citizen Communication Threads”, I’m going to leave an update here. Citizens have …
As we don’t have “Citizen Communication Threads”, I’m going to leave an update here. Citizens have been required to opt-in to Season 6 . However, to opt in, there’s a process that requires installation of the Warpcast mobile application. I believe forcing citizens to install a fully centralized third party mobile application (or even an external decentralized protocol like Farcaster) is against the OP Collective’s ethos of openness and accessibility. The only requirement should be to hold an Ethereum-compatible address, as is the case with Token House and all DAOs I’m aware of. I passed on this feedback to a Citizen House operator a few days ago, and hope it’ll be addressed in the future. Until then, I’ll continue as a Delegate to the Token House, but will no longer be a Citizen.
That’s a bummer for sure and as of now, Farcaster mobile client-friendly client is Warpcast
.
Assum…
That’s a bummer for sure and as of now, Farcaster mobile client-friendly client is Warpcast
.
Assuming after completing the opt-in form a record is being inserted in a database, would it not be possible to insert your record manually?
It’s not just that - you need to have Warpcast installed on mobile, period. If it was just linking …
It’s not just that - you need to have Warpcast installed on mobile, period. If it was just linking a Farcaster account, I’d complain about it, but maybe I’d understand, but forcing a fully centralized third party mobile app is unacceptable.
I have no problem with that being an option, but at least have Sign in with Ethereum alongside it?
As for the manual input, at this point I’d opt out anyway until this is fixed.
Hey @polynya,
Thanks for the feedback! I hear you on the distinction between Farcaster & Warpcast a…
Hey @polynya,
Thanks for the feedback! I hear you on the distinction between Farcaster & Warpcast and in the docs below you’ll see that the Farcaster id registry, not Warpcast, is the building block we’re incorporating.
Here’s some additional context on how we’re building out the social identity layer of the Optimism Collective, starting with Retro Funding and Citizenship:
Forum post: Retro Funding 4 : Application process
Gov docs: Project and individual identity in the Collective | Optimism Docs
I’m opening a new thread for this topic over here 3 , because gov docs don’t have a comment feature.
Thanks for chiming in. That may be the case, but I was commenting about the specific opt-in process…
Thanks for chiming in. That may be the case, but I was commenting about the specific opt-in process for season 6 , which required Warpcast mobile app, as informed by your colleague. I’ll look into the docs later, thanks. For now, I’ll focus on the Delegate role.
Electing Security Council is the most important decision, as they ultimately provide security until…
Electing Security Council is the most important decision, as they ultimately provide security until we get to Stage 2 decentralisation. As a result, I have in mind a couple of criteria:
Positively contributed to the space for 5 + years with an immaculate reputation
Jurisdictional diversity
Aligned strongly with Optimism’s values
Having preliminarily browsed through some of the nominations, I can only think of 2 or 3 people meeting the above criteria. For most proposals, I’m willing to give the benefit of doubt, but this is too important. It’s a tough one - it’ll have to be one of those where I wait till later in the cycle to vote.
Voted for the Governor Update Proposal # 3 , however, the Agora UI doesn’t show my vote. Is it a bu…
Voted for the Governor Update Proposal # 3 , however, the Agora UI doesn’t show my vote. Is it a bug? Where else can I check? Onchain vote was executed: OP Mainnet Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | OP Mainnet Etherscan 6
GM @polynya! I’m reporting it to the Agora team. If anything, we’ll let you know.
cc. @yitong @zcf …
GM @polynya! I’m reporting it to the Agora team. If anything, we’ll let you know.
cc. @yitong @zcf @kent
Edit: Issue fixed :cowboy_hat_face:
Thank you @brichis :pray:
Let us know if you need anything else @polynya :saluting_face:
Thank you @brichis :pray:
Let us know if you need anything else @polynya :saluting_face:
