Starting from first principles, this is my opinion for how $OP can be economically sustainable. My general philosophy is elegance, simplicity and minimal friction. No lockups, staking rewards and similar mechanisms - $OP will always be a frictionless, liquid token.
Revenues
Assuming a MEVA/PBS-like setup, builders (sequencers) bid in ETH. Note: depending on the implementation, users may pay fees in other tokens (e.g. OP, DAI) to dapps/builders, but this is abstracted away from Optimism Collective.
ETH revenues are a) contributed to treasury and/or b) used to buy back and burn OP, or a combination thereof. Governance will decide the exact proportion, and dynamically adjusted in response to market conditions, governance plans etc.
Issuance
There’ll be a dynamic issuance per revenues earned. For example, if OP is accruing significantly more value than the issuance rate, then issuance can be ramped up via governance vote. It could also be automated.
As always, governance (Token House + Citizens’ House) will direct issuance and treasury reserves. E.g. X% to RPGF, Y% to ecosystem etc. Staking rewards are possible, but in spirit of simplicity the buyback-and-burn directly accrues value to the OP token.
Concluding
Post EIP- 4844 , both L 1 fees & sequencer costs will be trivial (of course, no issuance required for safety, unlike L 1 s), and congestion fees/MEV can be very lucrative if we attract top developers and their users to Optimism. I believe $OP can be a rare economically sustainable token in the space.
The post discusses a strategy for making $OP economically sustainable, emphasizing elegance, simplicity, and minimal friction. It proposes revenue generation through a MEVA/PBS-like setup, where builders bid in ETH, and revenue is used for treasury funding or buying back and burning OP tokens. Governance would determine the proportion and adjust it based on market conditions. Issuance would be dynamic based on earned revenues, potentially ramping up issuance through governance votes or automation. Staking rewards are considered but simplicity is prioritized, focusing on direct value accrual to OP token through buyback-and-burn. With EIP-4844, L1 fees and sequencer costs are expected to be low on the platform, and the post suggests that $OP could become an economically sustainable token in the market.
Starting from first principles, this is my opinion for how $OP can be economically sustainable. My …
Starting from first principles, this is my opinion for how $OP can be economically sustainable. My general philosophy is elegance, simplicity and minimal friction. No lockups, staking rewards and similar mechanisms - $OP will always be a frictionless, liquid token. Revenues Assuming a MEVA/PBS-like setup, builders (sequencers) bid in ETH. Note: depending on the implementation, users may pay fees in other tokens (e.g. OP, DAI) to dapps/builders, but this is abstracted away from Optimism Collective. ETH revenues are a) contributed to treasury and/or b) used to buy back and burn OP, or a combination thereof. Governance will decide the exact proportion, and dynamically adjusted in response to market conditions, governance plans etc. Issuance There’ll be a dynamic issuance per revenues earned. For example, if OP is accruing significantly more value than the issuance rate, then issuance can be ramped up via governance vote. It could also be automated. As always, governance (Token House + Citizens’ House) will direct issuance and treasury reserves. E.g. X% to RPGF, Y% to ecosystem etc. Staking rewards are possible, but in spirit of simplicity the buyback-and-burn directly accrues value to the OP token. Concluding Post EIP- 4844 , both L 1 fees & sequencer costs will be trivial (of course, no issuance required for safety, unlike L 1 s), and congestion fees/MEV can be very lucrative if we attract top developers and their users to Optimism. I believe $OP can be a rare economically sustainable token in the space.
I would propose to pay the gas fees in OP. What happens with Polygon with the Matic token. Polygon …
I would propose to pay the gas fees in OP. What happens with Polygon with the Matic token. Polygon is not a true layer 2 like Optimism however it would increase the demand for OP.
Using OP to pay gas just adds an extra step in a transaction and would have to be sold to cover the…
Using OP to pay gas just adds an extra step in a transaction and would have to be sold to cover the eth gas fee on mainnet. So no making OP a gas token is backwards and pointless .
I would propose to pay the gas fees in OP. What happens with Polygon with the Matic token. Polygon …
I would propose to pay the gas fees in OP. What happens with Polygon with the Matic token. Polygon is not a true layer 2 like Optimism however it would increase the demand for OP.
Using OP to pay gas just adds an extra step in a transaction and would have to be sold to cover the…
Using OP to pay gas just adds an extra step in a transaction and would have to be sold to cover the eth gas fee on mainnet. So no making OP a gas token is backwards and pointless .
Some valuable suggestion and if you are looking for info on MEVA/PBS, MEV and EIP- 4844
MEVA:-
The…
Some valuable suggestion and if you are looking for info on MEVA/PBS, MEV and EIP- 4844
MEVA:-
The idea behind MEVA is rather simple: instead of trying to prevent front-running, auction off the rights to order transactions, and allow the winner (called the Sequencer) to front-run as much as they’d like. Users have two ways to submit transactions: pay the Sequencer a fee for inclusion in an aggregated block or submit transactions directly to the miners. Either way, the Sequencer chooses the order in which the transactions are executed.
PBS:- Works by splitting the block construction role from the block proposal role. A separate class of actors called builders build exec block bodies (essentially an ordered list of transactions that becomes the main “payload” of the block), and submit bids. The proposer’s job is only to accept the exec block body with the highest bid. Notably, the proposer (and everyone else) does not learn the contents of any exec block body until after they select the header (and hence the body) that wins the auction. This pre-confirmation privacy is needed to prevent “MEV stealing”, where sophisticated proposers detect builders’ MEV extraction strategies and copy them without compensating the builder.
EIP- 4844 aka proto-danksharding
Proto-danksharding (aka. EIP- 4844 ) is a proposal to implement most of the logic and “scaffolding” (eg. transaction formats, verification rules) that make up a full Danksharding spec, but not yet actually implementing any sharding. In a proto-danksharding implementation, all validators and users still have to directly validate the availability of the full data.
Or simply put Danksharding turns Ethereum into a unified settlement and data availability layer.
MEV 1 : Maximal extractable value (MEV) refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production in excess of the standard block reward and gas fees by including, excluding, and changing the order of transactions in a block
Some valuable suggestion and if you are looking for info on MEVA/PBS, MEV and EIP- 4844
MEVA:-
The…
Some valuable suggestion and if you are looking for info on MEVA/PBS, MEV and EIP- 4844
MEVA:-
The idea behind MEVA is rather simple: instead of trying to prevent front-running, auction off the rights to order transactions, and allow the winner (called the Sequencer) to front-run as much as they’d like. Users have two ways to submit transactions: pay the Sequencer a fee for inclusion in an aggregated block or submit transactions directly to the miners. Either way, the Sequencer chooses the order in which the transactions are executed.
PBS:- Works by splitting the block construction role from the block proposal role. A separate class of actors called builders build exec block bodies (essentially an ordered list of transactions that becomes the main “payload” of the block), and submit bids. The proposer’s job is only to accept the exec block body with the highest bid. Notably, the proposer (and everyone else) does not learn the contents of any exec block body until after they select the header (and hence the body) that wins the auction. This pre-confirmation privacy is needed to prevent “MEV stealing”, where sophisticated proposers detect builders’ MEV extraction strategies and copy them without compensating the builder.
EIP- 4844 aka proto-danksharding
Proto-danksharding (aka. EIP- 4844 ) is a proposal to implement most of the logic and “scaffolding” (eg. transaction formats, verification rules) that make up a full Danksharding spec, but not yet actually implementing any sharding. In a proto-danksharding implementation, all validators and users still have to directly validate the availability of the full data.
Or simply put Danksharding turns Ethereum into a unified settlement and data availability layer.
MEV: Maximal extractable value (MEV) refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production in excess of the standard block reward and gas fees by including, excluding, and changing the order of transactions in a block
Some valuable suggestion and if you are looking for info on MEVA/PBS, MEV and EIP- 4844 MEVA:- The…
Some valuable suggestion and if you are looking for info on MEVA/PBS, MEV and EIP- 4844 MEVA:- The idea behind MEVA is rather simple: instead of trying to prevent front-running, auction off the rights to order transactions, and allow the winner (called the Sequencer) to front-run as much as they’d like. Users have two ways to submit transactions: pay the Sequencer a fee for inclusion in an aggregated block or submit transactions directly to the miners. Either way, the Sequencer chooses the order in which the transactions are executed. PBS:- Works by splitting the block construction role from the block proposal role. A separate class of actors called builders build exec block bodies (essentially an ordered list of transactions that becomes the main “payload” of the block), and submit bids. The proposer’s job is only to accept the exec block body with the highest bid. Notably, the proposer (and everyone else) does not learn the contents of any exec block body until after they select the header (and hence the body) that wins the auction. This pre-confirmation privacy is needed to prevent “MEV stealing”, where sophisticated proposers detect builders’ MEV extraction strategies and copy them without compensating the builder. EIP- 4844 aka proto-danksharding Proto-danksharding (aka. EIP- 4844 ) is a proposal to implement most of the logic and “scaffolding” (eg. transaction formats, verification rules) that make up a full Danksharding spec, but not yet actually implementing any sharding. In a proto-danksharding implementation, all validators and users still have to directly validate the availability of the full data. Or simply put Danksharding turns Ethereum into a unified settlement and data availability layer. MEV 1 : Maximal extractable value (MEV) refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production in excess of the standard block reward and gas fees by including, excluding, and changing the order of transactions in a block
I have already replied that I do not think the use of OP for expenses is a good idea. We are after…
I have already replied that I do not think the use of OP for expenses is a good idea. We are after the masses and paying with ETH reduces friction to make the onboard process easier. Using OP to build value for token holders may be beneficial for those with a short-term perspective but at this early stage we need to optimize and future-proof the ecosystem.
I have already replied that I do not think the use of OP for expenses is a good idea. We are after…
I have already replied that I do not think the use of OP for expenses is a good idea. We are after the masses and paying with ETH reduces friction to make the onboard process easier. Using OP to build value for token holders may be beneficial for those with a short-term perspective but at this early stage we need to optimize and future-proof the ecosystem.
How to control the amount of issuance will be the key. I don’t think it will be easy.:sweat_smile:
How to control the amount of issuance will be the key. I don’t think it will be easy.:sweat_smile:
How to control the amount of issuance will be the key. I don’t think it will be easy.:sweat_smile:
How to control the amount of issuance will be the key. I don’t think it will be easy.:sweat_smile:
Non existent service is okay :white_check_mark: the only way to delegate pons or
Non existent service is okay :white_check_mark: the only way to delegate pons or
Non existent service is okay :white_check_mark: the only way to delegate pons or
Non existent service is okay :white_check_mark: the only way to delegate pons or
