There will be a session to discuss any and all of the below with the Foundation from 9 : 00 - 9 : 30 am PST / 5 : 00 - 5 : 30 pm GMT on Wednesday, November 9 th. Recording from this session can be found here.
We’d like to start with a huge thank you to our tireless delegates. We appreciate all of your hard work and for being a part of our iterative governance experiments to date. We know it’s not easy to be the first to try something.
Each Season is an experiment as the Collective iterates toward its final governance design. Community feedback has surfaced many learnings during Season 2 , and Season 3 is an opportunity to course correct in the face of some hard truths:
Delegate Overload: Delegates are overloaded with proposals to vote on, which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. Placing this level of demand on delegates does not position Token House governance to effectively scale. Ideally, the Token House would infrequently approve high importance decisions and serve as a check on the Citizens’ House. The Token House would not be voting frequently on granular decisions such as individual grant approvals.
Proposer Frustration: Proposers find the current grant process hard to navigate and are frustrated with conflicting feedback from delegates. Several protocols have gotten so frustrated that they’ve considered leaving the Optimism ecosystem to work with competitors.
Protocol Participation: Protocols are frustrated by debates concerning self-delegation. Protocols are important stakeholders and should have a voice in governance, but delegates are understandably uncomfortable with protocols self-delegating grants to increase voting power.
Committee Conflict: Committees helped reduce non-committee member workload, but added complexity to the process and introduced additional confusion for proposers. Conflicts between committees contributed to a dramatic degradation in governance culture.
Culture Concerns: Governance culture is not currently reflective of the Collective’s values. Governance conversations have been lacking in civility, respect, and positivity. There hasn’t been an enforceable code of conduct to address inappropriate delegate behavior, which has occurred frequently.
Limited Accountability: The impact of Governance Fund grants has been disappointing so far. The pace of grant distribution has been aggressive and there is almost no accountability for grant recipients. There have been multiple examples of grant-related transactions well outside the scope of what was outlined in proposals.
Undefined Scope: There has been limited guidance on the types of initiatives grants should support. This has led to the over-funding of less effective initiatives (like retroactive airdrops) and the under-funding of strategically important initiatives (like builder grants.)
While we have challenges to overcome, delegates have also shown a remarkable dedication to Optimism and an impressive willingness to experiment. We’re extremely grateful to delegates (and their delegators!) for their dedication during the earliest stages of the Collective. It makes us incredibly optimistic about the future of Token House governance. Experimentation and iteration have been core to the vision for Optimism governance from the start. We didn’t expect to get things right on the first try, and it’s clear we’re ready for some big changes. The below docs outline several initiatives aimed at addressing the above challenges for Season 3 .
We would appreciate community feedback on the following posts:
Delegate Code of Conduct: An enforceable delegate code of conduct to restore a healthy governance culture
Governance Fund Charter: Guidance on the purpose and scope of the Governance Fund
We would appreciate community feedback on the following proposal drafts. Token House will vote on final drafts in Special Voting Cycle # 9 a:
Draft Proposal: Moving to a Grants Council: A proposal to restructure the grants process to overcome the challenges faced by committees, improve the proposer experience, create accountability for grant recipients, and reduce delegate workload
Draft Proposal: Protocol Delegation Program: A proposal to allow protocols to have a voice in governance without self-delegating grants
In recognition of the incredible work delegates have done in Seasons 1 & 2 :
Retroactive Delegate Rewards for Season 1 & 2 : Retroactive rewards in recognition of the incredible work top active delegates have done
The next few weeks will follow the below schedule, as original outlined in Governance Update # 4 :
Nov 10 - Nov 16 th: Off-Season for Committees to allocate the retroactive component of their compensation
November 17 th - December 7 th: Reflection Period
Dec 8 th - Dec 21 st: Special Voting Cycle # 9 a (voting on grants council and protocol delegation program proposals)
We are making the following updates to the schedule following Special Voting Cycle # 9 a:
December 22 nd - Jan 4 th: Holiday break
Jan 5 th - January 18 th: Special Voting Cycle # 9 b (any proposals contingent upon passing in Special Voting Cycle # 9 a). If Special Voting Cycle # 9 b is not necessary, Season 3 may start on January 5 th
January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10
The post discusses upcoming changes in governance for the Collective, acknowledging challenges faced in Season 2. Issues addressed include delegate overload, proposer frustration, protocol participation, committee conflict, culture concerns, and limited accountability. Proposed solutions include a delegate code of conduct, a governance fund charter, restructured grant processes, and a protocol delegation program. The post also mentions retroactive rewards for delegates and outlines the upcoming schedule, including Special Voting Cycles and the start of Season 3.
polynya: system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
Gonna.eth: system:
Dec 8th - Dec 21st: Special Voting Cycle #9a (voting on grants council and protocol delegation program proposals)
If the Grants council proposal is approved, will we vote the council members here: ?
system:
Jan 5th - January 18th: Special Voting Cycle #9b (any proposals contingent upon passing in Special Voting Cycle #9a). If Special Voting Cycle #9b is not necessary, Season 3 may start on January 5th
Or do we vote for council members at the start of season 3 here: ?
system:
January 19th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle #10
Michael: polynya:
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
To me this is all a somewhat related issue. It would be great to find an incentive structure to funnel this un-delegated vote share into the delegates with the best track record.
Gonna.eth: system:
January 19th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle #10
@lavande could you add the estimated end date of season 3, please?
There will be a session to discuss any and all of the below with the Foundation from 9 : 00 - 9 …
There will be a session to discuss any and all of the below with the Foundation from 9 : 00 - 9 : 30 am PST / 5 : 00 - 5 : 30 pm GMT on Wednesday, November 9 th. Recording from this session can be found here. 34
We’d like to start with a huge thank you to our tireless delegates. We appreciate all of your hard work and for being a part of our iterative governance experiments to date. We know it’s not easy to be the first to try something.
Each Season is an experiment as the Collective iterates toward its final governance design. Community feedback has surfaced many learnings during Season 2 , and Season 3 is an opportunity to course correct in the face of some hard truths:
Delegate Overload: Delegates are overloaded with proposals to vote on, which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. Placing this level of demand on delegates does not position Token House governance to effectively scale. Ideally, the Token House would infrequently approve high importance decisions and serve as a check on the Citizens’ House. The Token House would not be voting frequently on granular decisions such as individual grant approvals.
Proposer Frustration: Proposers find the current grant process hard to navigate and are frustrated with conflicting feedback from delegates. Several protocols have gotten so frustrated that they’ve considered leaving the Optimism ecosystem to work with competitors.
Protocol Participation: Protocols are frustrated by debates concerning self-delegation. Protocols are important stakeholders and should have a voice in governance, but delegates are understandably uncomfortable with protocols self-delegating grants to increase voting power.
Committee Conflict: Committees helped reduce non-committee member workload, but added complexity to the process and introduced additional confusion for proposers. Conflicts between committees contributed to a dramatic degradation in governance culture.
Culture Concerns: Governance culture is not currently reflective of the Collective’s values. Governance conversations have been lacking in civility, respect, and positivity. There hasn’t been an enforceable code of conduct to address inappropriate delegate behavior, which has occurred frequently.
Limited Accountability: The impact of Governance Fund grants 45 has been disappointing so far. The pace of grant distribution has been aggressive and there is almost no accountability for grant recipients. There have been multiple examples of grant-related transactions well outside the scope of what was outlined in proposals.
Undefined Scope: There has been limited guidance on the types of initiatives grants should support. This has led to the over-funding of less effective initiatives (like retroactive airdrops) and the under-funding of strategically important initiatives (like builder grants.)
While we have challenges to overcome, delegates have also shown a remarkable dedication to Optimism and an impressive willingness to experiment. We’re extremely grateful to delegates (and their delegators!) for their dedication during the earliest stages of the Collective. It makes us incredibly optimistic about the future of Token House governance. Experimentation and iteration have been core to the vision for Optimism governance from the start. We didn’t expect to get things right on the first try, and it’s clear we’re ready for some big changes. The below docs outline several initiatives aimed at addressing the above challenges for Season 3 .
We would appreciate community feedback on the following posts:
Delegate Code of Conduct 33 : An enforceable delegate code of conduct to restore a healthy governance culture
Governance Fund Charter 35 : Guidance on the purpose and scope of the Governance Fund
We would appreciate community feedback on the following proposal drafts. Token House will vote on final drafts in Special Voting Cycle # 9 a:
Draft Proposal: Moving to a Grants Council: A proposal to restructure the grants process to overcome the challenges faced by committees, improve the proposer experience, create accountability for grant recipients, and reduce delegate workload
Draft Proposal: Protocol Delegation Program: A proposal to allow protocols to have a voice in governance without self-delegating grants
In recognition of the incredible work delegates have done in Seasons 1 & 2 :
Retroactive Delegate Rewards for Season 1 & 2 44 : Retroactive rewards in recognition of the incredible work top active delegates have done
The next few weeks will follow the below schedule, as original outlined in Governance Update # 4 23 :
Nov 10 - Nov 16 th: Off-Season for Committees to allocate the retroactive component of their compensation
November 17 th - December 7 th: Reflection Period
Dec 8 th - Dec 21 st: Special Voting Cycle # 9 a (voting on grants council and protocol delegation program proposals)
We are making the following updates to the schedule following Special Voting Cycle # 9 a:
December 22 nd - Jan 4 th: Holiday break
Jan 5 th - January 18 th: Special Voting Cycle # 9 b (any proposals contingent upon passing in Special Voting Cycle # 9 a). If Special Voting Cycle # 9 b is not necessary, Season 3 may start on January 5 th
January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10
polynya: system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
Gonna.eth: system:
Dec 8th - Dec 21st: Special Voting Cycle #9a (voting on grants council and protocol delegation program proposals)
If the Grants council proposal is approved, will we vote the council members here: ?
system:
Jan 5th - January 18th: Special Voting Cycle #9b (any proposals contingent upon passing in Special Voting Cycle #9a). If Special Voting Cycle #9b is not necessary, Season 3 may start on January 5th
Or do we vote for council members at the start of season 3 here: ?
system:
January 19th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle #10
Michael: polynya:
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
To me this is all a somewhat related issue. It would be great to find an incentive structure to funnel this un-delegated vote share into the delegates with the best track record.
Gonna.eth: system:
January 19th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle #10
@lavande could you add the estimated end date of season 3, please?
There will be a session to discuss any and all of the below with the Foundation from 9 : 00 - 9 …
There will be a session to discuss any and all of the below with the Foundation from 9 : 00 - 9 : 30 am PST / 5 : 00 - 5 : 30 pm GMT on Wednesday, November 9 th. Recording from this session can be found here. 30 We’d like to start with a huge thank you to our tireless delegates. We appreciate all of your hard work and for being a part of our iterative governance experiments to date. We know it’s not easy to be the first to try something. Each Season is an experiment as the Collective iterates toward its final governance design. Community feedback has surfaced many learnings during Season 2 , and Season 3 is an opportunity to course correct in the face of some hard truths: Delegate Overload: Delegates are overloaded with proposals to vote on, which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. Placing this level of demand on delegates does not position Token House governance to effectively scale. Ideally, the Token House would infrequently approve high importance decisions and serve as a check on the Citizens’ House. The Token House would not be voting frequently on granular decisions such as individual grant approvals. Proposer Frustration: Proposers find the current grant process hard to navigate and are frustrated with conflicting feedback from delegates. Several protocols have gotten so frustrated that they’ve considered leaving the Optimism ecosystem to work with competitors. Protocol Participation: Protocols are frustrated by debates concerning self-delegation. Protocols are important stakeholders and should have a voice in governance, but delegates are understandably uncomfortable with protocols self-delegating grants to increase voting power. Committee Conflict: Committees helped reduce non-committee member workload, but added complexity to the process and introduced additional confusion for proposers. Conflicts between committees contributed to a dramatic degradation in governance culture. Culture Concerns: Governance culture is not currently reflective of the Collective’s values. Governance conversations have been lacking in civility, respect, and positivity. There hasn’t been an enforceable code of conduct to address inappropriate delegate behavior, which has occurred frequently. Limited Accountability: The impact of Governance Fund grants 44 has been disappointing so far. The pace of grant distribution has been aggressive and there is almost no accountability for grant recipients. There have been multiple examples of grant-related transactions well outside the scope of what was outlined in proposals. Undefined Scope: There has been limited guidance on the types of initiatives grants should support. This has led to the over-funding of less effective initiatives (like retroactive airdrops) and the under-funding of strategically important initiatives (like builder grants.) While we have challenges to overcome, delegates have also shown a remarkable dedication to Optimism and an impressive willingness to experiment. We’re extremely grateful to delegates (and their delegators!) for their dedication during the earliest stages of the Collective. It makes us incredibly optimistic about the future of Token House governance. Experimentation and iteration have been core to the vision for Optimism governance from the start. We didn’t expect to get things right on the first try, and it’s clear we’re ready for some big changes. The below docs outline several initiatives aimed at addressing the above challenges for Season 3 . We would appreciate community feedback on the following posts: Delegate Code of Conduct 30 : An enforceable delegate code of conduct to restore a healthy governance culture Governance Fund Charter 34 : Guidance on the purpose and scope of the Governance Fund We would appreciate community feedback on the following proposal drafts. Token House will vote on final drafts in Special Voting Cycle # 9 a: Draft Proposal: Moving to a Grants Council: A proposal to restructure the grants process to overcome the challenges faced by committees, improve the proposer experience, create accountability for grant recipients, and reduce delegate workload Draft Proposal: Protocol Delegation Program: A proposal to allow protocols to have a voice in governance without self-delegating grants In recognition of the incredible work delegates have done in Seasons 1 & 2 : Retroactive Delegate Rewards for Season 1 & 2 44 : Retroactive rewards in recognition of the incredible work top active delegates have done The next few weeks will follow the below schedule, as original outlined in Governance Update # 4 21 : Nov 10 - Nov 16 th: Off-Season for Committees to allocate the retroactive component of their compensation November 17 th - December 7 th: Reflection Period Dec 8 th - Dec 21 st: Special Voting Cycle # 9 a (voting on grants council and protocol delegation program proposals) We are making the following updates to the schedule following Special Voting Cycle # 9 a: December 22 nd - Jan 4 th: Holiday break Jan 5 th - January 18 th: Special Voting Cycle # 9 b (any proposals contingent upon passing in Special Voting Cycle # 9 a). If Special Voting Cycle # 9 b is not necessary, Season 3 may start on January 5 th January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10
polynya: system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
Gonna.eth: system:
Dec 8th - Dec 21st: Special Voting Cycle #9a (voting on grants council and protocol delegation program proposals)
If the Grants council proposal is approved, will we vote the council members here: ?
system:
Jan 5th - January 18th: Special Voting Cycle #9b (any proposals contingent upon passing in Special Voting Cycle #9a). If Special Voting Cycle #9b is not necessary, Season 3 may start on January 5th
Or do we vote for council members at the start of season 3 here: ?
system:
January 19th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle #10
Michael: polynya:
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
To me this is all a somewhat related issue. It would be great to find an incentive structure to funnel this un-delegated vote share into the delegates with the best track record.
Gonna.eth: system:
January 19th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle #10
@lavande could you add the estimated end date of season 3, please?
Thank you for all of the work that went into receiving community feedback and working towards impro…
Thank you for all of the work that went into receiving community feedback and working towards improvements. I’m really glad to see the changes being made and I’m excited for season 3 .
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally importa…
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
Justin: Big delegates have too much power. I have voted in every proposal because i care … but my tiny holdings are irrelevant compared to the handful of delegates that decide every vote. And those delegates effectively have lifetime power because there is no sunset on the delegation that users thoughtlessly sprinted through en route to claiming. I will continue to vote my own tokens, but just saying…
Michael: polynya:
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
To me this is all a somewhat related issue. It would be great to find an incentive structure to funnel this un-delegated vote share into the delegates with the best track record.
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally importa…
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy 15
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
Justin: Big delegates have too much power. I have voted in every proposal because i care … but my tiny holdings are irrelevant compared to the handful of delegates that decide every vote. And those delegates effectively have lifetime power because there is no sunset on the delegation that users thoughtlessly sprinted through en route to claiming. I will continue to vote my own tokens, but just saying…
Michael: polynya:
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
To me this is all a somewhat related issue. It would be great to find an incentive structure to funnel this un-delegated vote share into the delegates with the best track record.
Thank you for all of the work that went into receiving community feedback and working towards impro…
Thank you for all of the work that went into receiving community feedback and working towards improvements. I’m really glad to see the changes being made and I’m excited for season 3 .
system: which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. An equally importa…
system: which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy 14 So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
Justin: Big delegates have too much power. I have voted in every proposal because i care … but my tiny holdings are irrelevant compared to the handful of delegates that decide every vote. And those delegates effectively have lifetime power because there is no sunset on the delegation that users thoughtlessly sprinted through en route to claiming. I will continue to vote my own tokens, but just saying…
Michael: polynya:
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
To me this is all a somewhat related issue. It would be great to find an incentive structure to funnel this un-delegated vote share into the delegates with the best track record.
This call will take place on Meet:
Video call link: https://meet.google.com/qkh-kaaj-ptw 5
More p…
This call will take place on Meet:
Video call link: https://meet.google.com/qkh-kaaj-ptw 5
More phone numbers: https://tel.meet/qkh-kaaj-ptw?pin= 8405857935366 3
This call will take place on Meet:
Video call link: https://meet.google.com/qkh-kaaj-ptw
More phone…
This call will take place on Meet:
Video call link: https://meet.google.com/qkh-kaaj-ptw
More phone numbers: https://tel.meet/qkh-kaaj-ptw?pin= 8405857935366
Call recording accessible here for those that couldn’t join: qkh-kaaj-ptw ( 2022 - 11 - 09 09 : 0…
Call recording accessible here for those that couldn’t join: qkh-kaaj-ptw ( 2022 - 11 - 09 09 : 03 GMT- 8 ) - Google Drive 4
Call recording accessible here for those that couldn’t join: qkh-kaaj-ptw ( 2022 - 11 - 09 09 : 0…
Call recording accessible here for those that couldn’t join: qkh-kaaj-ptw ( 2022 - 11 - 09 09 : 03 GMT- 8 ) - Google Drive
This call will take place on Meet: Video call link: https://meet.google.com/qkh-kaaj-ptw 5 More p…
This call will take place on Meet: Video call link: https://meet.google.com/qkh-kaaj-ptw 5 More phone numbers: https://tel.meet/qkh-kaaj-ptw?pin= 8405857935366 1
Call recording accessible here for those that couldn’t join: qkh-kaaj-ptw ( 2022 - 11 - 09 09 : 0…
Call recording accessible here for those that couldn’t join: qkh-kaaj-ptw ( 2022 - 11 - 09 09 : 03 GMT- 8 ) - Google Drive 3
Even though season 2 felt like “ Two steps forward, one step backward” it’s important that we con…
Even though season 2 felt like “ Two steps forward, one step backward” it’s important that we continue to experiment and see what works. I look forward to seeing the new changes implemented in Season 3 , especially with an accountability committee.
Even though season 2 felt like “ Two steps forward, one step backward” it’s important that we con…
Even though season 2 felt like “ Two steps forward, one step backward” it’s important that we continue to experiment and see what works. I look forward to seeing the new changes implemented in Season 3 , especially with an accountability committee.
Big delegates have too much power. I have voted in every proposal because i care … but my tiny hol…
Big delegates have too much power. I have voted in every proposal because i care … but my tiny holdings are irrelevant compared to the handful of delegates that decide every vote. And those delegates effectively have lifetime power because there is no sunset on the delegation that users thoughtlessly sprinted through en route to claiming. I will continue to vote my own tokens, but just saying…
BTW, props to whoever created the OP Governance Calendar, it has saved me so much time just being a…
BTW, props to whoever created the OP Governance Calendar, it has saved me so much time just being able to open up my personal calendar to see where we are vs searching in the forum and Discord
rasmuky: Governance calendar is great, thanks for the call out. I hadn’t noticed that.
One useful add would be the date / time of the snapshot so I can pull any $OP staked back to my wallet.
Big delegates have too much power. I have voted in every proposal because i care … but my tiny hol…
Big delegates have too much power. I have voted in every proposal because i care … but my tiny holdings are irrelevant compared to the handful of delegates that decide every vote. And those delegates effectively have lifetime power because there is no sunset on the delegation that users thoughtlessly sprinted through en route to claiming. I will continue to vote my own tokens, but just saying…
BTW, props to whoever created the OP Governance Calendar, it has saved me so much time just being a…
BTW, props to whoever created the OP Governance Calendar, it has saved me so much time just being able to open up my personal calendar to see where we are vs searching in the forum and Discord
rasmuky: Governance calendar is great, thanks for the call out. I hadn’t noticed that.
One useful add would be the date / time of the snapshot so I can pull any $OP staked back to my wallet.
system:
Dec 8 th - Dec 21 st: Special Voting Cycle # 9 a (voting on grants council and proto…
system:
Dec 8 th - Dec 21 st: Special Voting Cycle # 9 a (voting on grants council and protocol delegation program proposals)
If the Grants council proposal is approved, will we vote the council members here: ?
system:
Jan 5 th - January 18 th: Special Voting Cycle # 9 b (any proposals contingent upon passing in Special Voting Cycle # 9 a). If Special Voting Cycle # 9 b is not necessary, Season 3 may start on January 5 th
Or do we vote for council members at the start of season 3 here: ?
system:
January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10
system: Dec 8 th - Dec 21 st: Special Voting Cycle # 9 a (voting on grants council and proto…
system: Dec 8 th - Dec 21 st: Special Voting Cycle # 9 a (voting on grants council and protocol delegation program proposals) If the Grants council proposal is approved, will we vote the council members here: ? system: Jan 5 th - January 18 th: Special Voting Cycle # 9 b (any proposals contingent upon passing in Special Voting Cycle # 9 a). If Special Voting Cycle # 9 b is not necessary, Season 3 may start on January 5 th Or do we vote for council members at the start of season 3 here: ? system: January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10
Governance calendar is great, thanks for the call out. I hadn’t noticed that.
One useful add would …
Governance calendar is great, thanks for the call out. I hadn’t noticed that.
One useful add would be the date / time of the snapshot so I can pull any $OP staked back to my wallet.
Governance calendar is great, thanks for the call out. I hadn’t noticed that. One useful add would …
Governance calendar is great, thanks for the call out. I hadn’t noticed that. One useful add would be the date / time of the snapshot so I can pull any $OP staked back to my wallet.
polynya:
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An e…
polynya:
system:
which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates.
An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy
So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates.
To me this is all a somewhat related issue. It would be great to find an incentive structure to funnel this un-delegated vote share into the delegates with the best track record.
polynya: system: which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. An e…
polynya: system: which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. An equally important problem not addressed here is participation among $OP token holders: [Temp-Check] - Give Incentives to Solve Voters Apathy So, we both need higher participation of $OP token holders delegating to active delegates, and active participation from delegates. To me this is all a somewhat related issue. It would be great to find an incentive structure to funnel this un-delegated vote share into the delegates with the best track record.
system:
January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10
@lavande could you add the…
system:
January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10
@lavande could you add the estimated end date of season 3 , please?
system: January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10 @lavande could you add the…
system: January 19 th: Season 3 starts with Voting Cycle # 10 @lavande could you add the estimated end date of season 3 , please?
’ * Delegate Overload: Delegates are overloaded with proposals to vote on, which is leading to lowe…
’ * Delegate Overload: Delegates are overloaded with proposals to vote on, which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. Placing this level of demand on delegates does not position Token House governance to effectively scale. Ideally, the Token House would infrequently approve high importance decisions and serve as a check on the Citizens’ House. The Token House would not be voting frequently on granular decisions such as individual grant approvals.’
I have argued previously on these forums that the issue here is the tendency for delegates to be delegates across multiple protocols, becoming super delegates of a sort, almost as if it’s a job. When really it should be a quite localised role.
’ * Delegate Overload: Delegates are overloaded with proposals to vote on, which is leading to lowe…
’ * Delegate Overload: Delegates are overloaded with proposals to vote on, which is leading to lower participation among some top delegates. Placing this level of demand on delegates does not position Token House governance to effectively scale. Ideally, the Token House would infrequently approve high importance decisions and serve as a check on the Citizens’ House. The Token House would not be voting frequently on granular decisions such as individual grant approvals.’ I have argued previously on these forums that the issue here is the tendency for delegates to be delegates across multiple protocols, becoming super delegates of a sort, almost as if it’s a job. When really it should be a quite localised role.
