PROPOSAL NAME:
ApeChain, On-chain – ApeCoin DAO Governance Revamp
TEAM DESCRIPTION:
@BoredApeG , ApeCoin DAO Special Council
@Hazel, ApeCoin DAO Special Council
@mo_ezz 14 , ApeCoin DAO Special Council
@Waabam, ApeCoin DAO Special Council
PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION:
This AIP proposes replacing AIP- 1 and AIP- 2 and guiding the ApeCoin DAO to a drastically more effective governance process by removing administrative layers and moving more decision-making on-chain.This proposal would place more autonomy and power into the hands of the ApeCoin DAO, while focusing the DAO around a new mission: growing ApeChain.
Key Points:
DAO Treasury:
On-chain DAO treasury using Governor Bravo contracts
65 / 35 split
65 % of total treasury placed on-chain for the ApeCoin DAO
35 % of total treasury provided to Ape Foundation for its Administrative Budget
Power directly in hands of ApeCoin DAO
ApeChain Protocol Upgrades:
On-chain protocol upgrades and updates using Governor Bravo contracts, governed by the ApeCoin DAO
Reducing Scope of and Sunsetting the Special Council:
Significantly reduced scope of the Special Council, limiting their role in governance to merely security and administrative matters, including oversight of the Banana Bill program.
Sunsetting the Special Council entirely once each current member’s term is over.
Replacing AIP- 1 and AIP- 2 , and adopting the ApeCoin DAO Constitution (see below in the “Benefit to ApeCoin Ecosystem” section).
MOTIVATION
Following the successful launch of ApeChain, it is imperative that the ApeCoin DAO now focus its efforts on growing the ApeChain protocol.
While the introduction of a governable protocol and chain presents an economic opportunity for the ApeCoin DAO, it also presents an opportunity to reimagine and improve ApeCoin DAO governance to effectuate on-chain actions autonomously and streamline on-chain access to the treasury.
This AIP does not propose the end-all version of ApeCoin DAO governance and could evolve over time to incorporate governance processes that better fit an ever evolving DAO, such as the potential introduction of a bicameral governance system, or the introduction of ApeCoin lock-up mechanics to increase ApeCoin DAO voting power. Governance is not perfect and is an iterative process – this AIP proposes one giant leap for Ape kind.
BENEFIT TO APECOIN ECOSYSTEM
On-Chain DAO Treasury:
a. Splitting the treasury (and locked APE streams) in a 65 / 35 split:
i. 65 % of the treasury and unlocking APE will be directed to an on-chain DAO treasury contract, which will be controlled directly by the ApeCoin DAO.
ii. 35 % of the treasury and unlocking APE will be directed to the Ape Foundation for its Administrative Budget, which will be utilized to build and maintain ApeChain, and to support the administrative needs of the ApeCoin DAO.
a. DAO-Controlled Drip Contract: In order to keep in line with transparency, decentralization and accountability to the ApeCoin DAO, the 30 % treasury split for the Administrative Budget will be held in a multi-sig, over which the ApeCoin DAO will hold an admin key and be able to “clawback” such funds and send them to the DAO treasury contract.
b. The DAO-Controlled Drip Contract will “drip” along a monthly scheduled rate of 18 months, which will be able to be claimed by the Ape Foundation.
On-Chain Protocol Upgrades and Updates:
a. The ApeCoin DAO, and the Security Council (as introduced below), will be given “chain owner” privileges over ApeChain, having the power to directly propose, vote on and implement ApeChain upgrades and updates.
Introduction of the Security Council:
a. With the mainnet launch of ApeChain, security should be the utmost priority for the ApeCoin DAO. Given that the governance process is subject to a timeline unfit for quickly addressing emergency situations, it is critical that there be a fail-safe to quickly and immediately react to potential security threats to ApeChain.
b. To address this issue, a democratically elected Security Council will be empowered to implement certain Emergency and Non-Emergency Actions, as described further in the Constitution of the ApeCoin DAO.
Reduced (and Eliminated) Role of Special Council:
a. Rather than serving as the last filter before an AIP is put up for vote by the ApeCoin DAO, the Special Council’s Administrative Review will no longer be a prerequisite for an AIP to go to vote by the ApeCoin DAO, and the Special Council will merely provide administration and oversight of AIPs until the end of each current member’s terms, after which the Special Council will fall away entirely.
b. Additionally, with the passage of AIP- 454 : “The BANANA Bill: Apes Gotta Eat”, the Special Council will temporarily serve to provide oversight over the Banana Bill program until its elimination entirely. With the passage of this AIP, AIP- 454 will be amended to remove references to the Special Council and instead replace their final oversight role with the directors and administrators of the Ape Foundation.
By adopting the below proposed Constitution, inspired directly by the ArbitrumDAO Constitution, the ApeCoin DAO will be empowered to have a stronger voice and on-chain authorities and powers to shape the future of the ApeCoin ecosystem and ApeChain.
Constitution of the ApeCoin DAO
This document lays out the Constitution of the ApeCoin DAO.
Some of the rules and procedures of this Constitution will be enforced directly by smart contracts on a blockchain, and some will not. All rules are equally binding. Actions taken under this Constitution may be on-chain or off-chain actions. On-chain actions are those that are actuated directly by the governance smart contracts of the DAO as transactions on a blockchain. Off-chain actions are those that are actuated by other means.
This Constitution also includes some “recommended guidelines” which are non-binding but strongly recommended as good governance practice.
This Constitution describes the procedures by which it may be amended and lays out the governance framework of the ApeCoin DAO and the Ape Foundation.
Definitions:
AIP: An Ape Improvement Proposal
Administrative Budget: The assets held by the Ape Foundation separate from the DAO Treasury.
ApeChain: The canonical ApeChain blockchain utilizing Arbitrum Nitro technology
DAO Treasury: All $APE tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ApeCoin DAO and/or the Security Council of the Ape Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms.
Votable Tokens: All $APE tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by the Ape Foundation, including its Administrative Budget and the DAO Treasury (including any locked APE intended for the Administrative Budget and DAO Treasury)
Section 1 : Chain “ownership”
This Constitution describes the decision-making framework for the ApeCoin DAO governance over ApeChain and the broader ApeCoin ecosystem.
ApeChain, utilizing Arbitrum technology, has one or more “chain owners” who have the power to take administrative actions that change ApeChain’s core protocol and code and/or alter any of its core parameters. The “chain owner” will also have the power to upgrade certain associated Layer 2 contracts. The “chain owner” will control affordances on the chain such as updating the contract implementation of any of ApeChain’s core protocol Transparent Upgradeable Proxy contracts, and adjusting system parameters via, e.g., setter methods in the ArbOwner precompile.
“Owner” privileges on ApeChain have been given to both the ApeCoin DAO and the Security Council of the Ape Foundation.
Section 2 : DAO Proposals and Voting Procedures
The following process governs the rules and procedures by which the ApeCoin DAO may propose, vote on and implement Ape Improvement Proposals (AIPs). Each phase may only begin once the prior phase is completed, unless otherwise stated. No AIP may be in violation of applicable laws, in particular sanctions-related regulations. Any such AIP in violation of applicable laws, including sanctions-related regulations, may be vetoed by the Security Council.
Phase 1 : Temperature Check ( 1 week): The AIP is suggested on the Discourse and discussed/debated for 1 week. The AIP should be accompanied by a Snapshot poll or other method as determined pursuant to the governance process, which can only be submitted by an address that can vote at least 500 , 000 Votable Tokens. The Snapshot poll also runs for 1 week, and is decided by a simple majority with no required participation threshold. An AIP that fails the temperature check should not be submitted for a vote.
Phase 2 : KYC and contract negotiations ( 0 - 14 days): During this phase, if applicable, the Ape Foundation will be tasked with oversight and administration of the AIP, including, but not limited to, conducting KYC and contract negotiations. Coming to contractual terms at this phase will allow for votes approved in Phase 4 to be self-executing.
Phase 3 : Formal AIP and call for voting ( 3 days): The AIP is submitted via governance contracts on ApeChain, with a user interface available on Tally, Snapshot X, or another on-chain voting platform. The AIP proposer is required to have an address that is delegated at least 1 , 000 , 000 Votable Tokens.
After 3 days, a voter distribution snapshot will be taken and the voting period will begin; this gives interested parties time to discuss the AIP and gather votes before the voter distribution snapshot is taken.
Each AIP must be labeled as Constitutional or Non-Constitutional.
A Constitutional AIP is one that:
Process: Modifies the text or procedures of this Constitution
Software update: Installs or modifies software on ApeChain
Core: Takes any action that requires “chain owner” permission on ApeChain
Recommended guideline: DAO members should vote against any AIP that is incorrectly labeled.
A Non-Constitutional AIP is one that is not considered a “Constitutional AIP” including:
Funding: Requests funds/grants or otherwise propose how to spend or allocate funds from the DAO Treasury and, so long as the Ape Foundation exists, the ability to clawback the remaining funds in the DAO-Controlled Drip Contract
Informational: Provides general guidelines or information to the community but does not otherwise propose a new feature or update
As a recommended guideline, an AIP should include:
Team Description - A brief description of the team.
Proposal Description - A summary outlining the proposal.
Benefit to ApeChain - An explanation of how the proposal benefits ApeChain.
Definitions - Definitions of any terms within the proposal that are unique to the proposal, new to the ApeCoin community, and/or industry-specific.
Steps to Implement - The steps to implement the proposal, Including the project’s start and end dates, any milestones and key performance indicators, any associated costs, personnel, and platforms needed for each step., and any requests directed to the APE Foundation for each step.
Reporting Expectations - A schedule for sharing progress reports to the community.
Overall Cost - The total cost to implement the AIP.
As a recommended guideline, the AIP author can add additional fields to any template if necessary to fully communicate the intentions, specifics and implications of the AIP.
As a recommended guideline, resubmitted AIPs should also include:
A link to the original AIP;
Reasons such original AIP was not approved;
Changes that have been made and why it should now be approved; and
Any additional fields to any template if necessary to fully communicate the changes made and the intentions, specifics and implications of such resubmitted AIP.
Phase 4 : DAO votes on AIP, on ApeChain ( 14 - 16 days): During this Phase 4 , the ApeCoin DAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
More Votable Tokens have casted votes “in favor” than have casted votes “against” (“Threshold 1 ”); and
In the case of a:
Constitutional AIP, at least 5 % of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either “in favor” or “abstain”; or
Non-Constitutional AIP, at least 3 % of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either “in favor” or “abstain” (collectively, “Threshold 2 ”).
The voting period ends 14 days after the start of voting. However, if Threshold 2 is reached within the last 2 days of the 14 -day voting period, the voting period will be extended to end 2 days after Threshold 2 was reached.
If the AIP fails to pass, the process ends after this Phase 4 .
If the AIP passes, then:
If it is a Constitutional AIP, Phases 5 through 8 below are carried out.
If it is a Non-Constitutional AIP, Phase 5 is carried out, and then Phases 6 and 7 are bypassed, after which the AIP enters Phase 8 immediately.
Phase 5 : L 3 Waiting Period ( 3 days): After an AIP has passed Phase 4 , a 3 day waiting period occurs. This gives users who object to the AIP time to initiate withdrawal of their funds or take other action on L 3 .
Phase 6 : Initiate and Finalize an L 3 -to-L 2 Message (at least 1 challenge period of the rollup protocol): After the 3 day waiting period in Phase 5 has passed, an L 3 -to-L 2 message is sent indicating that the AIP was passed. When this message is finalized on L 2 , anyone can redeem it to complete this step and initiate the next step. This step ensures that the completion of the L 3 waiting period will be recognized on L 2 after any withdrawals initiated during or soon after the voting period have been recognized on L 2 .
Phase 7 : L 2 Waiting Period ( 3 days): Following the completion of Phase 6 , there will be an additional 3 day waiting period. This ensures that users who initiated withdrawals or other L 3 -to-L 2 messages have time to execute them on L 2 before the AIP takes effect.
Phase 8 : Implementation: The AIP is fully executed and implemented. This may happen on L 2 or via a transaction sent from L 2 to ApeChain.
This AIP process as specified will typically require 37 days from the beginning of the temperature check in Phase 1 until an AIP is finally executed in Phase 7 for a Constitutional AIP, or 27 days for a Non-Constitutional AIP. An AIP may optionally specify further delay before its implementation.
Section 3 : The Security Council
The Security Council is a committee of 9 members who are signers of a multi-sig wallet, which has powers to perform certain Emergency Actions and Non-Emergency Actions, as delegated to it by the ApeCoin DAO and the Ape Foundation, and is responsible for upholding this ApeCoin DAO Constitution. Through the submission, approval and implementation of a Constitutional AIP, the ApeCoin DAO is able to modify the Security Council’s powers or to eliminate the Security Council entirely.
Equivalent “copies” of the Security Council multi-sig contracts exist, one on Arbitrum One and another on ApeChain.
Emergency Actions:
The Security Council has the power to execute any software upgrade or perform other required actions with no delay in order to respond to a security emergency, should one arise (such actions, “Emergency Actions”). Performing any Emergency Action requires a 7 -of- 9 approval from the Security Council. The Security Council must not use its power to perform Emergency Actions except in a true security emergency, such as a critical vulnerability that could significantly compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of ApeChain.
After performing any Emergency Action, the Security Council must issue a full transparency report (at an appropriate time after the security emergency has passed) to explain what was done and why such Emergency Action was justified.
The ApeCoin DAO is able to curtail or eliminate the Security Council’s power to perform Emergency Actions via approval and implementation of a Constitutional AIP.
Non-Emergency Actions:
The Security Council may also approve and implement routine software upgrades, routine maintenance and other parameter adjustments in a non-emergency setting, as well as veto AIPs which violate applicable law or otherwise put the integrity, security and safety of the ApeCoin DAO, ApeChain or the Ape Foundation at risk. These actions (“Non-Emergency Actions”) require a 5 -of- 9 approval in order to take effect. Any software related Non-Emergency Action, after approval by the Security Council, will bypass Phases 1 to 4 of the AIP process and instead directly go through Phases 5 to 8 of the AIP process, to provide a delay before any Non-Emergency Action is deployed. The Security Council may optionally specify additional delays before deployment. Other Non-Emergency Actions may be utilized during Phase 5 to ensure the security, integrity and safety of the ApeCoin DAO, ApeChain or the Ape Foundation.
The ApeCoin DAO is able to curtail or eliminate the Security Council’s power to perform Non-Emergency Actions via approval and implementation of a Constitutional AIP.
Section 4 : Security Council Elections
The Security Council has 9 members, who are divided into two Cohorts of 4 and 5 members.
The members of the initial Security Council are:
Matthew Katz (Caldera)
Bill Lingafelter (LayerZero)
[Placeholder] (Offchain Labs)
Quit (Yuga Labs)
Feld (Boring Security)
Roman (Ape Express)
Gerry (Ape Solar, Former APE Foundation)
BoredApeG (APE Foundation)
CaptainTrippy (Banana Bill)
The initial Security Council Cohorts were determined by randomly splitting the 9 members into two 6 -member cohorts – 4 members in the ‘First Cohort’ and 5 members in the ‘Second Cohort’.
The first Security Council election is scheduled to begin on the 15 th May 2025 or the earliest possible date. The election can only begin upon the availability of an on-chain election process that is approved and installed by the ApeCoin DAO. This first election replaces the ‘First Cohort’. The next election replaces the ‘Second Cohort’ and so forth.
The date chosen for the first election will form the basis for all future elections. Every election should begin 6 months after the previous election has started and it will replace its respective cohort of 4 or 5 members.
All Security Council members are expected to serve their term until the election is complete and the new Security Council members are installed.
The following timeline governs an election that starts at time T:
Contender submission (T until T+ 7 days): Any DAO member may declare their candidacy for the Security Council, provided that a current Security Council member in one cohort may not be a candidate for a seat in the other cohort.
Nominee selection (T+ 7 until T+ 14 days): Each DAO member or delegate may vote for their declared contender. Each token may be cast for one contender. To the extent that there are more than six contenders, each eligible contender must be supported by pledged votes representing at least 0 . 2 % of all Votable Tokens.
Compliance process (T+ 14 until T+ 28 days): All candidates will cooperate with the Ape Foundation and complete the compliance process. The Ape Foundation is responsible for removing any candidates that fail the compliance process. In the event that fewer than 4 or 5 (as applicable] candidates are supported by pledged votes representing at least 0 . 2 % of all Votable Tokens, the current Security Council members whose seats are up for election may become candidates (as randomly selected out of their Cohort) until there are [ 4 or 5 (as applicable)] candidates.
Member election (T+ 28 until T+ 49 days): Each DAO member or delegate may vote for any declared candidate. Each token may be cast for one candidate. Votes cast before T+ 35 days will have 100 % weight. Votes cast between T+ 35 days and T+ 49 days will have weight based on the time of casting, decreasing linearly with time, with 100 % weight at T+ 35 days, decreasing linearly to 0 % weight at T+ 49 days.
At T+ 49 days: The process for replacing the cohort of Security Council members with the [ 4 or 5 (as applicable)] candidates who received the most votes will be activated. The installation process must be executed via the on-chain governance smart contracts and it may take several days until the new Security Council members are installed.
The Ape Foundation is allocated 14 days for the Compliance process and it should be executed between the Nominee selection and Member election. The Ape Foundation has flexibility to update its compliance policy for every new election. This is required to allow the Ape Foundation to comply with Cayman Island laws. Furthermore, the Ape Foundation maintains the right to issue new procedures and guidelines for off-chain components of the Security Council election. All efforts should be made by the Ape Foundation to ensure an orderly, fair, and transparent election.
As a matter of best practice for maintaining an independent Security Council, no single organization should be overly represented in the Security Council. In particular, there should not be more than 3 candidates associated with a single entity or group of entities being elected to the Security Council, thereby ensuring that there will be no single entity or group of entities able to control or even veto a Security Council vote.
Furthermore, no candidate with conflicts of interest that would prevent them from acting in the best interests of the ApeCoin DAO, ApeChain and/or the Ape Foundation should be elected to the Security Council. Potential conflicts of interest could be, but are not limited to, affiliations with direct ApeChain competitors, proven histories of exploiting projects and others.
The DAO may approve and implement a Constitutional AIP to change the rules governing future Security Council elections, but the AIP process may not be used to intervene in an ongoing election.
Security Council members may only be removed prior to the end of their terms under two conditions:
At least 5 % of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either “in favor” of removal or “abstain”, and at least 5 / 6 ( 83 . 33 %) of all casted votes are “in favor” of removal; or
At least 7 of the Security Council members vote in favor of removal.
The seats of Security Council members who have been removed prior to the end of their respective terms shall remain unfilled until the next election that such seats are up for appointment, unless otherwise replaced prior to such next election by a vote of at least 7 of the Security Council members, in which case such seat shall be up for appointment at the next such election. The Security Council may not re-appoint a removed member and they can only be re-elected via the election voting system.
Section 5 : Data Availability Committee
Transactions occurring on the ApeChain are settled on Arbitrum One, with the underlying transaction data batches posted and stored by the members of the Data Availability Committee on a Data Availability Server (and not on Arbitrum One).
The members of the Data Availability Committee of ApeChain are the following:
Yuga Labs
Offchain Labs
Animoca
Caldera
Magic Eden
LayerZero Labs
Horizen Labs
Data Availability Committee members can be appointed and removed at any time pursuant to a Constitutional AIP approved by the ApeCoin DAO. In the event that a Data Availability Committee member is removed (and not otherwise replaced) pursuant to a Constitutional AIP approved by the ApeCoin DAO, or in the event that a Data Availability Committee member resigns without a replacement, the Security Council may execute an Emergency Action ( 7 -of- 9 approval required) to appoint a replacement for such removed or resigned Data Availability Committee member.
Section 6 : Community Values
As the guiding values of the ApeCoin DAO and the Ape Foundation, ApeChain, technology, and community should be:
Boldness: We don’t shy away from the weird, the hard, or the new.
Equality: One APE equals one APE.
Transparency: Processes and decisions are shared openly with the community.
Collective Responsibility: We leave everything better than we found it.
Persistence: Success is an ouroboros, not a straight line.
DEFINITIONS:
The definitions in the Constitution are referenced and incorporated herein.
PLATFORMS & TECHNOLOGIES:
Snapshot
Tally, Snapshot X, or other on-chain voting platform
Arbitrum Nitro technology stack
STEPS TO IMPLEMENT:
Implementing ApeCoin DAO governor contract and adding it as an “owner” of ApeChain contracts
Moving 65 % of treasury held by Ape Foundation to on-chain treasury
Deprecating AIP- 1 and AIP- 2 via adoption of the ApeCoin DAO Constitution
OVERALL COST
Total Cost: $ 0 .
This AIP represents a cost savings of $ 400 , 000
Each Security Council member shall receive $ 25 , 000 per year.
There are 9 Security Council members proposed. The total cost of which would be $ 225 , 000 .
However, Special Council members currently receive $ 125 , 000 per year. There are 5 of them, representing a total cost of $ 625 , 000 . This role is being eliminated, which offsets the $ 225 , 000 for the Security Council and saves the DAO an additional $ 400 , 000 .
